Tóth, István János, Hajdu, Miklós, Bencic Sandra

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Tóth, István János, Hajdu, Miklós, Bencic Sandra Intenzitet tržišne utakmice, koruptivnih rizika i procjenjenog direktnog društvenog gubitka u javnim nabavama Grada Zagreba i Holdinga 2011-2016 Tóth, István János, Hajdu, Miklós, Bencic Sandra About the authors. Listopad 2017 CMS Zagreb 2018.12.10.

Istraživački i analitički alati motivations  mean results  lessons Istraživački i analitički alati Analiza 5,922 ugovora iz 4,483 javnih nabava Grada Zagreba i Holdinga Period: 2011-2016 Analiza 1,197 tvrtki dobitnica ugovora 2018.12.10.

Istraživački i analitički alati motivations  mean results  lessons Istraživački i analitički alati Stvorena baza podatka i analitički alat za hrvatske javne nabave (DCPP) On-line platforma Podaci o javnim nabavama sa podacima o tvrtkama dobitnicama (bilance i podaci o vlasništvu) Omogućuje analizu u realnom vremenu 2018.12.10.

Javne informacije potrebne za analizu Registar sklopljenih ugovora za Grad Zagreb i za Zagreb Holding u pretraživom formatu pogodnom za ponovnu uporabu Podaci iz registra trgovačkog suda o tvrtkama i povezanim subjektima Baza dokumenata javne nabave: Obavijesti o sklopljenim ugovorima u pretraživom formatu i dostupna za preuzimanje po naručitelju 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons Glavni rezultati 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons 1. Koruptivni rizici u javnim nabavama značajno su povećani u promatranom razdoblju. Udio nabava bez tržišne utakmice (jedan ponuditelj) povećao se sa 25% na 34% od 2011 do 2016 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons Udio natječaja bez tržišne utakmice (SB=1) po godini, 2011-16, %, N = 5,922 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons Udio natječaja bez tržišne utakmice(SB=1) iu drugim glavnim gradovima EU , 2006-15, N = 3,407,027 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons Udio natječaja bez tržišne utakmice(SB=1) u Gradu Zagrebu i Holdingu, 2011-16, 2011-16, %, N = 5,922 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons 2. Intenzitet tržišne utakmice (ICI) smanjio se od 0.65 to 0.55 poena tokom promatranog perioda [0 ≤ ICI ≤ 1] 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons Prosječna vrijednost indikatora Intenziteta tržišne utakmice po godini (ICI) po godini i sektoru , 2011-16, N = 4,238 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons Intenzitet utakmice i koruptivni rizik u drugim EU glavnim gradovima 2006-15, N = 3,407,027 Berlin Vienna Rome Paris Ljubljana Budapest Warsaw Prague Zagreb 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons 3. Distrozija cijene bila je izuzetno visoka u 2013 and in 2015 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons Važnost distrozije cijene: squared error (SE) ugovorenih cijena u odnosu na teoretsku Benfordovu distribuciju, 2011-16, N = 5,922 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons Važnost distrozije cijene: squared error (SE) ugovorenih cijena u odnosu na teoretsku Benfordovu distribuciju, po sektoru 2011-16, N = 5,922 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons 4. 27% ukupne vrijednosti ugovora je potrošeno u natječajima bez tržišne utakmice. Između 2011 i 2016 utakmice nema u četvrtini vrijednosti javnog novca potrošenog kroz javne nabave. Najviši udio uočen je u 2011 (43%) a najniži u 2015. (21%) 2018.12.10.

Udio novca utrošenog bez tržišne utakmice, %, 2011-16, N = 5,922 motivations  results  lessons Udio novca utrošenog bez tržišne utakmice, %, 2011-16, N = 5,922 2018.12.10.

Vrijednost ugovora bez kompeticije, u milionimaHRK, 2011-16, N = 1,684 motivations  results  lessons Vrijednost ugovora bez kompeticije, u milionimaHRK, 2011-16, N = 1,684 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons 5. Vrijednost medijana procjenjenog direktnog društvenog gubitka je stabilna u promatranom vremenu i iznosi između 31-34% ukupne vrijednosti nabava 2018.12.10.

