RBAC-LBAC-DAC Prof. Ravi Sandhu.

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Presentation transcript:

RBAC-LBAC-DAC Prof. Ravi Sandhu

LBAC: LIBERAL *-PROPERTY + - H L M1 M2 - + Read Write

RBAC96: LIBERAL *-PROPERTY + HR LR M1R M2R LW HW M1W M2W - Read Write

RBAC96: LIBERAL *-PROPERTY user  xR, user has clearance x user  LW, independent of clearance Need constraints session  xR iff session  xW read can be assigned only to xR roles write can be assigned only to xW roles (O,read) assigned to xR iff (O,write) assigned to xW

LBAC: STRICT *-PROPERTY + H L M1 M2 - Read Write

RBAC96: STRICT *-PROPERTY HR LR M1R M2R M1W LW HW M2W

Variations of DAC Strict DAC Liberal DAC 4

Strict DAC Only owner has discretionary authority to grant access to an object. Example: Alice has created an object (she is owner) and grants access to Bob. Now Bob cannot grant propagate the access to another user. 5

Liberal DAC Owner can delegate discretionary authority for granting access to other users. One Level grant Two Level Grant Multilevel Grant 6

One Level Grant Owner can delegate authority to another user but they cannot further delegate this power. Alice Bob Charles 7

Two Level Grant In addition to a one level grant the owner can allow some users to delegate grant authority to other users. Alice Bob Charles Dorothy 8

Revocation Grant-Independent Revocation. Grant-Dependent Revocation. 11

Common Aspects Creation of an object in the system requires the simultaneous creation of three administrative roles OWN_O, PARENT_O, PARENTwithGRANT_O One regular role READ_O 12

Administrative role hierarchy OWN_O PARENTwithGRANT_O PARENT_O READ_O Administration of roles associated with object O OWN_O PARENTwithGRANT_O PARENT_O Administrative role hierarchy 13

Common Aspects II We require simultaneous creation of Eight Permissions canRead_O destroyObject_O addReadUser_O, deleteReadUser_O addParent_O, deleteParent_O addParentWithGrant_O, deleteParentWithGrant_O 14

Roles and associated Permissions OWN_O destroyObject_O, addParentWithGrant_O, deleteParentWithgrant_O PARENTwithGRANT_O addParent_O, deleteParent_O PARENT_O addReadUser_O, deleteReadUser_O READ_O canRead_O 15

Common Aspects III Destroying an object O requires deletion of four roles and eight permissions in addition of destroying the object O. 16

Strict DAC in RBAC96 Cardinality constraints as: Role OWN_O = 1 Role PARENTwithGRANT_O = 0 Role PARENT_O = 0 17

One level DAC in RBAC96 Cardinality constraints as: Role OWN_O = 1 Role PARENTwithGRANT_O = 0 18

Two Level DAC in RBAC96 Cardinality constraints as: Role OWN_O = 1 19

Grant-Dependent Revoke U1_PARENT_O U1_READ_O U2_PARENT_O U2_READ_O Un_PARENT_O Un_READ_O READ_O role associated with members of PARENT_O 25