GHANA ARMED FORCES APORA PRESENTATION

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION 1. GAF KEY PLAYERS IN GHANA’S PREPAREDNESS PLAN 2. GAF DEPLOYED IN LIBERIA (UNMIL) AND MALI (MINUSMA) GHANCOY AND GHAV 3. PARTICIPATE IN INTER-MINISTERIAL MEETINGS ON EBOLA PREPAREDNESS 4. ROLE OF MILITARY HEALTH SERVICE IN SUPPORTING CIVIL COUNTERPARTS

AIM To give an overview of the role of the Ghana Armed Forces in the national disease outbreak response.

SCOPE ROLE OF GAF IN NATIONAL OUTBREAK RESPONSE GAFMS STRUCTURE FOR OUTBREAK RESPONSE COUNTRY SPECIFIC OUTBREAK RESPONSE OBSERVED GAPS AND WAY FORWARD

ROLE OF GAF IN NATIONAL OUTBREAK RESPONSE

ROLE OF GAF AN INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FORMED INVOLVING DEFENCE, INTERIOR, COMMUNICATIONS, HEALTH AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT HON DEP MIN OF DEFENCE REPRESENTS MINISTRY AT INTERMINISTERIAL MEETINGS ROLE OF MOD – DEPLOY ENGINEERING AND MEDICAL EXPERTISE AROUND GHANA POSSIBLY PROVIDE AIR TRANSPORT AND SECURITY, MOVE LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL One of the major drawbacks so far in the isolation of the Ebola virus and the search for a cure, has been the inability to identify the reservoir species. It is evident that this reservoir species has its home somewhere within the rainforest and has only in recent times come into contact with man. This also indicates the possibility that the species is not yet a recorded one.

ROLE OF GAF Operations DG GHS

ROLE OF GAF 1. DEPUTY INCIDENT MANAGER FOR LOGISTICS AND COORDINATION AT EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTRE IS A MILITARY OFFICER 2. 48 ENGINEER REGIMENT INVOLVED IN PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTING TREATMENT CENTRES 3. GAF MEDICAL SERVICE – DEPLOY MEDICAL EXPERTISE TO SUPPORT NATIONAL RESPONSE One of the major drawbacks so far in the isolation of the Ebola virus and the search for a cure, has been the inability to identify the reservoir species. It is evident that this reservoir species has its home somewhere within the rainforest and has only in recent times come into contact with man. This also indicates the possibility that the species is not yet a recorded one.

GAF PARTNERS 1. NAMRU-3 GHANA DETACHMENT 2. WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION 3. MINISTRY OF HEALTH

GAFMS SETUP FOR DISEASE OUTBREAK RESPONSE

GAF Medical Facilities TAMALE 6MRS SUNYANI 3MRS HO 7MRS KUMASI 4MRS ACCRA 37 MIL TAKORADI 2MRS TEMA 1MRS

37 MILITARY HOSPITAL

ORGANIZATION OF RESPONSE 1. GAF HAS AN EBOLA TASK FORCE TO CREATE AWARENESS & DIRECT OUTBREAK CONTROL EFFORTS 2. PUBLIC HEALTH DIVISION COORDINATES SURVEILLANCE AND PREVENTION EFFORTS 3. EACH GARRISON AND UNIT HAS LOCAL TASK FORCE One of the major drawbacks so far in the isolation of the Ebola virus and the search for a cure, has been the inability to identify the reservoir species. It is evident that this reservoir species has its home somewhere within the rainforest and has only in recent times come into contact with man. This also indicates the possibility that the species is not yet a recorded one.

PUBLIC HEALTH DIVISION

GAF CAPABILITIES 1. ON-THE- SPOT INVESTIGATIONS, HANDLING OF DANGEROUS PATHOGENS AND CASE DETECTION PATIENT MANAGEMENT, CONTAINMENT 3. PROVISION OF LOGISTICS IN THE FORM OF STAFF AND SUPPLIES 4. RISK COMMUNICATION

GAF CAPABILITIES 5. TRANSPORTATION OF ASSETS FOR MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND/ OR PATIENTS IN OUTBREAKS 6. SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT SAFE BURIAL 8. DISEASE SURVEILLANCE OF HUMAN AND ZOONOTIC DISEASES

STATE OF PREPAREDNESS 1. A TEMPORARY ISOLATION TENT IN MIL HOSP 2. LOGISTICS FROM MOH, NGOs, WHO 3. TRAINED PERSONNEL PUT ON STANDBY 4. AWARENESS CREATION WITHIN GAF 5. PPEs AND OTHER LOGISTICS POSITIONED IN GARRISONS 6. CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE FOR EVD AND OTHER THREATS

