Chapter 14 Strategy

Table 14.1 Simultaneous Entry Game © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

Solved Problem 14.1 (Page 483) © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

Figure 14.1 Whether an Incumbent Pays to Prevent Entry © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

Figure 14.2 Noncredible Threat © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

Figure 14.3 Game Trees for the Deterred Entry and Stackelberg Equilibria © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

Table 14.2 Entrant’s Best Response and Profit © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

Figure 14.4 Cournot and Stackelberg Equilibria © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

Figure 14.5 Incumbent Commits to a Large Quantity to Deter Entry © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

Figure 14.6 Incumbent Loss if it Deters Entry © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

Solved Problem 14.3 (Page 496) © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

Figure 14.7 Investment Game Tree © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

Figure 14.8 Raising-Costs Game Tree © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

Application (Page 503) Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

Figure 14.9 Advertising © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

Figure 14.10 Shifts in the Marginal Benefit of Advertising © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

Table 14.3 Advertising Game © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved

Cross-Chapter Analysis (Page 515) Magazine Subscriptions © 2004 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved