Boethius on the Problem of Freedom & Determinism Boethius (480-524 AD; Roman Official) Fluent in both Latin and Greek Familiar with works of both Plato & Aristotle Translated some of Aristotle’s logical works into Latin Thereby transmits Aristotle’s logical works to early medieval western Europe Aristotle’s other works remain unknown in western Europe until 1100+

Appointed to the office of Consul by the Roman Emperor Theodoric Christian, opposed to Arian heresy, which denied the full divinity of Christ and which was espoused by Theodoric Accused of treason, imprisoned & executed While imprisoned composed The Consolation of Philosophy, which includes an analysis of the problem of freedom and determinism

Freedom & Determinism Is Human Freedom Compatible with God’s omniscience? If God already knows with complete certainty whatever you will ever do, how could your future be up to you to determine? How could you be genuinely free in planning your life and enacting your plans if God already knows what you will plan and what you will do?

The Incompatibilist Argument An Incompatibilist argues as follows that God’s omniscience is incompatible with human freedom: God foreknows everything that will happen So, God foreknows my future in full detail What God foreknows necessarily happens exactly as it does happen Hence, my future necessarily happens exactly as it does If my future necessarily happens exactly as it does, then I am not free Consequently, I am not free!

Boethius Rejects the Incompatibilist Argument The Incompatibilist Argument conceals a mistake pertaining to how the concept of necessity appears in the argument It is true that if my future is necessary, then I am not free But the argument fails to prove that my future is necessary because the argument mistakenly asserts: (3.a) What God foreknows necessarily happens exactly as it does happen

Boethius Rejects the Incompatibilist Argument Rather, the following is true: (4.a) Necessarily, what God foreknows happens exactly as it does. (4.a) merely and trivially implies (5.a) What God foreknows happens exactly as it does. God’s foreknowledge does imply that everything happens exactly as it does Hence, everything I do happens exactly as it does But since (7) does not refer to the necessity of anything that I do, we may maintain that the Incompatibilist has failed to demonstrate that God’s omniscience is incompatible with human freedom

Omniscience as “Vision” of the Future Your vision of the present, does not in itself impose any necessity on the present You see that the ball is red Your so seeing does not in itself make it necessary that the ball is red Your knowledge of the present, like vision of the present, does not in itself impose any necessity on the present You know that the ball is red Your so knowing does not in itself make it necessary that the ball is red God’s omniscience is merely knowledge of all time. God’s knowledge of all time, like your knowledge of the present, does not it itself impose any necessity on the past, present or future