20 Years of DOT&E What Have We Learned & How Can We Make It Better

Reasons for Testing To deliver relevant increments of combat and support capability – a continuing challenge Systems that perform as advertised in the relevant environment – in hand Systems of systems that provide both the platform capability and the systems that enable the potential capabilities – the new challenge Secondary at best: Testing to specifications Specifications not likely to be explicitly relevant to the future environment Transformational capabilities more often a surprise than a plan

The Legacy Requirements unrelated to combat reality Rudimentary testing in success oriented scenarios Combat discovery – some Vietnam examples Fuzes – delivering explosives to the enemy Air-air Missiles – frustration10 Caseless ammunition – realistic environment impact

The First Evolution Combat oriented requirements Commitment to performance testing Spiral development Well defined performance and test requirements for each increment But some excessive rigidity F-15A top speed AMRAAM compatibility The delivered product Systems that served the combat forces by performing as expected but . . .

The First Evolution (cont) Binary approach – one or zero Exquisite performance definition Omnipotent foresight assumed Runaway cost and schedule Acquisition reform assumptions doomed to failure Abandoned spiral development Total Package Procurement - abandoned government authority and accountability

The Next Evolution Capability-based needs Tolerant of threat variations Essential in the more complex and unpredictable environment Return to spiral development and spiral testing Spiral requirements and spiral test goals – not rubber requirements and goals Fielding useful increments on the path to the capability-based goal System-of-systems needs Optimize the system not the elements (platforms) ISR, C2, platforms, weapons, etc. Vastly more complex testing requirements

Capability-Based System of System Goals – Some Examples Precision Strike – strike any target anywhere in the world in any weather at any hour of the day in the face of any defenses to achieve the desired effect and only the desired effect Ballistic Missile Defense – defend the United States, our deployed forces and our allies by defeating ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight The path to the capability-based goal is spiral development to field a system of systems with useful increments of capability

FCS – A System of Systems in a System of Systems System Capability Core FCS Systems Multiple Unit of Action Complementary Systems UE and Above Complementary UA SoS UA Complementary FCS Core Systems INTERDEPENDENCE Complementary programs at the various levels provide an extensive range of capabilities that will be needed to succeed with the FCS concept of operations. Some of these programs may be more vital to the ultimate success of the FCS concept than are some of the hardware programs within FCS proper. Critical communications systems such as JTRS, WIN-T, and DCGS-A are foundations for FCS operational concepts, but are not managed within the FCS program. In addition, as will be discussed in the third section, the network-centric networks and services that are the responsibility of DISA, JFCOM, and STRATCOM will be essential for FCS. Many Unit of Employment & Above Systems