Searle, Minds, Brains and Science Chapter 6 Philosophy 224 Searle, Minds, Brains and Science Chapter 6

A Quick Survey Discussions of freedom typically revolve around three possible positions that one can take on the possibility. Determinism: the claim that everything that happens is determined by antecedent causal conditions, up to and including the laws of nature. If determinism is true, then human free will is an illusion. Libertarianism: the claim that at least a range of human actions are the product of free, undetermined choice from a range of possibilities. Compatibilism: the claim that while determinism is the correct description of the universe, humans none the less have free will (in the sense that they can choose what they want without encumbrance).

Where does Searle Stand? Searle begins by noting the scope of the debate between determinism and libertarianism. There seem to be strong arguments on both sides of the issue. Searle suggests this may explain the popularity of compatibilism. Searle does not share this view, however. According to him, compatibilism either fails to answer the question concerning whether our behavior is determined or just refuses to acknowledge the force of our experience of freedom (collapsing into a form of determinism).

The experience of freedom If we think about this experience of freedom, we see that it serves as a reliable indication of a feature of our experience. The Hypnosis Example shows that there is a difference between our usual actions and actions done under compulsion. This sort of experience by itself is not enough to answer the question about the source of our behavior. But it does allow us to sharpen out analysis.

The Suspicious Determinist The suspicion the determinist has about this experience is that it seems contrary to what the sciences tell us is true about the world. The scientific analysis of the world moves from the bottom up. It starts with the smallest physical particles and builds all of the complex features of our experience out of these simples. This doesn't seem to leave any room for freedom of the will.

A Real Difference The recognition of the difference between our normal actions and acts done under compulsion allows us to specify certain features of our belief in freedom: Freedom is essentially tied to consciousness—only conscious things are believed to be free; More particularly, it seems to be an ineliminable part of one particular form of consciousness: intentional consciousness.

Conclusions The determinist/compatibilist assertion that all human behavior is compulsive turns out to be false. There is a real difference between free and non-free actions. As such, real significance is restored to the notion of possibility ('could have’). However, our scientific description of reality is incompatible with radical libertarianism (like Sartre’s). Nonetheless, we have the ineliminable experience of freedom, in such a way that we will never be able to accept the determinism of our scientific world view.