By group 3(not the ones who made the paper :D)

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Presentation transcript:

By group 3(not the ones who made the paper :D) SybilDefender Defend against Sybil Attacks in Large Social Networks Wei Wei, Fengyuan Xu, Chiu C. Tan , Qun Li By group 3(not the ones who made the paper :D)

What is Sybil? Large Scale creation of pseudonymous identities Attacks/fools a reputation based peer to peer network system Can be cheap depending on security measures

What has been done before? Sybil Guard - SybilGuard:Defending against sybil attacks via social networks H. YU, M. Kaminsky, P. B. Gibbons, And A.Flaxman SybilLimit - Sybillimit: A near optimal social network defence against sybil attacks H. YU, P. B. Gibbons, M. Kaminsky, and F. Xiao Both identify one sybil node at a time |/n Log n and log n respectively. 2006 and 2008, CMU boys ,

SybilDefender Identification Detection Limiting the number of attacks Base idea: Sybil node must go through a small cut in the social graph to reach the honest region. 2012

Why Sybil Defender Efficient and Scalable to large scale networks Outperforms SybilLimit by one or two orders of magnitude in accuracy and runtime Sybil nodes are expected to stay within their circles during random walks

Assumptions The honest region is fast mixing One known honest node The administrator knows the social network topology The size of the sybil region is not comparable to the size of the honest region The number of attack edges is limited

Pre processing algorithm 1: J = {h} 2: for i = 1 to f do 3: Perform a random walk with length ls = log n originating from h 4: J = J ∪ {the ending node of the random walk} 5: end for 6: l = lmin 7: while l <= lmax do 8: for i = J.first() to J.last() do 9: Perform R random walks with length l originating from node i 10: Get ni as the number of nodes with frequency no smaller than t 11: end for 12: output {l,mean({ni : i ∈ J}), stdDeviation({ni : i ∈ J})} 13: l = l + 100 14: end while

Sybil Identification Algorithm SybilIdentification(G, u, tuples from Alg.1) 1: l = l0 2: while l <= lmax do 3: Perform R random walks with length l originating from u 4: m = the number of nodes whose frequency is no smaller than t 5: Let the tuple corresponding to length l in the outputs of Algorithm 1 be (l,mean, stdDeviation) 6: if (mean − m > stdDeviation ∗ a) then 7: output u is sybil 8: end the algorithm 9: end if 10: l = l ∗ 2 11: end while 12: output u is honest

Analysis of Algorithm FAST MIXING: Mixing time: Informally its is the length of a random walk to reach a constant distance from a stationary distribution of that walk when starting from any node in the graph. A random walk of length θ(log n) is long enough such that with probability atleast 1-1/n, the last traversed node is drawn from node stationary distribution graph. This is fast mixing

Walk Length Estimation 1: l = l0/2 2: deadWalkRatio = 0 3: while deadWalkRatio < b do 4: l = l ∗ 2 5: deadWalkNum = 0 6: for i = 1 to R do 7: Perform a partial random walk originating from s with length l 8: if (the partial random walk is dead before it reaches l hops) then 9: deadWalkNum++ 10: end if 11: end for 12: deadWalkRatio = deadWalkNum / R 13: end while 14: output l

Conductance Let d be the sum of the degrees of all the nodes in set S, and a be the number of edges with one endpoint in S and one endpoint in S’. Then the conductance of S is a/d. The conductance of a set S measures the quality of the cut between S and S’: the smaller the conductance is, the smaller the cut is.

The reason why we need Algorithm 4 is that not all the nodes traversed by the partial random random walks in Algorithm 3 are sybil nodes. Some walks cross the small cut and enter the honest region we need an algorithm to select the sybil nodes from the set of traversed nodes.

Random walk length

This algorithm only relies on performing R partial random walks originating from a sybil node, which makes it very efficient and scalable to large-sized social networks.

Limiting number of attack edges It has been shown that not all the relationships in online social networks are trusted . Two nodes share an edge in an activity network if and only if they have interacted directly through the communication mechanisms or applications provided by the corresponding social network. If the sybil defense schemes leverage the topologies of the activity networks, the number of attack edges an adversary can create can be further limited.

ANALYSIS : FALSE POSITIVES

Kthxbye Urgh.. Fine, Questions?