KEY MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS JOHNSON C.LEE, VICTOR C.M.LUENG, KIRK H.WONG, JIANNANO CAO, HENRY C.B. CHAN Presented By Viplavi.

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Presentation transcript:

KEY MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS JOHNSON C.LEE, VICTOR C.M.LUENG, KIRK H.WONG, JIANNANO CAO, HENRY C.B. CHAN Presented By Viplavi Donepudi CMSC 681

Outline: Introduction Security and operational requirements for Key Management Key Distribution Schemes Promising Key Management Protocols Summary Conclusion

Introduction WSN is a network formed by large number of sensor nodes where each node is equipped with a sensor to detect physical phenomena such as light, heat, pressure etc…

Introduction WSN devices have severe resource constraints in terms of energy, computation and memory. Key Management include the processes of key setup, the initial distribution of keys and key revocation (removal of the compromised key). Many Security-critical application that depend on key management processes demand a high level of fault tolerance when a node is compromised.

Security and operational requirements for Key Management Confidentiality- Nodes should not reveal data to any unintended recipients. Integrity- Data should not be changed between transmissions due to environment or malicious activity. Data Freshness- Old data should not be used as new. Authentication- Data used in decision making process should originate from correct source. Robustness- When some nodes are compromised the entire network should not be compromised. Self-organization- Nodes should be flexible enough to be self- organizing (autonomous) and self-healing (failure tolerant) Availability- Network should not fail frequently.

Continued…… Time Synchronization- These protocols should not be manipulated to produce incorrect data. Secure Localization- Nodes should be able to accurately and securely acquire location information. Accessibility- Intermediate nodes should be able to perform data aggregation by combining data from different nodes. Flexibility- Nodes should be replaceable when compromised. Scalability- WSN should concurrently support at least 3000 nodes even with key management in place.

Key Distribution Schemes Three keying models are used to compare the different relationships between WSN Security and operational requirements Network Keying Pairwise Keying Group Keying

Advantages & Disadvantages Network Keying : BenefitsProblems Simple Lacks Robustness. Allows data aggregation and fusion Scalable Able to self- organize Flexible

Advantages & Disadvantages Pairwise Keying: BenefitsProblems Provides best robustness. Non-scalable. Unable to self-organize. Authentication for each node. Not flexible.

Advantages & Disadvantages Group Keying: BenefitsProblems Allows Multicast. Lacks efficient storage for group keying in IEEE Allows group collaboration. Difficult to set up securely. Better robustness than network keying. Cluster formation information is application dependent. Adjustable scalability Flexible. Able to self-organize with in cluster.

Promising Key Management Protocols Eschenauer and Gligor: This protocol is simple, elegant and provides effective trade off between robustness and scalability. In this scheme a large pool of keys are generated (eg:10,000 keys) Randomly take K keys out of the pool to establish a key ring (K << N) Path Key Discovery: When two nodes communicate they search for a common key with in the key ring by broadcasting their identities (IDs) of the keys they have.

Advantages&Disadvantages: Advantages: Less than N-1 keys are stored Scalable Disadvantages: It lacks authentication process and does not clearly define any process for revoking or refreshing keys. The dynamic handshaking process prevents any form of data aggregation (eg: one event detected by two neighboring nodes will result in two separate signals.) No support for collaborative operations. No node is guaranteed to have common key with all of its neighbors, there is a chance that some nodes are unreachable. Fails to satisfy security requirement authentication and operational requirement accessibility.

Du, Deng, Han and Varshney: This protocol is based on pairwise keying model. This model extends Eschenauer and Blom's work by using the same paradigm but instead of individual keys it uses a array of keys. Blom's model is based on the idea of a sym­metric matrix multiplication, where row i column j is equivalent to row j column i, Thus, when node i calculates key ij and node j calculates key ji. the keys are identical, leading to a commonly shared secret. In Du's pairwise key management scheme, instead of using only one private matrix, the sink node generates i private matrices, and each node stores a subset of these matrices in the same manner as Eschenauer's key ring. When two nodes must cornmunicate, they start by broadcasting the node Ids, the indices of key matrices they carry and the seed of the column of the public matrix. If they share a common key matrix,then they can compute the pairwise secret key using Blom's Scheme.

Advantages & Disadvantages Advantages: It offers strong robustness against node compromise at a reasonable scalability cost. An adversary must compromise five times as many nodes compared with Eschenauer's scheme to compromise the entire network. Disadvantages: The complexity of the protocol increases overhead costs. The cluster operations are not supported because it is a pairwise keying scheme, and neither key revocation nor key refreshing are considered. Overall Du's scheme fails to satisfy accessibility and is not competitive with simpler schemes in terms of scalability due to its high overhead costs.

LEAP LEAP uses four types of keys: Indivudival, group, cluster and pairwise shared keys. The authentication mechanism known as µ-TESLA is used for the broadcast authentication of the sink node,which ensures that the packets sent with the group are from the sink node only. It also employs one-way hash-key mechanism for source packet authentication. LEAP uses a pre-distribution key to help establish the four types of keys. The individual key is first established using a function of a seed and the ID of the node. Then nodes broadcast their IDs. The receiving node uses a function, seeded with an initial key, to calculate the shared key between it and all of its neighbors. Thirdly, the cluster key is distributed by the cluster head using pairwise communication secured with the pairwise shared key. Lastly for distributing the network-wide group key, the sink node broadcasts it in a multi­hop cluster- by-cluster manner starting with the closest cluster.

Advantages & Disadvantages Advantages: It has µ-TESLA and one-way key chain authentication as well as key revocation and key refreshing. Scalability Able to perform cluster communications. Disadvantages: It assumes that sink node is never compromised.

SHELL Each cluster has its own distributed key management entity residing in a non-cluster­head node. The operational responsibility and key management responsibility are separated leading to better resiliency against node capture. Advantages: The main benefit of SHELL is that it has a high robustness against node capture. It supports cluster (group) communications and does not preclude data fusion or aggregation within the clusters. Disadvantages: Its structure and operation arc highly complex, involving hetero­geneous node operations and multiple (at least seven) types of keys.

PANJA, MADRIA, AND BHARGAVA This protocol is based on a hierarchical group keying scheme using the Tree-based Group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) protocol. The TGDH keying scheme has one level of general sensor nodes and multiple levels of cluster heads; that is there can be a head of clusters responsible for multiple cluster heads below it in a tree-like manner To establish the keys in this hierarchical tree based WSN two separate schemes are used: intra-cluster and inter-cluster keying.

Advantages & Disadvantages Advantages: The advantage of this scheme is that compared to SHELL, it is simple and elegant and hence, easy to implement. Less storage and computational costs. Key revocation and key refreshing problems are addressed. Disadvantages: Node addition and Node replacement are not considered explicitly. Compromises for robustness. Overall, Panjas scheme trades off robustness to better satisfy the self-organization, accessibility, Scalability and Flexibility requirements

Summary

Conclusion Future developments could incorporate the flexibility of LEAP with the adjustable robustness offered by Eschenauer or Dus scheme. For security-critical application SHELL seems to offer the highest robustness but it may be further improved to reduce implementation complexity. For extremely large WSNs, improving Panja's scheme to take advantage of its highly scalable hierarchical feature may prove attractive.

Thank You