Medijan procjenjenog gubitka , %, 2011-16, N = 3,076 motivations  results  lessons Medijan procjenjenog gubitka , %, 2011-16, N = 3,076 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons Rezultati ukazuju na postojanje pozitivne veze između korištivnih rizika u javnim natječajima i njihove važnosti u ukupnoj bilanci tvrtki koje su natječaje dobile. Što je viši udio prihoda tvrtke iz javnim natječaja Grada Zagreba to je veći indikator nekompetitivnosti natječaja na kojima te komapnije dobivaju poslove. => institucionalizacija korupcije (??) 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons Odnos udjela natječaja dobivenih bez kompeticije sa udjelom prihoda od natječaja u bilanci tvrtke, %, 2011-15, N = 878 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons Zaključci 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons ZAKLJUČCI Niski intenzitet tržišne utakmice Visoki koruptivni rizici Poklapanje naglih povećanja broja i vrijednosti natječaja, te natječaja bez kompeticije sa izbornim ciklusom Visok udio procjenjenog direktnog društvenog gubitka Korupcija koja može upućivati na institucionalizaciju 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons ZAKLJUČCI potreba za redovitom empiričkom analizom U REALNOM VREMENU Neadekvatnost dokumentacije EOJN-a i nemogućnost ponovne uporabe za analize bazirane na analizi velikih količina podataka Neadekvatnost podataka o tvrtkama za big data analitiku Sve baze su zaštićene od preuzimanja i ponovne uporabe kao cjelina Ovo je prvi korak u osiguravanju sredstava potrebnih za društvene potrebe u Gradu Zagrebu 2018.12.10.

KAKO FUNKCIONIRA BAZA http://dcpp.crcb.eu/ 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons Reference ACFE. 2016. Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, 2016 Global Fraud Study. Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, USA: Austin, Texas. Coviello, D., – Gagliarducci, S. 2010. Building Political Collusion: Evidence from Procurement Auctions. IZA DP No. 4939, Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). http://repec.iza.org/dp4939.pdf Chvalkovska, J., Fazekas, M., Skuhrovec, J., Tóth, I. J., King L. P. 2013. Are EU funds a Corruption Risk? The Impact of EU Funds on Grand Corruption in Central and Eastern Europe. In: Pippidi-Mungiu, A. Controlling Corrution in Europe. The Anticorruption Report 2. Oplanden, Berlin & Toronto: Barbara Budrich Publishers. pp. 68-89. Czibik, Á., Fazekas, M., Tóth, B., Tóth I. J. 2014. Toolkit for detecting collusive bidding in public procurement. With examples from Hungary. Working Paper Series: CRCB-WP/2014:02. CRCB, Budapest, 2014. http://bit.ly/2aDRYM7 CRCB. 2016. Competitive Intensity and Corruption Risks in the Hungarian Public Procurement 2009-2015. Main Findings & Descriptive Statistics. Budapest, CRCB. http://bit.ly/1TBpQDa Durtschi, C. - Hillison, W.- Pacini, C. 2004. “The Effective Use of Benford's Law to Assist in. Detecting Fraud in Accounting Data”, Journal of Forensic Accounting, Vol V. pp. 17-34, http://bit.ly/1QSUOER. Drake, P. D. – Nigrini, M. J. 2000. “Computer assisted analytical procedures using Benford’s law”, Journal of Accounting Education, Vol. 18. no. 2. pp. 127-146; Fazekas, M., Tóth, I.J., King. L. P. 2013a. Anatomy of grand corruption: A composite corruption risk index based on objective data. Budapest, CRCB. http://bit.ly/1Yc7zQL Fazekas, M., King, L. P., Tóth, I. J. 2013b. Hidden Depths. The Case of Hungary. In: Pippidi-Mungiu, A. Controlling Corrution in Europe. The Anticorruption Report 1. Oplanden, Berlin & Toronto: Barbara Budrich Publishers. pp74-82. Fazekas, M., Tóth, I. J., King, L. P. 2016. “An Objective Corruption Risk Index Using Public Procurement Data”. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, First Online: 25 April 2016 doi: 10.1007/s10610-016-9308-z. Fazekas, M., and Tóth, I. J. 2016. “From Corruption to State Capture. A New Analytical Framework with Empirical Applications from Hungary”. Political Research Quarterly, June 2016, vol. 69. no. 2. pp. 320-334, doi: 10.1177/1065912916639137. Fazekas, M. - Tóth, I. J. 2017. Corruption in EU Funds? Europe-wide evidence of the corruption effect of EU-funded public contracting. In: Bachler, J., Berkowitz, P., Hardy S., Muravska, T.: EU Cohesion Policy. Reassessing Performance and Direction, Routledge, London & New York., pp. 186-205. Garrido, Melissa M, Amy S. Kelley, Julia Paris, Katherine Roza, Diane E. Meier, R. Sean Morrison. 2014. Methods for Constructing and Assessing Propensity Scores. Health Services Research, 49 (5): 1701–20. doi:10.1111/1475-6773.12182 IEER. 2016. Integrity and corruption risks within the Hungarian corporate sector. Budapest: Institute for Economic and Enterprise Research. http://bit.ly/2jzzdZj 2018.12.10.

