Critical Infrastructure: the chemical industry Martijn Ligthart Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment Directorate of External Safety

Introduction Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment VROM (3500 p) Directorate External Safety (30 p) linked to Directorate General Environment (400p) Directorate General Spatial Planning (300p) 8-12-2018

Global characteristics: the chemical industry Global characteristics of the industry in the NL 16.3 million inhabitants 40.000 square km 500.000 companies 300 Seveso II sites 160 Seveso reporting sites 1000 storages of chemicals and pesticides 2200 LPG filling stations 8-12-2018

Authorities and parties involved Authorities and parties involved with the risks of the chemical industry Central Government: Policy and Legislation Implementation EU directives Provinces (12) and Municipalities (450): Environmental Management Act & Land-use Act Regional Fire brigades: Disaster and Major accidents Act; prevention, emergency planning, rescue operations Inspectorates of the ministries 8-12-2018

Project ‘Vitaal’: Critical Infrastructure, the chemical industry April 2002: Start project Critical (Vital) Infrastructure Main objectives: Development of a coherent set of measures to protect the critical infrastructure (incl. ICT) Establishment of these measures within the normal operations of the companies and the authorities At first the chemical industry was not selected as a critical sector, but it was added to the project in 2004 Reason: potentially vulnerable sector in terms of victims and societal disruption 8-12-2018

VROM Coördination: the chemical industry Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment: (VROM) responsible for: Drinking water sector Nuclear sector (Chemical) industry (dangerous substances) 3 different directorates involved; coordination by the VROM-Inspectorate 8-12-2018

Objectives September 2004: start project: “Dangerous substances and deliberate violation” Objectives: Inventory of possible effects of terrorist attacks (chemical sites and storages dangerous substances) Inventory of the vulnerability of the Dutch industry for such attacks (stationary installations and transport of dangerous goods) Ranking of vulnerabilities and if necessary development of extra measures for companies and on policy level 8-12-2018

Project outline The project is executed by VROM in cooperation with Other ministries security/intelligence experts of the AIVD, the provinces The Association of Dutch Enterprises (VNO/NCW) A (limited) international benchmark is also part of the project In September 2005 a report shall be sent to Parliament 8-12-2018

Results so far Results of the project so far are: (mid-February 2005) A ranking of the most important establishments based on potential casualties has been drawn up About 40 establishments are on the list The maximum possible effects of potential deliberate violations during the transport of dangerous goods by rail, road and ship have been calculated Vulnerability analysis chemical sector and transport dangerous goods has been performed with assistance of security experts 8-12-2018

‘Intended disturbance’: what to analyse? Vulnerability analysis: terrorist, employee, criminal, hooligan, anti-globalists and other activists, hacker type of weapon (explosive device, bomb car, RPG, ICT...) type of industry or other vulnerable objects (many people in the neighbourhood of dangerous substances) possibilities for protection (resistance) 8-12-2018

A possible approach Quick scan should give information on: Amount of casualties (deaths and wounded) Infrastructural damage Evacuations/displaced persons Contamination Economic impact Potential for multiple events Recovery time From geographical considerations and event dynamics one should focus on: Prevention/deterrence/protection Emergency Assesment/Diagnosis Emergency Management/Response Incident/Hazard Mitigation Public protection Victim care Investigation/Apprehension Recovery/Remediation 8-12-2018

USA examples of ‘Quick wins’ 2002 Chicago: fencing supposed to keep intruders away from Otto & Sons' Chicago warehouse and its lethal anhydrous ammonia. 2002 Houston Clorox factory: after 1 mln USD security investment still easy access to clorine gas pens due to gates left open. 2002 Westmoreland County Sony Technology Center: an unsecured gate gives access to 200.000 ponds of chlorine gas. 8-12-2018

Activities in the next three months Quick-scan inventory and evaluation of existing security measures for (most of) the 40 selected establishments Quick scan of situations of hazardous substances with large public events International benchmark of security measures in the chemical industry Discussion with companies and transport organisations about estimated effect levels and existing/necessary security levels Report to the Parliament 8-12-2018

Benchmark The Netherlands has little to no experience with terrorisme in relation to the chemical industry. Therefore we need to learn from other countries and their experiences: UK USA France Germany 8-12-2018

Questions responsability for the protection of critical infrastructure: state, district, (province), municipalities the balance between private companies – authorities security measures in chemical sites: quality control role of authorities, inspectorates 8-12-2018

Dilemma: need to know or need to share? What about the confidential information versus the “community right to know” 8-12-2018

Information on risks Information to the public about risks in the Netherlands Seveso directive (Major Accidents Hazards Decree, 1999) Two initiatives after fireworks explosion in Enschedé Ministry of Interior: risk mapping Ministry of HSP& the Environment: risk register 8-12-2018

8-12-2018

Discussion Safety reports do not give all the information we need ( information from emergency planning is also necessary) Experience from USA (ACC/SOCMA-methodology and of Port Authorities (IMO) can be used for assessment of security UK experience and approach can be useful for NL EC has taken initiatives (CCA and CIP committees) 8-12-2018

More Information For further information: VROM: Cees.Braams@minvrom.nl VROM: Hage.Postema@minvrom.nl BZK: Berend.Temme@minbzk.nl 8-12-2018