Do incentives build robustness in BitTorrent?

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Presentation transcript:

Do incentives build robustness in BitTorrent? Dr. Yingwu Zhu

Overview BitTorrent: P2P file distribution tool designed with incentives for contribution Users need to contribute resources (upload capacity) to receive good performance. Main question: Can we cheat?

Incentives: tit-for-tat (TFT) Decisions about which peers to send data are made by each peer individually following a tit-for-tat policy: I'll send data to you if you've been sending data to me.

Real Users

Fairness

Altruism Expected percentage of upload capacity which is altruistic when defined as upload capacity not resulting in direct reciprocation

Building BitTyrant Can altruism in existing BitTorrent swarms be exploited by a selfish client? – Yes. Key idea: strategic selection of which peers and at what rates to send data

Core Algorithm

Results BitTyrant improves average download performance by 70%. Regardless of capacity, using BitTyrant is in the selfish interest of every peer individually. When all peers behave selfishly, average performance degrades for all peers, even those with high capacity.