Do incentives build robustness in BitTorrent?

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
P2P Streaming Protocol Pro- incentive Parameters draft-zeng-ppsp-protocol-pro-incentive-para-01 IETF79 Meeting Wenjun (Kevin) Zeng & Yingjie Gu Huawei.
Advertisements

Alex Sherman, Jason Nieh, Cliff Stein Columbia University.
Peter R. Pietzuch Peer-to-Peer Computing – or how to make your BitTorrent downloads go faster... Peter Pietzuch Large-Scale Distributed.
Unstructured P2P Networks Achieving Robustness and Scalability in Data Dissemination Scenarios Michael Mirold Seminar on Advanced Topics in Distributed.
Rarest First and Choke Algorithms Are Enough
Rarest First and Choke Algorithms are Enough Arnaud LEGOUT INRIA, Sophia Antipolis France G. Urvoy-Keller and P. Michiardi Institut Eurecom France.
The BitTorrent Protocol
The BitTorrent Protocol. What is BitTorrent?  Efficient content distribution system using file swarming. Does not perform all the functions of a typical.
Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent Author: Bram Cohen Presenter: Brian Liao.
Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent- Bram Cohen Presented by Venkatesh Samprati.
The BitTorrent protocol A peer-to-peer file sharing protocol.
Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent Bram Cohen.
Bit Torrent (Nick Feamster) February 25, BitTorrent Steps for publishing – Peer creates.torrent file and uploads to a web server: contains metadata.
Presented by: Su Yingbin. Outline Introduction SocialSwam Design Notations Algorithms Evaluation Conclusion.
Agenda Introduction BT + Multimedia Experimental Conclusion 2.
Presentation by Manasee Conjeepuram Krishnamoorthy.
Cameron Dale and Jiangchuan LiuA Measurement Study of Piece Population in BitTorrent Introduction BitTorrent Experiment Results Simulation Discussion A.
ETH Zurich – Distributed Computing Group Raphael Eidenbenz, INFOCOM ETH Zurich – Distributed Computing Group Raphael Eidenbenz, Thomas Locher, Roger.
1 Communication Networks Kolja Eger, Prof. Dr. U. Killat 1 From Packet-level to Flow-level Simulations of P2P Networks Kolja Eger, Ulrich Killat Hamburg.
P2P I NCENTIVES Dror Marcus. Yoni DenyConfess HadasHadas Deny Redo the testYoni is free Hadas is expelled from school Confess Yoni is expelled from school.
Seed Scheduling for Peer-to-Peer Networks Flavio Esposito Ibrahim Matta Pietro Michiardi Nobuyuki Mitsutake Damiano Carra.
BitTorrent Join the swarm! BY: Joe Petruska. What is BitTorrent? a peer-to-peer file sharing protocol used for distributing large amounts of data.
Clustering and Sharing Incentives in BitTorrent Systems Arnaud Legout 1, Nikitas Liogkas 2, Eddie Kohler 2, Lixia Zhang 2 1 INRIA, Projet Planète, Sophia.
Exploiting BitTorrent For Fun (But Not Profit) Nikitas Liogkas, Robert Nelson, Eddie Kohler, Lixia Zhang University of California, Los Angeles.
Free-riding in BitTorrent Networks with the Large View Exploit Michael Sirivianos, Jong Han Park, Rex Chen and Xiaowei Yang University of California, Irvine.
CompSci 356: Computer Network Architectures Lecture 21: Content Distribution Chapter 9.4 Xiaowei Yang
CMPT 401 Summer 2007 Dr. Alexandra Fedorova Lecture XV: Real P2P Systems.
Game Theory Presented by Hakim Weatherspoon. Game Theory Main Question: Can we cheat (and get away with it)? BitTorrent –P2P file distribution tool designed.
Game Theory Presented by Hakim Weatherspoon. Game Theory BitTorrent Do Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent? BAR Gossip.
Alex Sherman Jason Nieh Cliff Stein.  Lack of fairness in bandwidth allocation in P2P systems:  Users are not incentivized to contributed bandwidth.
Network Coding for Large Scale Content Distribution Christos Gkantsidis Georgia Institute of Technology Pablo Rodriguez Microsoft Research IEEE INFOCOM.
Peer-Assisted Content Distribution Networks: Techniques and Challenges Pei Cao Stanford University.
Modeling and analysis of BitTorrent-like P2P network Fan Bin Oct,1 st,2004.
Do Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent? Piatek, Isdal, Anderson, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataramani Piatek, Isdal, Anderson, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataramani.
1 Incentives Build Robustness in BitTorrent? Analysis on Bit Torrent Client performance By Jimmy Wong.
A P2P file distribution system ——BitTorrent Fan Bin Sep,25,2004.
P4P: Proactive Provider Assistance for P2P Haiyong Xie (Yale) *This is a joint work with Arvind Krishnamurthy (UWashington) and Richard.
BitTorrent Background. Common Scenario Millions want to download the same popular huge files (for free) –ISO’s –Media (the real example!) Client-server.
Bit Torrent (Nick Feamster) February 25, BitTorrent Steps for publishing – Peer creates.torrent file and uploads to a web server: contains metadata.
University of Bologna, Italy How to cheat BitTorrent and why nobody does Simon Patarin and David Hales University of Bologna ECCS 2006,
BitTorrent Internet Technologies and Applications.
1 BitTorrent System Efrat Oune Bar-Ilan What is BitTorrent? BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer file distribution system (built for intensive daily use.
Yitzchak Rosenthal P2P Mechanism Design: Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Systems Paper By: Moshe Babaioff, John Chuang and Michal Feldman.
BitTorrent Dr. Yingwu Zhu. Bittorrent A popular P2P application for file exchange!
A P2P file distribution system ——BitTorrent Pegasus Team CMPE 208.
1 BitHoc: BitTorrent for wireless ad hoc networks Jointly with: Chadi Barakat Jayeoung Choi Anwar Al Hamra Thierry Turletti EPI PLANETE 28/02/2008 MAESTRO/PLANETE.
Do incentives build robustness in BitTorrent? Michael Piatek, Tomas Isdal, Thomas Anderson, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Arun Venkataramani.
Do incentives build robustness in BitTorrent? Michael Piatek, Tomas Isdal, Thomas Anderson, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Arun Venkataramani Szabolcs Nagy, ELTE.
Bit Torrent A good or a bad?. Common methods of transferring files in the internet: Client-Server Model Peer-to-Peer Network.
MULTI-TORRENT: A PERFORMANCE STUDY Yan Yang, Alix L.H. Chow, Leana Golubchik Internet Multimedia Lab University of Southern California.
A Novel approach to Bind-over Sybil nodes in a swarm Zhang Bhanu Kaushik Deep Kamal Singh Xiang Cui.
Tribler Download Core Improvement IN3700 Bachelor Thesis Presentation by Rick van Hattem Raynor Vliegendhart Committee Dr. Ir. J.A. Pouwelse.
B IT T ORRENT T ECHNOLOGY Anthony Pervetich. H ISTORY Bram Cohen Designed the BitTorrent protocol in April 2001 Released July 2, 2001 Concept Late 90’s.
Impact of Incentives in BitTorrent By Jenny Liu and Seth Cooper.
Bit Torrent Nirav A. Vasa. Topics What is BitTorrent? Related Terms How BitTorrent works Steps involved in the working Advantages and Disadvantages.
Peer to Peer Networking. Network Models => Mainframe Ex: Terminal User needs direct connection to mainframe Secure Account driven  administrator controlled.
Performance of P2P implementations
Lecture XV: Real P2P Systems
FairTorrent: BrinGing Fairness to Peer-to-Peer Systems
Introduction to BitTorrent
Designing a new BitTorrent Client
Economics and Computation Week 7: The economics of P2P file sharing
Managing Inter-domain Traffic in the Presence of BitTorrent File-Sharing Srinivasan Seetharaman and Mostafa Ammar School of Computer Science Objective:
Small Is Not Always Beautiful
Do incentives build robustness in BitTorrent?
Simplified Explanation of “Do incentives build robustness in BitTorrent?” By James Hoover.
The BitTorrent Protocol
Fluid Modeling Abstracting a discrete-valued system (e.g., packets, customers, users) into a continuous-valued model Writing equations to model system.
Challenges with developing a Commercial P2P System
Pure P2P architecture no always-on server
Presentation transcript:

