“Rethinking Local Democracy” Oliver, Ch. 6 “Rethinking Local Democracy”

Oliver, Ch. 6 We can predict who’s going to win a national election, but apparently not who’s going to win most small cities’ elections for mayor and council Presidential elections are large in size, scope, and bias, so they are predictable because they’re defined by long-standing political cleavages Most smaller communities are homogeneous and have few permanent political divisions

Oliver, Ch. 6 Most of what we think about local democracy is informed by studies of big cities, which don’t apply to smaller communities In managerial democracies, most incumbents are unopposed or re-elected No organized, motivated opposition except in response to specific issues But it’s difficult to predict when an issue will show up and motivate people to vote against the incumbent Rapid demographic change may provoke political change

Oliver, Ch. 6 Local democracy is “about large portions of the electorate attaining relatively easy consensus over the general management of a limited number of government services and a greater stratification of different groups across municipal boundaries. Local democracy in suburban America is less about intramunicipal political struggle than it is about intermunicipal exclusion.” (P. 186)

On Local Political Power Urban politics study is usually defined by coalitions or by local civic participation Elite theory (small number of business interests dominate local politics) Pluralist theory (power is exercised by different groups on different issues) Peterson (1981): Cities tend to focus on developmental policies to promote future economic growth

On Local Political Power Logan and Molotch (1987), Mollenkopf (1983): Local politics is defined by relationships to land Property owners, renters, small landowners are each trying to maximize their use of their assets Urban politics is dominated by commercial real estate interests (bankers, real estate developers, insurance brokers) Zoning, infrastructure improvements, tax policies improve the value of commercial property

On Local Political Power Elkin and Stone (1989): Successful policymaking requires certain groups to coalesce into a governing regime – requires social networks (linkages among groups) Local politics tends to be centered on the narrow and specific concerns of a small group with very concentrated interests Oliver asks whether these theories can be generalized to all American localities

On Local Political Power In many cities, it’s impossible to identify a dominant economic elite Many municipalities have few commercial properties and opportunities for development Larger size, relatively greater scope, higher bias differentiate larger cities from smaller (most local politics theory centers on larger cities, while Oliver looks at relatively smaller communities)

On Local Political Power Large cities require mass political participation and mobilization of interest groups and their supporters In most cities, politics revolves around managerial concerns and service delivery Most citizens accept an equilibrium point with a certain level of taxes and a certain level of service delivery Only when this equilibrium is disrupted will there be political controversy

Managerial and Participatory Democracies Is local politics the best venue for citizens to empower themselves in a democratic way? Transformative capacities of civic involvement Local politics as protection against large, impersonal politics of mass democracy at state or national level, and national economics Does civic participation foster people’s stronger identification with their communities, or does stronger identification with communities foster civic participation?

Managerial and Participatory Democracies Fragmented and decentralized democratic system in the US imposes very high civic demands People are asked to participate in governments on many different levels Civic participation is often higher in smaller democracies because of higher degree of interpersonal contact among members and candidates Democracies that are limited in scope provide fewer opportunities for active participation

Managerial and Participatory Democracies Political machines have been effective at empowering marginalized groups because they sustain their participation through material compensation (jobs, etc.), while social service organizations are disadvantaged because they can’t provide these incentives Cities generally have little redistributive power; most urban social programs are federally financed

Rethinking Local Democracy How should we think about issues of “community power” in contemporary America? Political implications of population size 20% of Americans live in rural areas 25% live in cities over 100,000 people The majority live in small or medium-size towns, villages, and suburbs What has been the power effect of people leaving the cities for smaller areas?

Rethinking Local Democracy Citizens in smaller areas are more likely to vote They are more likely to be familiar with local officials Political nature of suburbanization Limited scope of managerial democracy means that it can’t be an effective mechanism for redressing social inequities If you believe that government is inherently corrupt and inefficient, you may favor smaller-scope government

Rethinking Local Democracy Most small democracies have little potential for bias (as Oliver defines it) Most municipal services are not differentially distributed (no inequities in service provision) Argument that suburbanization was produced by a desire of wealthier groups to preserve their homogeneity and prerogatives Suburbs in the same metro area may vary in their resources and therefore in their service provision