University of Waikato Philosophy Seminar Series A solution to a puzzle about the badness of death: Satisfying the strict existence requirement University of Waikato Philosophy Seminar Series Dan Weijers September 1, 2016

The rollercoaster ride to come The puzzle & the “existence requirement” An extant solution: the “deprivation approach” The “strict existence requirement” and valid prudential relations Shape of a life Shape of a life can satisfy the strict existence requirement & can explain why death can be good

The famous puzzle about the badness of death “So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more.” (Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus) Death isn’t bad for the living or the dead, so why should we fear it?

The famous puzzle about the badness of death Can be put into the following form It is often rational to fear death because death is often bad (for the person that dies) Death is not a possible condition for people that are alive A person must exist for good or bad things to happen to her When a person is dead they do not exist At least one of these claims must be false The badness of death can’t occur when you are alive (because there is no death), and it can’t occur when you're dead (because there is no you)

The “existence requirement” “A person can be the subject of some misfortune only if he exists at the time the misfortune occurs” (McMahan: The Evil of Death, Ethics, 1988, 99: 32-61) (3) A person must exist for good or bad things to happen to her A posthumous attack The posthumous attack includes digging up your body, insulting you, punching it in the face, urinating on your gravestone, and then smashing it to pieces – how is it possible that this harms you?

The “deprivation approach” The person struck down by death misses out on (probably) valuable years of life, which is bad Fred Feldman, “Some Puzzels about the Evil of Death,” The Philosophical Review, 100 (1991), pp. 205-227. Jeff McMahan, "The Evil of Death"; Thomas Nagel, "Death," Nofts 4 (1970), pp. 73-80, revised and reprinted in Moral Problems, ed. James Rachels (New York, N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1975), pp. 401-409; Roy Perrett, Death and Immortality (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 1987); L. S. Sumner, "A Matter of Life and Death," Nofts 10 (1976), pp. 145-171; Douglas Walton, On Defining Death (Montreal, Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1979); and Bernard Williams, "The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality," in B. Williams, Problems of the Self (New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1973).

Deprivation approach in detail Deprivation approach states that the hypothetical state of affairs (S’) in which a person lives on is more valuable than the state of affairs (S) in which she dies This requires a comparison between S and S’ Intuitively: S’ has positive prudential value S has less prudential value than S’ (probably zero)

Deprivation approach vs. existence requirement DA requires a comparison between S and S’ S’ has a period of positive prudential value S has a period of neutral prudential value (neither good nor bad for the person) Existence requirement: A person must exist for good or bad things to happen to her On this version of DA, death has neutral prudential value, so it isn’t good or bad for the person, so nonexistence is not an issue On this version of the DA, death (S) is bad because it deprives the person of a more valuable life (S’)

The strict existence requirement Inspired by Harry Silverstein “The Evil of Death,” The Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980), pp. 401-424 A person must exist for good or bad or neutral things to happen to her I.e.: the state of non-existence cannot be good or bad or neutral for a person A posthumous (neutral) approach The posthumous approach includes saying you were OK, looking at your gravestone without being rude or reverent, and resting their hand on it– how is it possible that this affects you?

Deprivation approach vs. strict existence requirement DA requires a comparison between S and S’ S’ has a period of positive prudential value S has a period of neutral prudential value Strict existence requirement (SER): A person must exist for good or bad or neutral things to happen to her This version of the DA violates the SER (This version of the DA claims: death has neutral prudential value for the person) All versions of DA seem to include a comparison with S*, so they all violate SER (All versions of DA stipulate a non-null value of death for the person) *They need something to compare S’ with

Can non-existent things have neutral prudential value? But, is the strict existence requirement true? SER: A person must exist for good or bad or neutral things to happen to her Counter e.g.: compare having a pie to not having one A pie has positive prudential value to me Not-a-pie has neutral value to me Therefore, having a pie is better for me So, the pies have it: the non-existence of the pie on one side of the comparison does not invalidate the comparison. Non-existent things can have neutral (or some non-null) prudential value

But wait… The pie e.g. is not analogous In the pie e.g., there was still an existing person in both sides of the comparison, only one aspect of the whole state of affairs was missing (the pie) In the main example, the person, the location of the prudential value, does not exist So, free pies, no pies, poisoned pies—none of it matters if you don’t exist; there is nowhere for the prudential value to go

Valid and invalid prudential relations Pie Person Positive value P No pie Person Neutral value S’ Happy years Person Positive value S No happy years No person Neutral value

Taking the strict existence requirement seriously If it is rational to fear death, then death must be worse than living on If S (death) is worse than S’ (more happy years), then it is possible to favourably compare S’ to S in a valid comparison To validly compare S’ to S, the period of death in S cannot be part of the comparison (derived from the SER) Is there a way to compare S’ with S without using a non-null value for the state of death?

Shape of a life J. David Velleman (2000). Well-being and time. In J. D. Velleman (Ed.), The possibility of practical reason (pp. 56–84). Oxford: Clarendon Press. For a recent review, see Glasgow, Joshua. "The shape of a life and the value of loss and gain.” Philosophical studies 162, no. 3 (2013): 665- 682.

Relative value of moments view The prudential value of a life supervenes on the prudential value of the moments in that life Changes in the prudential value of a life only come about with the addition of new moments The prudential value of a moment is comprised of an intrinsic component and a relative component The value of the intrinsic component comes from the inherent value of the good for a person and is not affected by future events The value of the relative component come from the position of that moment in the overall shape of the life and can be affected by future events

Relative value of moments & the shape of life The effects of overall shape on past moments

Death and the shape of life The prudential value of a moment is not settled until death

A valid comparison If S (death) is worse than S’ (more happy years), then it is possible to favourably compare S’ to S in a valid comparison To validly compare S’ to S, the period of death in S cannot be part of the comparison (derived from the SER)

Also explains why death can be good When a person’s future years will go downhill, death means more relative value of the time while alive

The puzzle revisited It is often rational to fear death because death is often bad (for the person that dies) Death is not a possible condition for people that are alive A person must exist for good or bad (or neutral) things to happen to her When a person is dead they do not exist I said: “It seems that at least one of these claims must be false” The solution is that all these claims can be true The hidden issue is that for death to be bad, it must make the period of nonexistence bad for the person while they no longer exist Death can make a person’s life worse by decreasing the relative value of some moments that occurred while the person was alive (because the timing of death effects the shape of the life, which affects the relative value of the moments that make up the life)

A bonus solution However the value of moments in a life are calculated, compare the whole life S’ with the whole life S (without counting the periods in which the people are dead – they both have a period of death)