Unbalanced Globalization in the Oil-Producing States Michael Ross (UCLA) Erik Voeten (Georgetown)

Why Do Oil-Rich States Join Fewer International Organizations? Lack of Democracy Oil wealth retards democratization Democracies and democratizing states join more IOs

Political globalization by income, democracies vs Political globalization by income, democracies vs. non democracies (oil-exporters are red)

Why Do Oil-Rich States Join Fewer International Organizations? II. Credible Commitments Delegating authority to independent IOs and ratifying legally binding treaties increases the credibility of commitments to maintain free trade, respect human rights, not expropriate foreign investments, and so on. Oil-rich states are better able to attract investments and guarantee market access for exports without costly commitments. Observable implication: oil-rich states should be especially unlikely to join those IOs with high sovereignty costs.

Import and Export Restrictions for Oil-Rich and Oil-Poor Countries (Countries at least $100 per capita in oil income red dots with labels) Source: Kee, Hiau Looi, Alessandro Nicita and Marcelo Olarreaga. "Estimating trade restrictiveness indices", Economic Journal, 2009, vol. 119, p. 172--199.

Why Do Oil-Rich States Join Fewer International Organizations? III. Size of Domestic Coalitions Greater issue density results in more extensive regimes with decision-making procedures that apply to a range of issues; Oil-wealth affects competitiveness of other exports. Increases demand for protection. More export concentration Narrow demand for international coordination Observable implication: Oil-rich states should prefer single issue economic IOs to broad political IOs.

Export Concentration and Political Globalization by World Bank Income Category

Fixed Effects Panel Regressions on Political Globalization

Interaction Effect Oil Exporter Status and Trade Dependence

Other Findings Oil-rich states less likely to join political IGOs and human rights treaties, but not single issue economic IGOs (based on replication Mansfield-Pevehouse JCR); Among WTO member states, oil-rich states participate in fewer disputes (based on replication Bermeo & Davis, JOP) When states sign BITs, oil-rich states are significantly less likely to delegate authority to ICSID when they are the hosts for FDI and significantly more likely to do so when they are the home of FDI (based on replication Allee & Peinhardt, ISQ);