motivations  results  lessons Reference King, G., Nielsen, R. 2016. Why Propensity Scores Should Not Be Used for Matching. http://bit.ly/2iWZSUd Kossovsky, A. E. 2015. Benford’s Law. Theory, the General Law of Relative Quantities, and Forensic Fraud Detection Applications. Hackensack, New Jersey, USA: World Scientific Lambsdorff, J. G. 2007. The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform. Theory, Evidences and Policy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press Lechner, Michael. 2002. Program Heterogeneity and Propensity Score Matching: An Application to the Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policies. The Review of Economics and Statistics (84): 205-220. http://bit.ly/2j6kZPi Miller, S. J. (ed.). 2015. Benford’s Law: Theory and Applications. Princeton, New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny. 1993. “Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?” The American Economic Review Vol. 83, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1993), pp. 409-414. http://bit.ly/2ahOOJg Nigrini, M. J. 1996. “A taxpayer compliance application of Benford’s law”. Journal of the American Taxation Association. Vol. 18. no 1. pp. 72–91. Nigrini, M. J. (ed.). 2012. Benford's Law. Applications for Forensic Accounting, Auditing, and Fraud Detection. Hoboken, New Jersey, USA: John Wiley & Sons Spann, Delena D. 2013. Fraud Analytics: Strategies and Methods for Detection and Prevention, Hoboken. New Jersey, USA: John Wiley & Sons Szanto, Z., Tóth, I. J., Varga, S. 2012. The social and institutional structure of corruption: some typical network configurations of corruption transactions in Hungary, In: Vedres, B., Scotti, M. (eds.): Network sin Social Policy Problems. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Rose-Ackerman, S. (ed.). 2006. International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Rose-Ackerman, S. – Soreide, T. 2011. International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption. Volume Two. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Rosenbaum, Paul R., Donald B. Rubin. 1983. The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects. Biometrika. 70 (1): 41–55. doi:10.1093/biomet/70.1.41 Tóth, I. J., Hajdu, M. 2016a. Competitive Intensity and Corruption Risks in the Hungarian Public Procurement 2009-2015. Paper presented at the University of Cambridge, „Data for Policy” Conference, http://bit.ly/2b8p8kW Toth, I. J., Hajdu, M. 2016b. Korrupciós kockázatok, átláthatóság, közbeszerzések. Magyar közbeszerzések 2009–2015 közötti adatainak elemzése. In: Kolosi, T.- Tóth, I. Gy. (szerk.): Társadalmi Riport. Tárki, Budapest. 33-53. old. [Corruption risks, transparency, public procurement. Analysis of Hungarian Public Procurement in the period of 2009 and 2015. In: Kolosi, T. – Tóth, I. Gy. (eds): Social Report – 2016. Budapest: Tárki, pp. 33 -53.] http://bit.ly/2dA9XlI Varian, H. R.1972.: “Benford’s law”, The American Statistician, 26. Vol. no.3. pp. 65–66. 2018.12.10.

Hvala na pažnji Corruption Research Center Budapest www.crcb.eu Centar za mirovne studije www.cms.hr 2018.12.10.