Do incentives build robustness in BitTorrent? Michael Piatek, Tomas Isdal, Thomas Anderson, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Arun Venkataramani Offense by Patrick Wong, Xian Yi Teng Do incentives build robustness in BitTorrent?

Contribution? The paper seeks to show ‘incentives don’t build robustness in BitTorrent’ I have verified this years ago by setting my upload rate to 0 and still getting the whole file, then disconnecting immediately

Contribution? The paper seeks to show ‘a strategic peer can raise download speeds while still contributing the same’ Already proven by BitThief (‘Free Riding in BiTorrent is Cheap’, Locher et al., HotNets, 2006) – high download rates without uploading any data

Contribution? BitTyrant as example to show that incentives don’t build robustness Not a threat – if trackers don’t like it, they ban it

Strategic? Benefit of optimistic unchoking: Might discover faster peers at all points in time BitTyrant abolishes optimistic unchoking => does it catch peers that start out slow but become fast later? What is BitTyrant’s performance, long-term?

Strategic? BitTyrant designed not to upload too much if you cannot download so much in return Instead, look for people with higher upload rates instead so you can do a better deal Benefits people with higher upload capacities How many people have such connections? How much does it benefit low upload connections?

Suspicions so far Long-term performance? Low upload capacity performance? Does evaluation answer these questions?

Evaluation? Real-world swarms ‘evaluation’ What is their peer’s upload rate? (UW machines, fast network, capped at 128 KB/s upload) How about slower uploads? (question 2) Perhaps BitTyrant only benefits fast uploaders? Also, torrents with files larger than 1 GB ignored – why?

Evaluation PlanetLab ‘evaluation’ Ooh! Varying upload speed performance?! Wait! File size is 5 MB? Long-term performance? (question 1) Perhaps with this behavior, in long term, original client would catch up and outperform BitTyrant?

Suspicions so far Paper tries to do the obvious Questionable if BitTyrant really offers much performance benefit

Conclusion Everyone knows incentives don’t build robustness – How many people seed till 1.0 ratio? But this is not a threat to BitTorrent So we can raise download speeds while contributing the same? Other incentive-unrelated (upload-unrelated) ways of increasing download speeds exist (better network positioning – Ono)