Brendan Rauw, MBA, CLP Introduction Executive Committee, Director of the Oregon Bioscience Association Launched 4 new companies across cancer therapeutics, microfluidic diagnostics, crowd sourcing (IT), and technology transfer Four technology transfer organizations (Columbia, KAUST, UCLA, OHSU) Success Stories: University Owned and/or Partnered Technology Investment Funds

University of California (1996-2005) Challenge of Technology Transfer University of California (1996-2005) Disclosures 100% Patents Filed 42% Licensed 17% Revenue $ 4% Blockbusters 0.1% Technology transfer is not easy One in 1,000 technologies drive economics

Startups and Licenses for US Universities Universities Increasingly Launching Startups Startups and Licenses for US Universities 45% increase in Startups relative to licenses Startups increasing faster than overall licenses Source: AUTM 2005-2016 (FY2005=1)

The Challenge of Funding Innovation Stages of Innovation Research Technology Startup TRANSLATIONAL GRANTS SEED INVESTMENT Investment ($) Time “Valley of Death” Government Funding Public Markets Nonprofit Foundations Venture Capital Industry Research Individuals Non-Dilutive Dilutive There is a gap in early stage funding between research and commercialization, particularly for startups

Venture Capital Is Highly Concentrated Venture Capital Investment (US$B) Seattle raises about 1/10 SF in Early-Stage Funding (all areas) Portland raises about 1/6 Seattle (all areas) Internal data suggests this is even more pronounced in healthcare VCs increasingly investing in later stage technologies Source: National Venture Capital Association

US University Venture Investment Models Key choices: Size, Management, Source Bluefield Innovations: $65M Fund raised by and managed by Deerfield Management. Launched in 2017. Investments focused on companies from Johns Hopkins University. 4490 Ventures: Fund I $30M launched in 2014. Funds came from WARF and State of Wisconsin. Fund II $49M launched in 2018, raised from external sources. Investments focused on companies in the Midwest. Rogue Ventures: Fund II $10M launched in 2016. ~20% of funds came from Oregon State U. Fund III $30M launched in 2017, with OSU being largest investor. No focus on investments of funds, although most have stayed regionally. W Fund: $20M fund with funds from VC firms, private industry, federal stimulus funds, and the UW. Launched in 2012. Investments focused on startups from UW and other Washington state research universities and institutions Drive Capital: Fund I $250M with $50M from The Ohio State University. Fund II launched in 2016 as $300M fund. Investments focused on companies in the Midwest. Blavatinik Biomed Accelerator: $50M philanthropic donation from the Blavatinik family, formed in 2013. Managed internally within Harvard. Carolina Research Venture Fund: $10M fund from internal sources. Managed as joint venture with Hatteras Venture Partners. Invests in startups from UNC-Chapel Hill. Bow Capital (formerly UC Ventures): $250M venture fund created by UC Regents in 2014. Managed internally and investments are made to innovation coming from the UC system. Horizon Fund: $50M fund from UT Board of Regents formed in 2011. Managed internally within UT. Investments are made in companies with technology from UT and/or in which UT holds equity in the company.

Oregon Health and Science University Size US$25 Million US$80 Million US$100 Million Focus Pacific Northwest United States Global Management University New GPs Experienced GPs Investment None $450K Up to US$25 Million Three fund attempts All GP / LP Structured All not exclusively OHSU-focused Challenges Timing Internal Support Management Delays Other LPs

Lessons Traditional VCs are not typically investing in university technologies There are economic and strategic reasons for increasing translational research funding Sources of funds need to account for institutional priorities Competing demands on alumni, philanthropists, government, nonprofits Successful investment requires specialized focus Expertise required depends on fund structure, objectives Potential conflicts need to be anticipated Commitment does not begin or end with the investment decision The “ecosystem” and support available matters There is no one “right” model adaptable to all contexts