Culture and Institutions Center for the Study of Cultural and Ecological Foundations of the Mind Hokkaido University A 21st Century Center of Excellence Culture and Institutions Toshio Yamagishi Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University Center for Cultural and Ecological Foundations of the Mind

This talk is about an “institutional approach” to culture. Culture-specific behavior and cognition  Institution-specific adaptive strategy “Strategy” in the biological sense—no conscious decision making is needed.

Institutional Approach to Culture How to explain variations in human behavior and psychology across “cultures”? Cultural psychology A group of people share a meaning system. The meaning system is self-perpetuating. Institutional analysis A group of people collectively create an incentive system that makes them behave in a particular way. The incentive system is self-sustaining.

Strategy People anticipate, explicitly or implicitly, what others would do in response to their own behavior, and adjust their behavior accordingly. Cultural beliefs are used in this prediction.  Expectations of others’ responses to one’s own behavior is the key to understanding institutional behavior in this sense. Explaining how expectations are generated by cultural beliefs, and how they generate/ maintain institutions, is an important goal of this analysis.

Example 1: Choice of a pen (Kim & Markus, 1999) Self-sustaining behavior in this sense (via stably maintained incentives) is different from perpetuating behavior as conceived by some cultural psychologists. Example 1: Choice of a pen (Kim & Markus, 1999) Euro-Americans prefer uniqueness (i.e., minority-color pen); East Asians prefer conformity (i.e., majority-color pen). Culture (shared value and meaning system) instills its members preferences (for conformity, or for uniqueness). Preferences perpetuate through culture.

Replication by Yamagishi & Suzuki (in press) Study 1 Japanese participants behaved as if they were Americans when they chose a pen in the absence of an experimenter. Experimenter’s Presence (among Japanese Ss) Subject’s nationality

Replication by Yamagishi & Suzuki (in press) Study 2, a vignette study There is practically no difference between Americans and Japanese in their personal evaluation of those who choose a majority-color pen or a minority-color pen. However, they, particularly Japanese, think that other people would evaluate the majority-chooser more favorably than the minority-chooser. Beliefs are different, not preferences Evaluation of the majority chooser and the minority chooser? (9-point scale) Expected valuation by others

Replication by Yamagishi & Suzuki (in press) Study 2, a vignette study Without order information When S is the first person to take a pen among 5 people When S is the last person to take a pen among 5 people Cultural difference in the choice of a pen derives from the “default” choice situation assumed by the Japanese and American participants. Different strategies are applied under the assumed situation.

Example 2: Self-enhancement versus self-effacement Self-enhancement (“Lake Wobegon effect”): Americans see themselves better than others. E.g., 60% of 829,000 seniors in high school surveyed by College Board consider their ability to “get along well with others” in the top 10%. Some cultural psychologists claim that East Asians (in particular Japanese) do not show this self-enhancing tendency. 29% 69% Self-effacement is a “default” strategy for self-presentation; default in the sense that it is used when no clear definition of the situation is provided 71% 31% When Japanese Ss were paid for making correct judgments, self-enhancement rather than self-effacement occurred!

Strategies Not Preferences!

Research Agenda, 1: Human Cooperation Why do humans cooperate? Adaptationist approach: “Why” means “what advantage” What advantage do individuals derive from cooperative behavior? What institution (incentive structure) makes cooperation a profitable endeavor? Traditional Answers ◆Kin altruism ◆Reciprocal altruism Direct reciprocity ◆Generalized reciprocity, Indirect reciprocity  Institutional arrangement that makes altruistic behavior profitable (not in the conscious sense, though) Many of my studies concern generalized reciprocity in a broad sense of the term, and the role of shared beliefs and expectations of others’ responses in it.

Research Agenda, 1: Human Cooperation Generalized Reciprocity Q: What makes altruistic behavior profitable? A: When there is a system of generalized exchange—a system of behavior that brings fitness-advantage to the altruist. This is a tautology. Q: How? Reputation  Having a good reputation is the condition for receiving benefits from those who share the same strategy. Behavioral linkage  cooperator/punisher vs. non-cooperator/non-punisher Error management  bias to reduce critical errors These are fundamentals of human behavior that make us successful social animals.

