Desirability of religion and the non-cognitive function of misbeliefs Konrad Talmont-Kaminski (Marie Curie-Sklodowska U., Poland) Desirability of religion and the non-cognitive function of misbeliefs

Background Philosopher of science Using Investigating superstitious and religious beliefs Their relation to human rationality Using Cognitive approaches Evolutionary explanations of human behaviour Philosophy of science

Plan Adaptive misbeliefs Protecting misbeliefs Plausible misbeliefs Desirability of misbeliefs Investigating misbeliefs

Adaptive misbeliefs Misbeliefs can motivate adaptive behaviour Fear of Fri 13th leads to avoiding train crash Coincidental Only significant if systematic Possible systematic examples Magical contagion Religion

Adaptive misbeliefs Magical Contagion (Paul Rozin) Cardigan example (Bruce Hood) Fear of ‘catching’ evil Invisible vehicles of contagion passed by contact Very useful given bacteria & viruses False explanation, partly true (overgeneralised) correlation Role of explanation? Ideas of magical contagion motivate behaviour Ideas of magical contagion post hoc explanation of behaviour Studied extensively by Paul Rozin Misbelief explained as by-product of cognitive heuristic

Adaptive misbeliefs The “boy who cried wolf” problem Misbelief in the face of counterevidence McKay and Dennett, BBS (forthcoming) Misbelief unstable due to counterevidence Can not be systematically adaptive Disproved misbeliefs Rejected Reinterpreted

Protecting misbeliefs Misbeliefs can be protected against counterevidence Talmont-Kaminski, BBS (forthcoming) & Teorema 28.3 Protected misbeliefs stable Can still motivate behaviour Three ways to protect misbeliefs Content Social context Methodological context

Protecting misbeliefs Content of stable misbeliefs Avoid content in direct conflict with experience Claim epistemic impediments Invisibility – ghosts, Christian god Shyness – faeries Distant locale – dragons, Olympic gods Shape-shifting – Olympic gods Vagueness – New Age beliefs Problem Belief in the face of the lack of evidence

Protecting misbeliefs Social context of misbeliefs Make investigation of misbeliefs socially unacceptable The sacred – religious and magical beliefs Religious relics Respecting religious beliefs above other kinds Disparage curiosity Oppose rational criticism Problem Stultifies progress

Protecting misbeliefs Methodological context of misbeliefs Related to social context Limit access to science Scientific equipment Scientific methods Scientific attitudes Problem Limited access to science Not an issue traditionally

Plausible misbeliefs Why believe without evidence? Not really a problem Only problem with perfectly rational beings Why believe without evidence the things we do? Primarily: Due to the particularities of human cognitive system Secondarily: Due to function of the beliefs

Plausible misbeliefs By-products of cognitive heuristics Type I errors (Skinner, Error Management Theory) Magical contagion (Rozin) Cognitive science of religion Minimally counterintuitive concepts (Boyer) Hyperactive agency detection device (Guthrie)

Desirability of misbeliefs What, if anything, is the function of misbeliefs? Not to accurately represent the world Protecting against disconfirmation ensures truth of a belief is coincidental Allows other functions to determine popularity of belief Function must depend upon the behaviour motivated by the belief

Desirability of misbeliefs Several possibilities Adaptive for individuals Costly-signalling (Sosis) Adaptive for groups Pro-social behaviour (D. S. Wilson) Adaptive for beliefs Memetic virus (Dawkins, Blackmore) Not directly functional Simply a by-product (Boyer)

Desirability of misbeliefs Which thesis about function is correct? Need to investigate religion to find out Answer may be complex Is religion is something desirable for us? Universally assumed by religious individuals Dennett’s “Belief in belief” Not necessarily even if an individual adaptation Dennett’s question: Who thinks that their goal in life is to have as many kids as possible?

Investigating misbeliefs Problem Investigation of religion Requires scientific attitude Maintaining positive effects of religious claims Requires maintaining belief in those claims Which requires Protecting those beliefs Investigation of religion undermines its function Even if that function happens to be individually desirable

Thank you Konrad Talmont-Kaminski konrad@talmont.com deisidaimon.wordpress.com McKay & Dennett Evolution of Misbelief, Behavioral & Brain Sciences (forthcoming) Talmont-Kaminski, Effective untestability and bounded rationality help to see religion is adaptive misbelief, Behavioral & Brain Sciences (forthcoming) Talmont-Kaminski, Fixation of superstitious beliefs, Teorema 28.3