Impact of Hypersonic Glide Technologies on Nuclear Deterrence Rachel wiener Advanced delivery system readiness manager Department of energy National nuclear Security Administration 2016 CSIS PONI Nuclear Scholar

Disclaimer The views and opinions expressed in this presentation are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency of the U.S. government. Examples of analysis performed within this article are only examples. Assumptions made within the analysis are not reflective of the position of any U.S. government entity

The Question What should the United States do as adversarial nuclear weapon states develop and deploy potentially destabilizing nuclear-armed hypersonic glide vehicles?

Graphic redacted from James Acton, “Silver Bullet,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013 http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf

Current Threat Landscape Russia and China continue significant advancements in offensive hypersonic missile technologies Recently announced intent to insert nuclear weapons Hypersonic vehicles designed to evade ballistic missile defenses United States currently unable to defend against incoming vehicles Not only problem for United States, but also for its allies

Russian Program One publicly acknowledged hypersonic glide vehicle Yu-71 intended for operational deployment in mid-2020s Possible option of deploying with nuclear and conventional missiles Five flight tests between 2011 and 2016 First successful April 2016 Part of Project 4202 Effort to overcome U.S. ballistic missile defenses as counter to NATO Focus on modernizing entire arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems

Chinese Program One publicly acknowledged class of hypersonic boost-glide vehicle DF-ZF intended for operational deployment in mid-2020s Also possible option of deploying with nuclear and conventional explosives Seven flight tests between 2014 and 2016, six successful Noteworthy capability to penetrate layered missile defense system of U.S. and allies Only member of Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT ) Declared Nuclear Weapons States that is increasing overall size of its nuclear weapons arsenal

U.S. Program Experimented with hypersonic technology since inception of conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) program in 2003 Hypersonic Test Vehicle-2 (HTV-2) Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) Four flight tests between 2010 and 2014 Only successful in 2011 - AHW Tests of a scaled version of AHW scheduled for 2017 and 2019 Hypersonic vehicles not aspect of current U.S. nuclear modernization efforts CPGS program limited design and technical specifications of prototypes to outfit only conventional weapons

Total Flight Tests by Nation since Hypersonic Program Inception Flight Test Occurrences 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 2 1 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Year Russia China U.S.

Recommendation #1: United States should modify Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) scope of work to begin the exploration of dual-capable hypersonic platforms Requires policy change regarding nuclear modernization Technological improvements and increased rate of testing 2017 Nuclear Posture Review to reassess development and properly inform the establishment of a future congressional program of record

Recommendation #2: Develop countermeasures for hypersonic vehicles Yu Li and Nai-gang Cui, “Optimal Attack Trajectory for Hypersonic Boost-Glide Missile in Maximum Reachable Domain,” International Conference on Mechatronics and Automation, 2009, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5246695/.

Recommendation #3: Promote establishment of international norms Engaging in Track II diplomacy may be precursor to confidence-building measures necessary for establishment of international norms Demonstrated success with collaborative technical exchanges might to lead to employment of confidence-building measures U.S. might consider bilateral or multilateral exchanges to underscore stated purpose of ballistic missile defense system Reduction in tensions and uncertainty may lay foundation for Track I diplomatic negotiations

Final Thoughts The U.S. must plan for an approaching strategic imbalance Continued Russian and Chinese refinement of hypersonic glide technology and weapons create untenable security situation Must make use of the 2017 Nuclear Posture Review including potential insertion into Ground Based Strategic Deterrent Improve ballistic missile defense system capabilities Engage Russia and China in establishment of bilateral or trilateral agreements