Frank Moss (European Central Bank) Athens, 18 May 2012 3rd Bank of Greece Workshop The Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis and Its Implications for the Economies of SEE The implications for the financial sector and ECB policy initiatives to alleviate the consequences of the crisis Frank Moss (European Central Bank) Athens, 18 May 2012

The vicious cycle between fiscal/banking/growth developments A shock to the fiscal outlook Will add to financial volatility/increased interest rates in the sovereign debt market Will reduce the foreign investor base for sovereign debt (and increase the sovereign CDS) Will necessitate more domestic bank funding for the sovereign Will reduce the appetite for wholesale investors in bank debt (and increase bank CDS) Will lead to higher bank funding costs and a reduction in access to interbank markets Will reduce the capacity for banks to extend credit Will reduce economic growth Will create a new shock to the fiscal outlook and will increase the NPLs for banks 2 2

The ECB’s crisis response – non-standard monetary policy action to address malfunctioning financial market segments Bank funding Fixed-rate full allotment mode in all refinancing operations (since October 2008) Lengthening the maturity of the refinancing operations (1, 3, 6, 12 and 36 months) Extending the list of eligible collateral (and not fully relying on rating agencies) Extending liquidity directly in foreign currencies (USD and CHF) Reducing reserve requirements Covered bond market Covered Bond Purchase Programme 1 (CBPP1) EUR 60 bn purchased from July 2009-July 2010; CBPP 2 under way for EUR 40 bn (until November 2012) Sovereign bond market Securities Markets Programme (launched in May 2010); EUR 241 bn purchased so far (but no QE !) 2 3

The 2 VLTROs made a distinct improvement in banks’ funding conditions Euribor-OIS spread and the EUR/USD basis swap (Jan. 2008 – Mar. 2012 in basis points Historical volatility of DE, FR, IT and ES 10-year government bond prices (1 June 2011 – 16 April 2012 in ppt.) 3 4

… and had a beneficial effect on sovereigns, even outside the euro area

Using the window of opportunity to address the real challenges Repairing the banking sector Adequately provisioning for the sovereign risk exposures (EBA exercise) Capitalising the banks adequately (Basel III) Orderly deleveraging (national supervisors and ESRB) Addressing the fiscal consolidation needs Reinforcing the euro area fiscal frameworks Enhancing fiscal sustainability through growth-promoting structural reforms Strengthening the euro area/international financial support channels

Bank deleveraging as a medium-term global trend Return to more sustainable business models is a global trend which can contribute to financial stability less reliance on volatile funding sources lower leverage Euro area banks may need earlier and more deleveraging than their international peers Comparatively high leverage ratios High reliance on wholesale funding Regulatory changes requiring larger capital and liquidity buffers (EBA re-capitalisation exercise, Basel III) On-going subdued economic activity

Cross-border deleveraging in SEE countries Concern about ‘home bias’ of euro area banks Mitigating factors Geographic proximity Prospect of EU accession and euro adoption Relatively bright medium-term growth prospects (catching-up) Banks mainly funded by local deposits Risk factors Lack of economic growth in some countries External and internal imbalances Pockets of financial sector weaknesses Volatile political environment in some countries

SEE countries mainly funded by local deposits

No firm evidence of ‘home bias’ during crises periods

Policy Initiatives aimed at mitigating cross-border deleveraging risks European Banking Authority (EBA) Assessment of deleveraging plans in the EU Co-ordination of cross-border discussions in the Supervisory colleges European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) Focus on systemic risk dimension of deleveraging at the level of the EU Vienna 2.0 Initiative Joint public/private initiative including non-EU countries in Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe

No dramatic recent cross-border deleveraging … Change in bank liabilities (Contributions to change in total bank liabilities in percentage points) Q4 2011 versus Q3 2008 Q4 2011 versus Q3 2011 Sources: National authorities, Haver Analytics and ECB calculations. Notes: Data for Montenegro refer to Q3 2011 in the left panel chart as no data for Q4 2011 (and thus for the right panel) are available.

Domestic deleveraging in some countries due to unsustainable lending booms

Summary and conclusions A process of disorderly deleveraging by euro area banks was avoided through the ECB’s VLTROs and other policy measures Especially European (but also other globally active) banks have good reasons to orderly deleverage over the medium-term Weak credit growth in some countries may reflect demand factors at least as much as supply constraints The SEE financial sectors should be increasingly based on local savings (‘new growth model’) SEE countries face similar challenges as the euro area to maintain conditions for sustainable growth of which a sound financial sector is part