Security for Measurement Requests and Information

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Doc.: IEEE /1063r0 Submission Nov 2005 Jon Edney, NokiaSlide 1 The Lock-out Problem - an Analysis Notice: This document has been prepared to assist.
Advertisements

Doc.: IEEE /109r1 Submission July 2002 J. Edney, H. Haverinen, J-P Honkanen, P. Orava, Nokia Slide 1 Temporary MAC Addresses for Anonymity Jon.
Doc.: IEEE /1219r2 Submission January, 2006 S. Ponnuswamy (Aruba Networks)Slide 1 Virtual AP Presentation Notice: This document has been prepared.
Doc.: IEEE /0485r0 Submission May 2004 Jesse Walker and Emily Qi, Intel CorporationSlide 1 Management Protection Jesse Walker and Emily Qi Intel.
SubmissionJoe Kwak, InterDigital1 Simplified 11k Security Joe Kwak InterDigital Communications Corporation doc: IEEE /552r0May 2004.
Doc.: IEEE k Submission July 2004 Bernard Aboba, MicrosoftSlide 1 IEEE k Security: A Conceptual Model Bernard Aboba Microsoft.
Doc.: IEEE /552r0 Submission July 2003 Jon Edney, NokiaSlide 1 Protection of Action Frames Jon Edney Nokia
Doc.: IEEE /0343r1 Submission May 2005 Kapil Sood, IntelSlide 1 Protection of Management Frames - Protocol Requirements Notice: This document.
FILS Reduced Neighbor Report
Security Enhancement to FTM
Comment Resolution Actions
doc.: IEEE /xxx Jon Edney, Nokia
Service discovery architecture for TGaq
Directed Multicast Service (DMS)
Issues of MAC Management Security
Resource Request/Response Discussion
Broadcast and Unicast Management Protection (BUMP)
Motions to Address Some Letter Ballot 52 Comments
Which Management Frames Need Protection?
Multiple SSID Support Authors: November 2006 Date:
Mesh Security Proposal
Key Descriptor Version in EAPOL Key Frames
MAC Address Hijacking Problem
Wake Up Frame to Indicate Group Addressed Frames Transmission
RSC Pools for Mgmt Frames
Secure WUR frames Date: Authors: January 2018
March 2018 Project: IEEE P Working Group for Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs) Submission Title: [SG SECN Call for Proposals] Date Submitted:
Limiting Degrees of Freedom for Measurement Requests
Broadcast and Unicast Management Protection (BUMP)
Mesh Frame Formats Date: Authors: July 2007 March 2007
Broadcast and Unicast Management Protection (BUMP)
FILS Reduced Neighbor Report
Element for Legacy Indication
Beacon Protection Date: Authors: July 2018 July 2018
Beacon Protection Date: Authors: May 2018 January 2018
Security for Measurement Requests and Information
Security for Measurement Requests and Information
CID#102 - Channel Allocation
A Review of the Site Reporting Protocol in IEEE802.11k Draft 0.2
Pre-Association Negotiation of Management Frame Protection (PANMFP)
Directed Multicast Service (DMS)
Reducing Overhead in Active Scanning with Simulation Results
Mechanism to update current session parameters
doc.: IEEE /454r0 Bob Beach Symbol Technologies
Management Frame Policy Definition
FILS Handling of Large Objects
CID#89-Directed Multicast Service (DMS)
Air Efficiency and Reliability Enhancements for Multicast
Channel Allocation March 2008 Authors: Date: Month Year
Options for Protecting Management Frames
Mesh Security Proposal
Reducing Overhead in Active Scanning with Simulation Results
Beacon Protection Date: Authors: July 2018 July 2018
Session MAC Address Solves Deadlocks
Limiting GAS State-1 Query Response Length
Beacon Protection Date: Authors: May 2018 January 2018
Air Efficiency and Reliability Enhancements for Multicast
Use of EAPOL-Key messages
Directed Multicast Service (DMS)
Mesh Frame Formats Date: Authors: July 2007 March 2007
A Better Way to Protect APE Messages
Counter With Cipher Block Chaining-MAC
Virtual AP Presentation
TGi Draft 1 Clause – 8.5 Comments
Multiple SSID Support Authors: September 2006 Date:
Reducing Overhead in Active Scanning
Location Presentation
Request for Legacy IE ID for RSN Extension
Location Presentation
Patrick Worfolk (Kiwi Networks)
Presentation transcript:

Security for Measurement Requests and Information Month 2002 doc.: IEEE 802.11-02/xxxr0 Jan 2004 Security for Measurement Requests and Information Jon Edney, Nokia Corp. Dan Harkins, Trapeze Networks Henry Haverinen, Nokia Corp. Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks John Doe, His Company

Jan 2004 Goals Provide optional confidentiality of TGk information within a group of stations Provide optional source authentication for unicast action frames Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks

