Russian Perceptions of non-nuclear deterrence

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Presentation transcript:

Russian Perceptions of non-nuclear deterrence Harrison Menke is currently a wargaming analyst at SAIC and a recent graduate of Missouri State Defense and Strategic Studies program headed by Dr. Keith Payne. Harrison's studies focused on nuclear deterrence and Russian nuclear strategy. His thesis examined Russian nuclear posture with regard to Europe and earned Thesis with Distinction honors. Harrison's writings have appeared in US News & World Report, Defense News, and the Missile Defense Review. His views are his own and do not represent those of organizations' he is affiliated with. Harrison Menke Menke007@live.missouristate.edu

Introduction Research Question: What are Russian Perceptions of Non-Nuclear Deterrence? Russian Assumptions Current Confines of Non-Nuclear Deterrence

Doctrine Military Doctrine (2010, 2014) Russia Understands Nuclear Weapons Cannot be a Panacea Kokoshin and Pre-Nuclear Deterrence “Strategic Gesture”

Roles, Targets, and Intentions Early Stage: Targets Depth and C2 As Escalation Continues: Targets Shift to Civilian Politico-Economic Infrastructure Non-Nuclear De-Escalation?

Kremlin Approval: Capabilities New Strike Platforms Improved Missiles Leadership Views “…Russia has the will to use them [Russia’s non-nuclear deterrent] if it satisfies the national interests of our state and our people.” –V.V. Putin Far Left: Lada Grigorovich-class Yasen Buyan-M (Bottom) Demonstrate a Russian commitment to nonnuclear deterrenc

Naval Launch Point Coverage Below are nine maps depicting approximate range rings for an SS-N-30A launch platform (ship or submarine) operating in various areas of the world. The yellow and red rings depict 1,300km/700nm (conventional) and 3,000km/1,620nm (nuclear) ranges, respectively. The launch points chosen are not meant to suggest actual planned launch areas, but simply to provide a sense of LACM coverage. Yellow Rings: 1,300 km Red Rings: 3,000 km *Maps from 7 Fee Beneath the Keel, “The RF Navy vs Your ‘Critically Important Facilities,” March 29, 2015.

The Syrian Testing Ground Russian Cruise Missile Launches “…Russia has the will to use them [Russia’s non-nuclear deterrent] if it satisfies the national interests of our state and our people.” –V.V. Putin *Map partly from The Aviationist, “This Infographic Provides All the Details About the Russian Strategic Bomber Fleet Operations Over Syria,” Nov. 21, 2015.

Implications A New Coercive Toolkit Weakens Traditional Conventional-Nuclear Firebreaks Strategic Effects without Crossing the Nuclear Threshold Likely to Encourage Escalation and Crisis Instability

Complex Response “Shaping the Environment Before Crisis and Conflict” Diplomatic/Messaging Denial Capabilities