Improving Radiological Security in the Evolving Threat Environment Meili Swanson Project on Nuclear Issues Winter Conference Center for Strategic and International Studies December 2016

Civilian Radiological Sources Distinct from nuclear material Mainly used by the private sector Medical, food processing, construction, research, etc. Security varies across and within industries Construction sites Cobalt-60 Picture sources: https://www.britannica.com/science/cobalt-60 http://www.geo-con.com.au/products/nuclear-soil-moisture-density-testing/ Nuclear soil gauge used in construction

Threat Alarming trends Potential weapons Belgian nuclear facility monitoring Sources go missing & unaccounted for CNS Global Incidents and Trafficking Database Potential weapons Radiological emission device (RED) Radiological dispersal device (RDD) Loss of life, negative health effects, high economic costs, psychological impact Picture source https://emergency.cdc.gov/radiation/pdf/infographic_radiological_exposure_device.pdf http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/goiania-unfall-1987-nuklearkatastrophe-in-brasilien-fotostrecke-107586-4.html http://homelandsecurity.iowa.gov/programs/RAD_shop.html http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/cns-global-incidents-and-trafficking-database/

Current U.S. Policy Tracks radiological sources National Source Tracking System National Nuclear Security Administration Recovers, secures, and disposes sources Weak legal framework Companies not held legally liable for sources Varying security standards across industry Picture source http://www.nrc.gov/security/byproduct/ismp/nsts.html As part of its mission, GTRI’s Domestic Protect Program, works with U.S. partner sites like hospitals, universities and industry to provide voluntary security enhancements to prevent terrorists from acquiring in-use radiological materials. In addition, GTRI safely and securely recovers radiological sources that U.S. partner sites are no longer using.

Problem Current policies fail to adequately address the threat of a terrorist group acquiring radioactive materials for a radioactive weapon. Picture from

Alternative Policies Legal liability Substitution/alternatives Cesium-137 blood irradiators Cost $2 million to replace, $25- $33,000 annual maintenance Additional $105,000 to decommission High costs; NIMBY disincentivizes political motivation Picture from https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2014/05/11/despite-safety-concerns-effort-phase-out-radioactive-medical-material-faces-resistance/fhNknm7ELLZBHSHC3AKI8L/story.html Cesium-137 blood irradiator

Security Culture Courses in University Curricula Industry is the first line of defense Owners and operators of sources Security culture courses in curricula Security is important A credible threat exists The human factor Underlying attitudes and beliefs shape behavior How to measure and improve? Elevates the importance of security among safety Figure from Texas A&M Picture from http://nsspi.tamu.edu/nssep/courses/nuclear-security-culture/characteristics-of-nuclear-security-culture/characteristics/characteristics Much of the nuclear security culture building happens at the organizational level, but it may be beneficial to work on instilling and building security culture at the learning level, which feeds into the organizational security culture. Security culture is a change in beliefs and attitudes that underpin a change in behavior. Description from Texas A&M website: By the end of this course, students should be able to describe the elements of good nuclear security culture, understand the roles of organizations and individuals in promoting good nuclear security culture, and identify the ways in which nuclear security culture may be evaluated and improved within an organization.

Implementation and Challenges Model existing security culture courses Texas A&M University Outreach to academia and university stakeholders Challenges Train-the-trainer Targeted pilot program Varying employment standards across industries Expand to industry training program

Conclusion Promotes security at the industry level Elevates security culture among safety and other industry standards Shared cost-burden between government and industry Supports efforts towards sustainable radiological security by targeting underlying attitudes and beliefs Substitution policies Sharing of best-practices and decision trends Ultimately, security comes down to the human factor, the people operating radiological material on a day-to-day basis. Incorporating security culture education at the industry level has the potential to promote security at the direct level and support continuing efforts towards sustainable radiological security. Developing and sustaining a security culture at the industry level is imperative for improving the security of industrial radioactive sources in the United States. Additionally, it is both economically and politically feasible at this time. Ultimately, it will work to support the two other policy options, substituting radioactive sources and sharing information on decision trends and best practices. At the same time, promoting security culture at the industry level will support the U.S. government’s current efforts to protect radioactive sources against theft by terrorists. http://

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