Research Agenda, 2: Human Groups Groups are where humans obtain resources. They are venues for direct and generalized exchanges. Direct exchange: Continued direct exchanges between particular partners generate strong psychological bonding. It is in our own self-interest to make those who help us prosper. Implications   Categorical groups are irrelevant to direct exchanges. categorical groups (e.g., minimal groups) have no effect on direct exchanges  Since most direct exchanges take place within groups, interaction groups may affect direct exchanges

Research Agenda, 2: Human Groups Generalized exchange usually take place in a group. Implications   Individuals accumulate reputation that “entitles” them as beneficiary of the generalized exchange taking place within a group.  Humans give favor to in-group members because the “altruistic” behavior is an “investment” for future return, not through direct exchanges, but through generalized reputations. In-group cooperation Institutions of generalized exchanges are the sources of in-group favoring behavior.

Research Agenda, 2: Human Groups In-group favoring behavior Institutions of generalized exchanges are the sources of in-group favoring behavior at least with categorical groups. This institutional approach to in-group favoring behavior produces predictions that contradict with those produced by social identity theory. According to SIT, humans treat in-group members favorably because they feel they are a part of the group (they and their group are one and the same). Self-love extends to group members; preference for in-group members We predict that people give preferential treatment to (categorical) group members only when they expect a similar preferential treatment from in-group members (or unless the lack of favorable treatment from in-group members is salient)  Preference versus (default) strategy Self/Group Love or Mutual Help

Karp, Jin, Shinotsuka & Yamagishi, 1993 A replication of the original Tajfel et al.’s minimal group experiment. Money allocated to an ingroup and an outgroup member (out of 500 yen) by subjects who were also a target by other subjects' allocations (Target Condition) and those who were paid a fixed amount (Not a Target Condition)

Karp, Jin, Shinotsuka & Yamagishi, 1993 Ss gave more money to an ingroup member than to an outgroup member in the condition that replicated the original experiment by Tajfel et al. (1971). Ss disregarded the in/out distinction when the money they would receive did not depend on other participants’ decisions. Ss gave more money to an in-group member only when they could expect that they would receive more from in-group members.

The same result was replicated by Jin, Yamagishi & Kiyonari (1996)

Furthermore, only those who expected their favors to the in-group member to be reciprocated practiced in-group favoritism.

Jin & Yamagishi, 1997 Cooperation in one-shot PD (Cooperation rate: proportion of the endowment of 100 yen given to the PD partner) Ingroup favoritism typically observed in earlier experiments was replicated; Ss were more cooperative when they played with an ingroup member than with an outgroup member.

In-group favoring behavior did not exist when the in-group partner did not know that the subject was in the same group.

The same pattern was obtained by Kiyonari (2000) more clearly. Whether the partner was an ingroup or an outgroup member did not matter unless the partner knew that and thus the player could expect similar in-group favoring behavior from other in-group members.

Replication of Jin & Yamagishi (1997) with Japanese and New Zealanders (Mifune & Yamagishi, in preparation)

With nationality groups (Japanese versus Australian) Yamagishi, Makimura, Foddy, Matsuda, Kiyonari & Platow, 2005 With nationality groups (Japanese versus Australian) Japanese Data Ingroup=Japanese Outgroup=Australian Australian Data Ingroup=Australian Outgroup=Japanese

Dictator Game Dana, Cain & Dawes, 2006 Altruistic behavior in Dictator Games also reflects dictator’s desire to “look” fair to the recipient, even in completely anonymously played games. reputation mentality rather than intrinsic motivation for fairness Dictators were given an option to choose between playing the game (allocation of $10) or exiting. When the exit option was chosen, the dictator received $9 and the recipient received $0, while the recipient did not know that they were playing a game. Even some of the dictators who gave $5 to the recipient in the absence of the exit option chose to exit given the option. expectations of fair behavior from the recipient is a source of dictators’ in-group favoring behavior in the Dictator game.

