“They shouldn´t” or “Thou shalt not”: The impact of minimal or maximal goal-type on explicit negative intergroup behaviour Bastian Lücke, Thomas Kessler, Amélie Mummendey, Anne Berthold

Introduction Aims of the research: Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Introduction Aims of the research: 1. Distinction between minimal and maximal goals (goal-type) as factor affecting explicit negative behavior towards outgroups. 2. Experimental study of explicit negative behavior towards outgroups (research paradigm).

Theory: Minimal and maximal goals Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Theory: Minimal and maximal goals The distinction between minimal and maximal goals: (Kessler, Neumann, Mummendey, Berthold, Schubert & Waldzus, submitted; Fritsche, Kessler, Mummendey & Neumann, 2009; Berthold, Mummendey, Kessler & Lücke, submitted) Example Groups: Economists and Social Psychologists Goal: No deception in experimental studies (e.g. Cook & Yamagishi, 2008; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2002) Minimal goal: NO DECEPTION whatsoever (dichotomous evaluation). Maximal goal: As little deception as possible (graded evaluation).

Deception Example: Minimal goal Maximal goal additional information Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Deception Example: Minimal goal Maximal goal additional information no deception some deception massive deception

Definition goal-types Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Definition goal-types Maximal goal: Goal that should be achieved as much as possible → graded evaluation. Minimal goal: Goal that can either be achieved or not → dichotomous evaluation. Minmax Hypothesis (H1) More explicit negative behavior is shown by members of an IG if a goal is violated by the OG that is represented by a members of the IG as a minimal goal, less negative behavior is shown if the violated goal is represented as a maximal goal. Moral Outrage Hypothesis (H2) The impact of goal-type on negative behavior by members of an IG towards the deviant OG is mediated by moral outrage towards the OG.

Manipulation of goal-type Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Manipulation of goal-type Public Good Game Contribution rate Minimal goal Maximal goal 100 % 60 % 50 % 0 %

Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Study I Goal: Making money by contributing a share of the initial endowment Maximal goal condition: Gradual Public Good Game Contribute as much as possible. Minimal goal condition: Step level Public Good Game Threshold: 60 %. IG OG - Minimal groups: Other 2 IG players contribute more than 60 % Entire OG contributes less than 60 % - Exact amount of the initial endowment uncertain - Exact same contributions of other 5 co-players in both conditions!

Study I Contributions: Minimal goal condition: 62 %; SD=22,98 Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Study I Contributions: Minimal goal condition: 62 %; SD=22,98 Maximal goal condition: 77 %; SD=14,26 New DV: The „lottery item“ → Generalized social exclusion Identification: M=5.29; SD=1.03 (Cronbachs α=.94) Monetary punishment / identification r=.233, n.s. Moral outrage / identification: r=.360, p=.012 Exclusion (lottery item) / identification r=.394, p=.006

Study I: Results Moral outrage towards OG (Cronbachs α=.92) Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Study I: Results Moral outrage towards OG (Cronbachs α=.92) Monetary punishment of OG-members Minimal goal M = 3.19 SD = 2.06 Maximal goal M = 2.15 SD = 1.84 Minimal goal M = 4.46 SD = 2.00 Maximal goal M = 3.45 SD = 1.92 F (1, 46) = 4.055, p = .025, η2 = .08 F (1, 46) = 3.124, p = .042, η2 = 0.06

Study I: Results Exclusion (from future rounds) Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Study I: Results Exclusion (from future rounds) Social Exclusion (lottery-item) Minimal goal M = 4.54 SD = 2.34 Maximal goal M = 3.09 SD = 1.90 Minimal goal M = 5.69 SD = 1.67 Maximal goal M = 4.86 SD = 1.55 F (1, 46) = 5.411, p = .012, η2 = .11 F (1, 46) = 3.133, p = .042, η2 = .06 Monetary punishment / exclusion (future rounds): r=.692, p<.001 Monetary punishment / exclusion (lottery item): r=.320, p=.026 Exclusion (future rounds) / exclusion (lottery item): r=.320, p=.026

Study I: Criticism Conceptual differences between payoff matrices in a Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Study I: Criticism Conceptual differences between payoff matrices in a gradual public good game and a step-level public good game Payoffs from Public Good Individual payoff Individual payoff step-level gradual Δ p1 Δ p1 Δ p2 average contribution rate average contribution rate Conceptual difference, even if payoffs and Δ p1 are kept constant!

