Reserve Products Interaction

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Presentation transcript:

Reserve Products Interaction Lisa Morelli Manager, Real-Time Market Operations EPFSTF January 4, 2019 www.pjm.com

Reserve Services and Products Each service carries a reserve requirement and has an ORDC. 30 Minute Reserves Secondary Reserves (Response in minutes 10-30 from on and offline resources) Primary Reserves (Response in minutes 1-10) Non-Synch Reserves Synch Reserves Reserve Products Each product has a market and a clearing price. Clearing Price represents procurement of the Synch Reserve requirement Clearing price represents procurement of the balance of the Primary Reserve Requirement not met by Synch Reserves Clearing price represents procurement of the balance of the 30 Min Requirement not met by Synch and Non-Synch Reserves www.pjm.com

Reserve Substitution Sub-zone Synch Reserves Sub-zone Primary Reserves MW can be used to meet Sub-zone PR requirement or RTO SR requirement Product Substitution Sub-zone Primary Reserves MW can be used to meet RTO PR requirement or Sub-zone 30-Min requirement Product Substitution Sub-zone 30-Min Reserves MW can be used to meet RTO 30-Min requirement SR Price >= NSR Price NSR Price >= Secondary Reserve Price * Sub-zone will be modeled only when needed Sub-zone Price >= RTO Price Locational Substitution Locational Substitution Sub-zone Price >= RTO Price RTO Synch Reserves MW can be used to meet RTO PR requirement RTO Primary Reserves MW can be used to meet RTO 30-Min requirement RTO 30-Min Reserves NSR Price >= Secondary Reserve Price SR Price >= NSR Price www.pjm.com

Impact of Multiple Simultaneous Reserve Shortages The ORDC represents the reliability value of a single product in a single location Five separate ORDCs will exist to model reserves for each product/location combination A sixth ORDC will be created for Sub-Zone 30 Minute Reserves, but will only be modeled when operationally necessary due to gas contingencies or other conservative operations When there are multiple reserve products with substitution, the ability of one product to meet the requirement for another increases the reliability value of the “multi-purpose” reserve products Prices become additive www.pjm.com

Limitations on Additivity of Shortages From a pricing perspective, the most extreme shortage condition that could occur would be a shortage of Synchronized Reserve, Primary Reserve and 30-Min Reserve in both RTO and the Sub-zone Violation of all six reserve requirements Summation of 6 penalty factors As part of the initial implementation of shortage pricing, an administrative rule was implemented to allow, at maximum, two simultaneous shortages to affect energy and reserve prices (2 * Penalty Factor) Prior to the implementation of shortage pricing in 2012, historical experience was that there had never been more than two simultaneous reserve requirement violations at any one time During the Polar Vortex in 2014, PJM experienced a shortage of all four reserve requirements www.pjm.com

Proposal: Discontinuation of Administrative Reserve Price Capping PJM proposes to discontinue the practice of administratively capping the reserve prices. It artificially suppresses prices and is superseded by the use of the ORDC to reflect the reliability value of reserves. Simultaneous shortage of all reserve requirements in all locations is highly unlikely Procurement and valuation of 30 minute reserves can signal tightening conditions in advance of a shortage of primary or synch reserves (severely degraded operating conditions) Downward sloping demand curves reflect the reliability value of additional reserves for mitigating the risk of reserve shortages www.pjm.com

Resulting Increases to Max Energy & Reserve Prices Using a penalty factor of $2,000/MWh on each of the ORDCs will result in the following changes to the maximum energy and reserve clearing prices in the unlikely scenario of simultaneous shortage of all 3 reserve products in all locations Product Current Maximum Clearing Price($/MWh) Proposed Maximum Clearing Price ($/MWh) Secondary Reserves N/A $2,000* Primary Reserves $850 $6,000* Synchronized Reserves $1,700 $10,000* Energy $3,700 $12,000* (assumes the marginal energy resource is $2,000) * Assumes the sub-zone is not modeled for 30 Minute Reserve. In instances when the sub-zone is modeled, the $2000 penalty factor on the 30 Minute Reserve Sub-zone ORDC would also cascade through the above prices. www.pjm.com