TEMPORARY ISOLATION

TEMPORARY ISOLATION

TEMPORARY ISOLATION

RISK COMMUNICATION

TRAINING 1. 49 PERSONNEL OF GAF TRAINED IN THE FIRST NATIONAL TRAINING FOR EBOLA CASE MANAGEMENT 2. EXPERTS FROM WHO AND MOD-GHS CONDUCTED HANDS-ON TRAINING 3. AMETHYST TECHNOLOGIES TRAINED 82 PERSONNEL ON INFECTION CONTROL AND PPE DONNING AND DOFFING 4. SCREENING EXERCISE AND LECTURES One of the major drawbacks so far in the isolation of the Ebola virus and the search for a cure, has been the inability to identify the reservoir species. It is evident that this reservoir species has its home somewhere within the rainforest and has only in recent times come into contact with man. This also indicates the possibility that the species is not yet a recorded one.

TRAINING SESSIONS

TRAINING SESSIONS

COUNTRY SPECIFIC OUTBREAK RESPONSE

EVD RESPONSE STRUCTURE Operations DG GHS

CONCEPT AND TOR OF THE EBOLA EOC MODELED ON SUCCESSFUL NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE AND MODIFIED TO GHANAIAN CONTEXT TORS: 1. PREVENT AND PROTECT AGAINST INTRODUCTION AND SPREAD OF THE EVD IN GHANA 2. IDENTIFY, ISOLATE AND MANAGE INCIDENT OF EBOLA IN RAPID RESPONSE TIME AND COORDINATE ALL ACTIVITIES REGARDING THE CONTROL OF THE INFECTION

CONCEPT AND TOR OF THE EBOLA EOC 3. LIAISE WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS TO MANAGE PUBLIC INFORMATION AND COORDINATED COMMUNITY ACTION 4. IDENTIFY RESOURCES NEEDS AND LIAISE WITH GOVERNMENT AND DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS TO FILL GAPS 5. BRIEF GOVERNMENT OF ON-GOING ACTIVITIES TO CONTROL THE INFECTION.

COUNTRY PLAN 1. NATIONAL PANDEMIC RESPONSE PLAN DEVELOPED 2005 REVISED IN 2009 3. PLAN REVISED AND EXERCISED IN 2009 IN ELMINA (USAFRICOM)

COUNTRY PLAN 1. GHANA ADHERES TO WHO GUIDELINES A. CASE DEFINITION B. PATIENT MOVEMENT C. CLINICAL AND EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PROCEDURES D. LABORATORY PROCEDURES

COUNTRY PLAN 1. DISEASE SURVEILLANCE UNIT COORDINATES OUTBREAK RESPONSE 2. SYSTEM IS BOTH PAPER BASED AND ELECTRONIC 3. CASES REPORTED TO PUBLIC HEALTH AUTHORITIES DAILY, WEEKLY AND MONTHLY PER GUIDELINES 4. GOOD COLLABORATION BETWEEN MILITARY AND NATIONAL SYSTEM

OBSERVED GAPS

GAPS 1. LACK OF A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY TEAM FOR OUTBREAK RESPONSE (HEALTH, SECURITY, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS) 2. WEAK INDEPENDENT MILITARY DISEASE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM 3. INFECTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL TRAINING AND LOGISTICS SHORTFALLS 4. LACK OF DEFINITE OUTBREAK COMMUNICATION PLAN 5. LACK OF GENERAL PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES FOR COODINATING RESPONSE AMONG DISCIPLINES INCLUDING SOCIAL DISTANCING IMPLEMENTATION

GAPS 5. INADEQUATE ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH FACILITIES FOR WASTE SEGREGATION, INCINERATION 6. INADEQUATE INFECTION PREVENTION EQUIPMENT SUCH AS AUTOCLAVES IN ALL MILITARY HEALTH FACILITIES. 7. LACK OF A PROPER ISOLATION FACILITY 8. LACK OF LABORATORY CAPACITY FOR PCR, MOLECULAR ASSAYS, SOME SEROLOGICAL ASSAYS, TISSUE CULTURE MORE STAFF TRAINING FOR RISK COMMUNICATIONS 10. NEED FOR TOPIC-SPECIFIC AND MILITARY HEALTH PROMOTION MATERIALS.

CONCLUSION

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