Dictator game with Minimal Groups: Study 1 (Suzuki, Konno & Yamagishi, 2006): Recipients have expectations that in-group Dictator would be more altruistic to them than are out-group Dictator. Study 2 (Yamagishi & Mifune, in preparation): Dictators are in fact more altruistic to in-group Recipient than to out-group Recipient when and only when they are expected to behave that way. Two Between-Ss Conditions Common Knowledge Condition Unilateral Knowledge Condition – Only one of the two players knew whether or not the two players are in the same group.

Study 1: Choice of the Dictator Game (cf, Foddy, Yamagishi & Platow, under review) Japanese Ss (n=81, 52 males and 29 females) Ss are divided into two groups, Klee and Kandinski groups. “Player 1” allocates 1,700 yen (about $15) between him/herself and a partner anyway he/she prefers. (matched with a Dictator in another experiment) Player 2 (Ss in this study) is given a choice between two Dictators—an in-group Dictator or an out-group Dictator.

Study 1: Choice of the Dictator Game Common Knowledge condition: Both the Dictator and the Recipient knew their memberships Recipients could expect in-group favoring allocation from an in-group Dictator. Unilateral Knowledge condition: Only the recipient (i.e., the S) knew the two players’ groups. The Dictator made the decision without knowing who the recipient was. Recipients could not expect an in-group favoring allocation from an in-group Dictator. If Recipients choose an in-group Dictator, it has to be based on the belief that their own group members are morally superior to members of the other group SIT prediction.

Proportion of the Recipient who chose an in-group Dictator

Similar result was found with colleges as groups, not minimal groups. Foddy, Yamagishi & Yamagishi (under review) With real groups – La Trobe University (in-group) and Melbourne University (out-group)

Study 2: Dictator’s behavior toward in-group and out-group Recipient Ss (n=155, 84 males and 71 females) played the role of a Dictator. The Dictator divided 900 yen between him/herself and a Recipient. One-shot game. Two between-subjects factors Group membership of the Recipient: In-group recipient versus out-group recipient Knowledge manipulation: Common knowledge versus Unilateral knowledge (only Dictator knew whether or not the two players were in the same group)

Proportion of the dictators who gave 450 yen or more to the Recipient Which group the recipient belonged to mattered only in the common knowledge condition.

Punishment of free-riders (Shinada, Ohmura & Yamagishi, 2003) Proportion of money spent on punishing a defector Cooperators punished ingroup defectors more than the outgroup defectors. Non-cooperators punished outgroup defectors more than ingroup defectors. Spite toward out-group members (or “punishment” of out-group norm violators) was observed only among defectors (norm violators).  Spiteful behavior is controlled within groups, but unregulated between groups.  Groups are where norm-violation is controlled.

Punishment of free-riders (Shinada, under review) In a follow-up study (Shinada, under review), the cost-effectiveness of punishment was reduced from 3:1 to 1:1. Then, out-group punishment by defectors disappeared. Out-group punishment by defectors observed with the 3:1 punishment is a spite behavior. Why? a) We have “target-specific preference” for spite, or b) spite is a default strategy (for some) in the domain of status-hierarchy (and mating), which is superseded by another (conditionally cooperative) strategy in the domain of social exchange that takes place in a group. Spiteful behavior is controlled within groups, but unregulated between groups.  Groups are where norm-violation is controlled.

Summary of the Findings People expect a favorable treatment from their fellow group members, expect that they are expected to give favorable treatment to other group members, and accordingly, they treat their group members favorably. Further, they provide sanctions within the group against free-riders. Their expectations and beliefs that other group members treat them favorably are supported by their own behavior; they receive more benefits from their own group members than from out-group members. This constitute an institution of generalized exchanges. The group as a venue of generalized exchanges.

