The mass psychology of disasters and emergency evacuations: Implications for the emergency services Presentation for the BPS annual conference, Dublin 2/4/2008 Chris Cocking, John Drury & Steve Reicher: London Metropolitan University, University of Sussex & University of St. Andrews Funded by ESRC (Ref no: RES-000-23-0446) c.cocking@londonmet.ac.uk

Outline of Presentation Background and aims of research Data from interview studies Implications for emergency planners 1) Mention that theory isn’t covered in detail, but I can elaborate on any points during q.s

Development of crowd behaviour theories over time 19th Century- The irrationalist approach (Le Bon, 1895) 1960s - 70s more rationalist approaches Emergent Norm Theory (Turner R., 1974) From 1980s to present- The Social Identity Model (Reicher, 2001) we’re not trying to say that all crowds are inherently good- they can do ‘bad’ things, e.g. lynch mobs etc but this is usually reflected by the ID of crowd as a whole, and done in a social context- doesn’t mean that crowds are pathological per se, but they behave in ways or norms that are consistent with their ID crowds can also be dangerous, but this is more down to physical pressures of large numbers of people who may not be aware of or able to act against dangers to them. When there are injuries or deaths in crowds it is more likely to be due to poor management than any ‘panic’ or irrational behaviour by crowd members e.g. Hillsborough and possibly also the recent Baghdad stampede

The ‘Panic’ model Part of the irrationalist tradition in crowd psychology a) Threat causes emotion to overwhelm reason b) Collective identity breaks down c) Selfish behaviours - pushing, trampling d) Contagion - these behaviours spread to crowd as a whole This has implications for emergency planning Critique panic model here; While there may be fear- people don’t lose all reason Far from breaking down, collective ID can grow in the face of threat selfish behaviour is rare and only usually happens when chance to co-operate has gone Rather than spreading individual distress/ selfishness is usually tempered by others

Iroquois fire 1903 ‘most of the dead were trampled or smothered, though many jumped or fell to the floor of the foyer. In places on the stairways, particularly where a turn caused a jam, bodies were piled 7 or 8 feet deep. Fireman and Police confronted a sickening task in disentangling them.[ ] The heel prints on the dead faces mutely testified to the cruel fact that human animals stricken by terror are as mad and ruthless as stampeding cattle’ (in Latané & Darley 1970 p. 53)

Under-reaction rather than over-reaction ‘When people die in fires, it’s not because of panic, it’s more likely to be the lack of panic’ p.73 Neil Townsend, Divisional Officer, London Fire Rescue Service (in Kemp, 2003) Supported by evidence of behaviour in fires that people are often unwilling to deviate from familiar activity, leading them to continue with existing behaviours or evacuate along known routes, even in the face of danger (Canter, 1990)

Social attachment model (Mawson, 2005) In emergencies, people seek out attachment figures: social norms rarely break down But, such ties can have fatal consequences- people escape (or die) in groups Improves on panic model, and supported by evidence from behaviour during fatal fires (Cornwell, 2001) but problems remain: a) Implies that panic in a crowd of strangers is more likely b) Why do strangers co-operate in emergencies? There is evidence for social attachment model e.g. Cornwell (2001) and Feinberg and Johnson’s studies of BHSC fire

The self-categorisation approach (Turner et al., 1987) Disasters create a common identity or sense of ‘we-ness’- Clarke (2002) This can result in orderly, altruistic behaviour as people escape common threat Increased threat can enhance common identity Mention that results from interview study supports our findings, but was from a wide range of emergencies, with different levels of real and perceived threat, so could be a lot of variability in data. Therefore we decided to look at 1 event- 7/7

Interview studies 21 survivors of 11 different emergencies Open–ended interviews Tape-recorded and transcribed Analysed using Content Analysis and IPA

Results from interviews Common identity quickly emerges Co-operative rather than selfish behaviour predominates If selfish behaviour happens, it is usually isolated and rarely spreads

Hillsborough survivor I don’t think people did lose control of their emotions [ ] they were clearly in control of their own emotions and their own physical insecurity, I mean [] you’re being crushed, you’re beginning to fear for your own personal safety, and yet they were [ ] controlling or tempering their emotions to help try and remedy the situation and help others who were clearly struggling

Research into 7/7/2005 Data from Press reports and web-logs Web based questionnaire study for eye-witnesses of bombings Interviews with 12 survivors 1) Mention that we were at Royal Soc showing VR prog. when bombs went off 2) Click onto web-link and briefly mention each section of q.s from survivors 3) Interview studies not done yet, cos we’ve only just got ethical clearance

Response to 7/7 Individual fear and distress, but no mass panic Evacuations characterised by orderly, calm behaviour Many reports of altruism, co-operation, and collective spirit of Londoners/ UK as a whole emphasise point that we’re not trying to say that individuals don’t become scared, distressed, or even panic, but that this v rarely becomes mass panic

Panic? There was no real panic - just an overwhelming sense to get out of the station quickly Almost straight away our packed carriage started to fill with smoke, and people panicked immediately. Thankfully there were some level-headed people on the carriage who managed to calm everyone down Some accounts of panic, but mixed and doesn't generalise Liverpool St King’s Cross

Unity One of the things which struck me about this experience is that one minute you are standing around strangers and the next minute they become the closest and most important people in your life. That feeling was quite extraordinary Both quotes from eye-witnesses of King’s Cross tube bomb Normal social inhibitions (not talking on the tube) break down, and a physical crowd becomes a psychological crowd

The myth of Panic Many accounts of ‘panic’ in emergencies But what actually is panic, and what is logical flight behaviour? Need to look at what people actually do, and decide if it is indeed ‘panic’ More than just semantics, as it could affect emergency evacuation planning 1) Press coverage and eye-witness reports full of mentions of panic 2) We’re not saying that individuals don’t have panic attacks, or that people can fear for their lives, just that the idea of mass, selfish panic is usually a myth 3) Panic model needs improving as it assumes that all crowds will panic in an evac. And doesn’t consider that there will be co-operation, orderly behaviour etc Explain that you’re gonna show 9/11 photo next to look at panic behaviour

Implications for emergency services More info rather than less can improve evacuation time and efficiency (Proulx & Sime, 1991) Source of info and whether it’s trusted matters Appeal to crowd’s co-operative nature - don’t assume they will behave selfishly or panic Practice evacuations- don’t assume it won’t happen to you! The panic model suggests that people shouldn’t be informed (communication de-emphasized since people are irrational) and that the emphasis should instead be on the width of exits.

Crowds can be part of the solution rather than part of the problem People may delay own escape to help others Appeal to the crowd’s common humanity- ‘We’re in this together’ Don’t address commuters as atomised ‘customers’ Influential leader figures may emerge from crowd, who can help rescue effort Common fate can emerge fairly quickly and encourage co-ordinated co-operative behaviour. PA messages and public information advertising on the tubes/buses could take this into account Social Psychology research over the years has shown how having groups in conflict can cause strong group in-group identity, but runs risk of generating more conflict- e.g. racism

Summary Crowds in emergencies behave in ways that are consistent with their identities and governed by the social norms of the situation The ‘panic model’ is largely a myth http://www.sussex.ac.uk/affiliates/panic/applications.html

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