NDIA / USMC War Game 2006 “Adapting to Change” Cell 1 Outbrief

Distributed Operations Strong Points The USMC is formalizing and professionalizing long-standing an operational concept Have been doing this historically on an ad hoc basis without a formal structure The formal operational concept of DO will now drive the development of the sustainment elements DO will better match the MAGTF to the current operational environment (GWOT and irregular foe) Weak Points Doubtful that large-scale DO operations can be supported with logistics or fires from existing sea-base capabilities Further experimentation for the DO concept should be conducted in urban areas coalition operations Current acquisition, training and manpower systems do not support the DO concept Current DO concept increases the individual’s Marine’s load

Distributed Operations (Cont) Capability Shortfalls Training for Battalion and Company commanders on how best to employ their DO platoon capabilities Ground maneuver organic support capability Small unit maneuver over larger distances and difficult terrain Ability of organic fires to support the AO Lack of organic ISR capability Availability of vertical lift Assumes air supremacy for the AO Assumes a persistent sea-base Weather will have exponential effect on sustainment capabilities

Distributed Operations (Cont) Recommendations De-couple sustainment from human factors Unmanned Para-foils Determine the detailed requirements for aerial sustainment vehicle Perform a dedicated look at COTS for DO operational constraints Perform dedicated look-back at historically similar operations Incorporate simulation-based training as a way to scale DO training across the USMC Identify training requirements for Bn and Co commanders who will be employing DO capabilities

D. O. Sustainment Strong Points Weak Points Understand the severity of the problem Standardized kitting is a good approach Solving DO sustainment will help drive the LOG Modernization initiative in the USMC Lots of available technologies “out there” to address re-supply The USMC can communicate Commander’s Intent very well internally Logistics footprint is small Weak Points Continuity of personnel working the problem Transition from S&T to acquisition to the Fleet Lack of awareness of other technologies / solutions being looked at in other services and other agencies (e.g., NASA) Lack of integration between the various agencies that are looking at solutions (DARPA, ONR) The USMC is not good at communicating the Commander’s Intent to Industry The distribution system is not adequate to support operations Frequency of re-supply operations will compromise OPSEC OPSEC not addressed adequately in terms of the debris, packaging, etc

D. O. Sustainment (Cont) Capability Shortfalls Battlefield distribution system Bulk fluids Water availability Production Distribution Communication Lack of BLOS communication capabilities for the CSS element who must support the DO platoon Decision support to understand and de-conflict multiple re-supply requests from multiple DO platoons or squads Sense and Respond logistics Automatically notified of supply status Ability to anticipate re-supply needs Timely Casualty evacuation “Platinum 15 min” or the “Golden Hour”

D. O. Sustainment (Cont) Recommendations Identify what part of the T/E can be considered disposable Need to determine how to get the best use of the multiple air platforms that will be supporting DO ops Improve knowledge management on sustainment issues and solutions across DOD USMC needs to talk to the S&T community and other services on a regular basis about how they may be able to support DO ops DOD-wide websites that publicize the work that is being done across the DOD to address sustainment issues Design a customizable CSS package

Logistics Modernization Strong Points Organizing and training the way we fight Matches up logistics elements directly with their supported unit counterparts Recognition from the USMC that S&R Logistics is the way forward Weak Points Organization / CONOPS not ready to maximize S&R Logistics capability Cultural gap Resourcing not available to effect S&R Logistics The initiative has re-organized the old FSSG structure into the new MLG structure, but it did not do this reorganization from a bottom-up, “what capability is needed” perspective May inherit the same constraints and problems of the previous structure The logistics elements may be Force Protection burdens for their supported units

Logistics Modernization(Cont) Capability Shortfalls The logistics modernization effort has not been resourced MLG skeleton has to get filled MLG TO and T/E has to get filled Connectivity between mission area responsibilities We are not prepared to use S&RL capabilities

Logistics Modernization(Cont) Recommendations Integrate all the various log systems currently in use Understand the capabilities available and be able to use them (e.g., be able to identify a given system and what it can do for you – AFATDS, C2PC, etc) Properly resource enabling technologies such as S&RL Analyze and determine the impact of S&RL on doctrine, organization, training and CONOPS Rapidly evaluate the point solutions being developed at the small-unit levels and determine which of those should be adopted for larger use across the USMC