A “joint-cultural” experiment Trust game experiment with Japanese, Chinese, and Taiwanese Four participants from each country. “Cultural” differences in trust, reciprocity, and punishment Group-based trust Group-based reciprocity Group-based punishment See Chisato Takahashi’s poster presentation

A “joint-cultural” experiment Trust game experiment with Japanese, Chinese, and Taiwanese Four participants from each country. Japan-China Experiment Japan-Taiwan Experiment Taiwan-China Experiment

A “joint-cultural” experiment Trust game experiment with Japanese, Chinese, and Taiwanese Four participants from each country. Six rounds of one shot games without feedback, three times with a members of the same nationality and three times with a member of another nationality

A “joint-cultural” experiment In-group Trust Participants trusted other participants of the same nationality more often than of another nationality. Japanese were generally lower in trust than either Chinese or Taiwanese. This difference is more pronounced in the Japanese trust in the participants of the same nationality.

A “joint-cultural” experiment In-group reciprocation Proportion of reciprocators In-group favoritism among Chinese and Taiwanese, but not among Japanese Large “cultural” difference in reciprocation to trust by participants of the same nationality—Japanese are low in in-group reciprocation.

A “joint-cultural” experiment Out-group punishment Japanese punished in-group norm violators more often than out-group norm violators, whereas both Chinese and Taiwanese punished out-group norm violators more often than in-group norm violators. With regard to nationality, in-group favoritism is not universal, while in-group trust may be (mutual knowledge)

Collectivist Culture and Institution  I call the type of incentive structures that produce pro-social behavior among group members a “collectivist institution.” People benefit from behaving in a pro-social manner under the collectivist institution because their reputations as decent members of the group entitles them to similar treatments from other members. This institution provides a basis for “collectivist culture.” A particular set of beliefs and cognitive styles that helps them to behave in a way to make them qualify as decent members of a group is at the core of the collectivist culture.

Collectivist Culture and Institution Individualist Institutions An alternative institution to promote cooperation is an individualist institution. It is basically a legalistic system; control by universalistic rules enforced by social instruments rather than by reputation and exclusion from the system of exchanges (cf., Greif, 1994). We are currently conducting a series of experiments to demonstrate that manipulating institutions in a laboratory makes people switch their “default” in their decision rules.

Experimental Design Two 50-person groups were run. Each 50-person group consisted of 9 or 10-person groups. Each 9 or 10-person group represents a community. The 50-person group represents a total society. Only in the collectivism condition, community members have a chance to spread reputations about their own community members.           Collectivism Condition Individualism Condition

Findings Finging 1: Compared to Ss in the individualism condition, Ss in the collectivism condition became more interdependent and less independent in their responses to the self-response questionnaire scales (Takata, 1999).

Findings Finding 2: Ss in the individualism condition preferred the unique pen more than Ss in the collectivism condition. （Kim & Markus, 1999）

Findings Finding 3: Framed-Line Test (Kitayama et al., 2003) Ss in the collectivism condition are more accurate in relative judgment than Ss in the individualism condition.

Junior College and Higher Findings Broken down by Education Level Junior College and Higher High School or Less ） IND (n=10) COL (n=24) IND (n=32) COL (n=21) 20 16 誤 誤 差 差 （ 16 （ ミ ミ 12 リ リ ） ） 12 8 8 4 4 Absolute Relative Absolute Relative

Another Pre-test Same design. N=15 in the reputation condition N=17 in the no-reputation condition Three 5-6 person groups in each condition. Dependent Measure: Emotional Judgment Task (Masuda, Leu, Mesquita, & Veerdonk (under review)

Task

Task

Task

Task

Task

(Masuda, Leu, Ellsworth, & Veerdonk, in prep.) Judgment of Happiness USA JPN Target: Happy Others: Happy Target: Happy Others: Not

No Reputation Reputation Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent

General Conclusions  An institution is a self-sustaining system of beliefs and behavior.  It is self-sustaining because individuals’ behavior collectively produces the incentives that makes such behavior adaptive.  People apply a default strategy (often supported by a cognitive style) given cues for a particular institution.