Study II Framing of goaltype Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Study II Framing of goaltype Exact same – gradual – payoff matrix in both goaltype-conditions. Only difference: Group goal that participants are supposed to suggest is either framed as minimal or maximal.

Study II: Results Participants contributions: Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Study II: Results Participants contributions: Minimal goal condition: 63 % (SD=19.84) Maximal goal condition: 75 % (SD=14.10) Moral outrage towards OG (Cronbachs α=.83) Max M = 2.41 SD = 1.35 Min M = 3.43 SD = 1.76 F (1, 46) = 4.991, p = .015, η2 = .10

Study II: Results Monetary punishment of OG-members Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Study II: Results Monetary punishment of OG-members Social exclusion of OG-members Min M = 5.38 SD = 1.38 Max M = 4.35 SD = 1.64 Min M = 4.79 SD = 1.79 Max M = 3.57 SD = 1.95 F (1,46) = 5.422, p = .012, η2 = .11 F (1,46) = 5.044, p = .015, η2 = .10 Monetary punishment & social exclusion: r = .487, p = .001

Studies I – III: Summary Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Studies I – III: Summary Combined sample Similar experimental design and the same hypotheses and dv - No interactions between the factors „study“ and „goal-type“ - No significant differences over the 3 studies with regard to level of identification, negative emotions towards OG, social exclusion, contribution; (exception: punishment)

Studies I – III: Summary Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Studies I – III: Summary Effect of goal-type on moral outrage towards OG: F (1, 153) = 14.27, p < .001, η2 = .09 Effect of goal-type on social exclusion of members of the OG: F (1, 153) = 10.20, p = .002, η2 = .08 Effect of goal-type on monetary punishment of the OG: F (1, 153) = 14.25, p < .001, η2 = .09 Behavioral measures: „Monetary punishment“ and „social exclusion“: r = .577, p < .001

Studies I - III: Summary Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Studies I - III: Summary outrage towards OG β = -.293 ** β = .582 ** goal-type social exclusion β = -.251 ** (-.088 n.s.) Test of the indirect effect: Bootstrapping (N=2000) b=-.68, p=.0006, BCa(95%)=[-1.0523,-.3257].

Studies I - III: Summary Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Studies I - III: Summary outrage towards OG β = -.293 ** β = .534 ** goal-type monetary punishment β = -.293 ** (-.149 *) Test of the indirect effect: Bootstrapping (N=2000) b=-.56, p=.0009, BCa(95%)=[-1.0583,-.3182].

Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect VII Summary Working experimental paradigm to research explicit negative behavior towards OG-members - H1: Minimal goal-representation leads to more explicit negative behavior towards the OG than a maximal goal-representation H2 : This relation is mediated by moral outrage towards the outgroup. Several replications of these results, excluding possible influence of the research paradigm

Thank You! Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Thank You!

Study I Contributions: Minimal goal condition: 71 %; SD=14,37 Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Study I Contributions: Minimal goal condition: 71 %; SD=14,37 Maximal goal condition: 76 %; SD=21,61 Identification: M=5.25; SD=1.40, Cronbachs α=.91 Monetary punishment / identification with IG: r=.279, p=.037 Moral outrage / identification with IG: r=.457, p=.001

Study I - Results Moral outrage towards OG (Cronbachs α=.78) Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Study I - Results Moral outrage towards OG (Cronbachs α=.78) Monetary punishment Minimal goal Maximal goal Minimal goal Maximal goal M = 4.53 SD = 2.06 M = 3.30 SD = 1.97 M = 3.77 SD = 1.53 M = 2.92 SD = 1.50 F (1, 59) = 5.61, p = .011, η2 = .09 F (1, 59) = 4.67, p = .018, η2 = .08 No effect of relative difference in payoff on behavior and emotion!

Study I - Criticism Study II Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect Study I - Criticism In minimal goal condition, goal level was given, in maximal goal condition not. → Possible influence of authority/ justification/ attribution. Study II Self selection of group-goal Goal selection: Participants were allegedly randomly selected to suggest a contribution between 10% and 100% as group goal. New DVs: The „lottery item“ – Generalized social exclusion Exclusion from future rounds