Epistemology of perception FILM-331, Epistemology: The sources of knowledge, specialization (FILK-229, FTY-924, FTE345e, FTE340.1e, FTE220) 5 cr Epistemology of Perception / Markus Lammenranta 14/03/2018

instructions We will discuss a paper or a book chapter at each session. Every participant will write an outline and give a short presentation of the text to be discussed for one session. Send the outline by email to the participants one day before each session. The materials and info on the course page: https://courses.helsinki.fi/en/FILM-331/121097818. The final paper (2500 words) is due 25.5. It can be partly based on the abstract and can also be written in Finnish or Swedish. Evaluation: Essay (40%) + Outline and presentation (30%) + discussion participation (30%)  Epistemology of Perception / Markus Lammenranta 14/03/2018

The possibility of perceptual knowledge How is perceptual knowledge about the external world possible? How can perceptual beliefs be epistemically justified? It seem that the answer to both questions must appeal to perceptual experience. The epistemological question: How can experience justify perceptual beliefs? The metaphysical question: What is the nature of perceptual experience? It seems that the answer to the first question depends on the answer to the second one. Epistemology of Perception / Markus Lammenranta 14/03/2018

The metaphysics of perception Representative (indirect) realism: In perceptual experience, we are directly aware of a mental object (idea, sense-datum) or a way of appearing (quale) that is caused by the physical external object. The mental object is sign of (indicate) the physical object. Richard Fumerton Direct realism: In veridical perceptual experience, we are directly aware of a physical object. Intentionalism (representationalism): Perceptual experiences have intentional contents that represent the world as being some way. In veridical perception the world is the way it is represented; in illusions and hallucinations it is not. Michael Huemer, Susanna Schellenberg, Susanna Siegel Naive realism (metaphysical disjunctivism): Veridical experiences are partly constituted by physical objects (or external facts). Hallucinations and illusions are other kinds of experiences. A perceptual experience is a veridical perception, hallucination or illusion. John Campbell, Lisa Miracchi Activism: (A) Perceptual experience is constituted by a mental activity, the activity of employing perceptual capacities (Schellenberg). (B) Perception is an activity (a performance with an aim). Perception is more fundamental than experience. (Miracchi). Epistemology of Perception / Markus Lammenranta 14/03/2018

Agrippa’s problem (the regress problem) (1) Assume that S can be justified in believing that p only if S has good reasons for p. (2) Assume also that these reasons must themselves be justified beliefs. These assumptions lead to an infinite regress or a circle. To avoid these, one may deny one of the assumptions. We get four possible accounts of the structure justification: A belief is made justified by a chain of reasons that is infinite (infinitism), a circular chain of reasons (coherentism) a chain of reasons that terminates in an unjustified belief (Wittgensteinian contextualism) Assumption 2 is denied: ultimate reasons are not justified. a chain of reasons that terminates in a basic belief, which is justified independently of its relation to other beliefs (foundationalism). Either 1 or 2 is denied: either basic justification does not depend on reasons or reasons need not be beliefs. Pyrrhonian skepticism: There are no justified beliefs. Epistemology of Perception / Markus Lammenranta 14/03/2018

Various forms of foundationalism Experientialism: Non-doxastic experiences justify perceptual beliefs. Mental state foundationalism (MSF): Beliefs about experiences are basic. Experience justify directly only our introspective beliefs, and the justification of perceptual beliefs is based on inference from these introspective beliefs. Epistemic indirect realism: Justification of perceptual beliefs is indirect (mediated by justified introspective beliefs). External object foundationalism (EOF): Beliefs about external objects are basic. Experience justifies directly perceptual beliefs about external physical objects. Epistemic direct realism Reliabilism: Basic beliefs are made justified by their reliable causal origin that do not involve other beliefs. The justification of perceptual beliefs does not essentially depend on experience. Jack Lyons Epistemology of Perception / Markus Lammenranta 14/03/2018

Sellars’ dilemma Wilfrid Sellars: ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ (1956) If experiences do not have propositional contents, they cannot to justify beliefs. D. Davidson: Because there cannot be logical relations between experiences and beliefs, experiences can just cause beliefs, never justify them. If experiences have propositional contents, they are themselves in need of justification (in which case the regress does not stop). So in neither case can experiences justify beliefs. In order avoid scepticism, an experientialist must deny either horn of the dilemma. Intentionalists deny the 2nd horn. Representative realists (MSF) and naïve realists deny the 1st horn. Epistemology of Perception / Markus Lammenranta 14/03/2018

Cartesian skepticism Perceptual knowledge about the external world is not possible. Cartesian skepticism is based on skeptical hypotheses that describe possibilities of error that our evidence or experience does not rule out. The dream hypothesis and the evil demon hypothesis. Epistemology of Perception / Markus Lammenranta 14/03/2018

A brain in a vat The brain-in-a-vat hypothesis: I am a brain in a vat wired to a computer that stimulates it so that I have the experiences and beliefs I have now but these beliefs are false. Epistemology of Perception / Markus Lammenranta 14/03/2018

The good case and the bad case The skeptical hypotheses draw attention to two possible situations, in which I have the same experiences and beliefs. We may call them the good case and the bad case: The good case: Things are the way I think they are. I have hands, and it does not just appear that I have. The bad case: I am a handless brain in a vat, and it merely appears to me that I have hands. In the bad case, I do not know that I have hands, the skeptic argues that I do not know this even in the good case. My evidence does not rule out the possibility that I am a handless brain (infallibilism). I do not know that I am not a handless brain. If I do not know this, neither do I know that I have hands (the closure principle). My evidence does not favor the hand hypothesis over the handless hypothesis (the underdetermination principle). Epistemology of Perception / Markus Lammenranta 14/03/2018

Two assumptions SAME EXPERIENCES: I have in both cases the same experiences. The same experiences because the same brain states. The same experiences because introspective indistinguishable. SAME JUSTIFICATION: I am in both cases equally justified in believing that I have hands. I have the same evidence. the new evil demon intuition Internalism: Justification (evidence) is a function of non-factive mental states Internalism (phenomenal conservatism, dogmatism) accepts both assumptions. It explains the appeal of skepticism, but is also in danger of falling into it. Metaphysical disjunctivism denies SAME EXPERIENCES. In the good case, I am perceptually aware of my hands; in the bad case, I am not. Veridical experiences and hallucinations are different sort of mental events. (Campbell) Epistemological disjunctivism denies SAME JUSTIFICATION. In the good case, my evidence consists of my seeing that I have hands or the fact that I have hands; in the bad case, my evidence consists of its merely appearing to me that I have hands. In the good case, I am more justified in believing that I have hands than in the bad case. (Hasan.) Epistemology of Perception / Markus Lammenranta 14/03/2018

The texts 15.3. Fumerton, “How Does Perception Justify Belief?” 21.3. Huemer, “A Version of Direct Realism” 22.3. Huemer, “A Version of Foundationaism” 28.3. Siegel, “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification” 5.4. White, “Problems for Dogmatism” 11.4. Sosa, “Does Knowledge Have a Foundation” 12.4. Lyons, “Experientialist Theories” 18.4. Campbell, “The Relational View of Experience” 19.4. Hasan, “Epistemological Disjunctivism” 25.4. Schellenberg, “Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity” 26.4. Comesaña & McGrath, “Perceptual Reasons” 3k.5 Miracchi, “Perception First,” Epistemology of Perception / Markus Lammenranta 14/03/2018