Problem with only Protecting Action Frames Jan 2004 Problem with only Protecting Action Frames Just encrypt Action frames Use pairwise keys for unicast frames Use group key for multicast frames Problem: Not all TGk information is sent in action frames Requirement is protect TGk information not just action frames Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks

Core Assumptions IEEE802.11i is completed as per current draft. Jan 2004 Core Assumptions IEEE802.11i is completed as per current draft. Good keys are available and managed under IEEE802.11i Information is secret to a group of stations but need not be hidden from other group members Source authentication and data integrity might be needed for some types of data Most violations of source authentication and data integrity only result in DOS attack by providing misinformation Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks

Jan 2004 Flexible approach Approach allows protection Information Elements separate from delivery method Approach also allows authentication and integrity protection of Action Frames IE protection is based on a group key rather than pairwise key Action Frame protection based on pairwise key for source integrity Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks

Jan 2004 Concept Summary Contents of TGk information elements are protected using a group key. This protects against unauthorised disclosure, modification, forgery and replay by non-group member Contents of unicast TGk Action frame can be optionally protected with pairwise MIC to protect against modification, forgery by group member Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks

Examples Hiding channel map information in a Probe Response Jan 2004 Examples Hiding channel map information in a Probe Response TGK IE Probe Response Probe Response cont… Broadcast action frame with partly hidden information Action Frame Hdr TGK IE Fully protected unicast action frame Action Frame Hdr MIC TGK IE Protected by Group Key Protected by Pairwise Key Unprotected Other Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks

Information Elements Four IEs eligible for protection: Jan 2004 Information Elements Four IEs eligible for protection: Measurement Request Measurement Report AP Channel Report Site Report Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks

General format for “Protectable IEs” Jan 2004 General format for “Protectable IEs” New Same as current draft Elem ID Length Flags Security Hdr. (opt) Element Specific Data Rsvd Protected Key ID ESN0 ESN1 ESN2 ESN3 ESN4 ESN5 b0 - b4 b5 b6 - b7 Protected bit indicates Whether Security header is present ESN = Element Sequence number (increments for each IE generated) Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks

Protection of IE using CCM Jan 2004 Protection of IE using CCM Elem ID Length Flags ESN0-5 Element Specific Data AAD Source MAC (TA) CCM Processing Nonce PIEkey Elem ID Length Flags ESN0-5 Protected Data MIC Note: Use of group key means there is no source integrity. Source MAC address is included to prevent Nonce collisions Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks

Jan 2004 Replay Protection PIEkey has group sequence number “Element Sequence Number” (ESN). Each Station tries to keep value of ESN up to date from received PIEs. This is “Transmit PIE” (TESN) Each station is given up to date ESN with key on first connection (First TESN) Possible race condition on transmit by two stations using same ESN Problem resolved by keeping separate ESN value for each station from which PIEs are received Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks

Maintaining the TESN Value is initialized from PIEkey key message Jan 2004 Maintaining the TESN Value is initialized from PIEkey key message When receiving valid PIE from other station, if ESN in received frame is greater than TESN then TESN is updated TESN is increment by one prior to each PIE generation Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks

ESN Table Keep entry for each other station Jan 2004 ESN Table Keep entry for each other station When receiving PIE from other station check that ESN is greater than last value received Initialize entry for each other station using own value of TESN Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks

Action Frames Generic format of action frame Jan 2004 Action Frames Generic format of action frame Category Action Details Existing TGk Radio Measurement Format 03 Action Dlg Tkn Information Elements Protected (& unprotected) Information Elements go here Proposed TGk Radio Measurement Format 03 Control Dlg Tkn MIC (opt) Information Elements 12 octets MIC computed over action frame plus TA & RA Using AES-CBC-MAC-96 – start block as per CCMP Using Pairwise keys of TA and RA Prot bit indicates Whether MIC present Prot Action b0 b1 - 7 Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks

Keys Protected Information Element Key (PIEkey) Jan 2004 Keys Protected Information Element Key (PIEkey) Derived for each station from GMK Delivered using EAPOL-Key message Must be recomputed when group key updated MGK = PRF-128(GMK, “Protected IE Expansion”||AA||Nonce) Measurement Pairwise Key (MPK) Use existing pairwise keys Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks

Negotiating Capabilities Jan 2004 Negotiating Capabilities New IE indicates PIE capability Included in beacons and Probe Resp by AP Indicates whether protected PIE is mandatory STA includes IE in assoc request if it wants to protect PIEs or not Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks

Jan 2004 Questions Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks

Jan 2004 Motion Move that TGk adopt the security approach described in doc 04-1003-00 and instruct the editor to incorporate the text of 04-0036-00 into the TGk draft Edney,Haverinen:Nokia, Harkins:Trapeze Networks