Mon., Sept. 2

drafting a complaint

-. Rule 8. General Rules of Pleading (a) Claim for Relief - Rule 8. General Rules of Pleading (a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.

Three things that can be wrong with a complaint: 1) legal sufficiency of factual allegations FRCP 12(b)(6) 2) level of specificity in factual allegations FRCP 8(a) 3) evidentiary support for factual allegations FRCP 11, 56

On Tuesday, August 26, 2013 at 2:31 p. m On Tuesday, August 26, 2013 at 2:31 p.m., Defendant Kathryn Ashley intentionally failed to praise Plaintiff Michael Green for Plaintiff’s exemplary lecture on civil procedure, in circumstances in which praise would have been reasonable, thereby causing Plaintiff substantial psychological distress.

Sierocinski v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. 3d Cir. 1939

Martin Sierocinski, also known as Martin Selensky, the plaintiff above named, brings this action in trespass against E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Company upon a cause of action whereof the following is a statement: 1. The plaintiff is a resident of the City and County of Philadelphia. 2. The defendant, E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Company, is and was at the time of the occurrences hereinafter described, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, and duly authorized to transact business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . . 3. The defendant is engaged in the business of manufacturing and distributing, and does manufacture and distribute, inter alia, blasting caps for use by the public. . . .

6. The Ehret Magnesia Manufacturing Company furnished to the plaintiff dynamite caps manufactured by the defendant, which dynamite caps were in the same condition as they were when distributed by the said defendant. 7. On or about September 24, 1936, the plaintiff was engaged in crimping a dynamite cap, manufactured and distributed by the defendant, when it prematurely exploded causing injuries hereinafter set forth. 8. In the crimping of the said dynamite cap, the plaintiff acted in the usual and customary manner, the process being a necessary one in the using of the said dynamite cap for the purpose for which it was manufactured and distributed , and such action on his part having been anticipated by defendant.

Conley v. Gibson “complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (U.S. 2007)

Paragraph 51 “In the absence of any meaningful competition between the [baby bells] in one another’s markets, and in light of the parallel course of conduct that each engaged in to prevent competition from [locals] within their respective local telephone and/or high speed internet services markets and the other facts and market circumstances alleged above, Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that Defendants have entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent entry in their respective local telephone and/or high speed internet service markets and have agreed not to compete with one another and otherwise allocated customers and markets to one another.”

Stevens: But the plaintiffs allege in three places in their complaint, ¶¶ 4, 51, 64, App. 11, 27, 30, that the [baby bells] did in fact agree both to prevent competitors from entering into their local markets and to forgo competition with each other. And as the Court recognizes, at the motion to dismiss stage, a judge assumes “that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”

The majority circumvents this obvious obstacle to dismissal by pretending that it does not exist. The Court admits that “in form a few stray statements in the complaint speak directly of agreement,” but disregards those allegations by saying that “on fair reading these are merely legal conclusions resting on the prior allegations” of parallel conduct. Ante, at 1970. The Court's dichotomy between factual allegations and “legal conclusions” is the stuff of a bygone era, supra, at 1976 - 1977.

Assume that the complaint had alleged a handshake agreement among the CEOs of the baby bells at a particular meeting. No evidence is offered at all. Is Twombly satisfied?