Thank you 

Nisbett (2003) China Greece Ecology Fertile planes, low mountains, navigable rivers Mountainous coast Economy, Social structure Agriculture  irrigation system  need for cooperation Hunting, herding, fishing, trade  little need for cooperation Social practice Paying attention to peers and authorities; attention to social world Little need to attend to social constraints Folk metaphysics Driving force in the social world Driving force in the object Tacit epistemology, cognitive processes Attention to the whole; relations and context Attention to traits of the focal object “So long as economic forces operate to maintain different social structures, different social practices and child training will result in people focusing on different things in the environment.” (p.38)

For cultural psychologists, the major source of “cultural differences” in behavior is in cognition (how people see the world. However, they tend to argue that cognition and motivation (or preference) influence each other. “Preferences, beliefs and constraints” approach shared by economists places more emphasis on preference.  The major source of cultural differences is in the preference (cf, Henrich’s BBS article, Henrich et al., 2005).  Preference for fairness, for example, varies across cultures.

Cultural psychology: cognition PBC: preference I argue that the major source of “cultural differences” in behavior is in the default strategy (decision rule) (in a braod sense, including some of cognitions like allocation of attention) that are adaptive (and implicitly or explicitly believed to be adaptive) under the dominant institutional arrangement in each culture. Cognition is a part of a strategy Cultural differences are in the institution--i.e., incentive structure consisting of responses of people who share a system of beliefs.

I share the CR (Choice of Rules) approach with people such as Gigerenzer, Messick, and some of the evolutionary psychologists who emphasize the domain-specificity of decision mechanisms. Additionally, I emphasize the “institutional” aspect. I borrow the concept of an institution from Aoki (2000) who defines an institution as a self-sustaining system of shared beliefs. Shared beliefs: beliefs are common knowledge. People anticipate others’ responses to their own based on the shared beliefs, and act accordingly (i.e., behave in the way to solicit the most desirable responses from others). The behavior (and the beliefs behind the behavior) becomes self-sustaining when it is the response most desired by others in a group.

A set of beliefs are shared by members of a group (or a society), and the fact it is shared is common knowledge. Members collectively define the game—i.e., they individually define the game and understand that other members define the game similarly. The behave in a way that solicit desired responses from others, in an anticipation that others will do the same. They follow the incentives consisting of other members’ responses. Members provide incentives for others by the very behavior following incentives provided by other members This recursive state of incentive provision is what is meant by “self-sustaining.” In each institution (a set of beliefs, behaviors, and incentives), a set of “default” strategies is adopted by its members. “Cultural” differences are the product of such default strategies, rather than culture-specific preferences.

Self-sustaining beliefs Participants expectation that they would be treated favorably by in-group members and unfavorably by out-group members is in fact confirmed by their own responses to the expectations. For example, participants in Jin & Yamagishi (1997) expected more money (76 yen) from in-group members than from outgroup members (45 yen). These expectations were supported by the in-group members’ and out-group members’ behaviors. The former gave (61 yen) and the latter (42 yen). Jin & Yamagishi, 1997 Responses to Expectations Expectations

“Cultural” differences in the punishment pattern (experiment just completed) Participants (Japanese, Taiwanese, Chinese) played trust games with other participants of their own nationality or another nationality. After the trust game, they were provided with an opportunity to punish any player. Proportion of the trust choice with in-group and out-group members

“Cultural” differences in the punishment pattern (experiment just completed) Participants (Japanese, Taiwanese, Chinese) played trust games with other participants of their own nationality or another nationality. After the trust game, they were provided with an opportunity to punish any player. Proportion of trust honored

“Cultural” differences in the punishment pattern (experiment just completed) Participants (Japanese, Taiwanese, Chinese) played trust games with other participants of their own nationality or another nationality. After the trust game, they were provided with an opportunity to punish any player. Proportion of in-group and out-group “defectors” participants punished