Modeling Botnet Propagation Using Time Zones

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Presentation transcript:

Modeling Botnet Propagation Using Time Zones Published by: Cliff Zou, David Dagon, Wenke Lee Presentation by: Corey Kuwanoe

Outline Background Data Collection Model Experiments Practical Usage Time Zone Diurnal Experiments Practical Usage

Background Botnets

Background (cont.) Heterogeneous Victims obtained through Viruses Worms Trojans

Data Collection Command and Control Servers Honeypots DNS manipulation

Time Zone Modeling Diurnal Shaping Function (t) Fraction of vulnerable computers online at time t Periodical function 24 hr period

Diurnal Model for Single Time Zone I(t) Number of infected hosts S(t) Number of vulnerable hosts N(t) Number of hosts that were originally vulnerable

Diurnal Model for Single Time Zone (cont.) I’(t) (t)I(t) # of online infected hosts S’(t) (t)S(t) # of online vulnerable hosts N’(t) (t)N(t) # of online hosts from N(t)

Diurnal Model for Single Time Zone (cont.) Worm propagation dynamics Worm propagation diurnal model  = proportion of scan rate / ip space  = removal parameter

Diurnal Model for Single Time Zone (cont.)

Diurnal Model for Multiple Time Zones Groups 24 groups for 24 hours

Experiments Botnet Grouping 350k members Random scanning Single Domain North America Asia Europe

Experiments (cont.)

Experiments (cont.)

Experiments (cont.)

Experiments (cont.) Automatically derive (t) Break down botnet traffic by region Process regional data Split dataset into segments Normalize data in segments Average data in segments Remove monitor noise Normalize result Place (t) in database

Experiments (cont.)

Practical Uses Time for releasing a worm Predict future propagation

Practical Uses (cont.)

Practical Uses (cont.)

Practical Uses (cont.)

Practical Uses (cont.) Successfully predicts dynamics of botnets Not infected populations

Contributions Simple and intuitive model Accurate predictions of future propagation

Weaknesses Only accurate for scanning worms Email worms/viruses pose a problem to model Predictions are only good for a limited amount of time Does not address multiple infection vectors