Lecture 5 CSE 331 Sep 7, 2012

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Homeworks HW 1 posted online: see blog/piazza Pickup graded HW 0 in TA OHs

On matchings Mal Wash Simon Inara Zoe Kaylee

A valid matching Mal Wash Simon Inara Zoe Kaylee

Not a matching Mal Wash Simon Inara Zoe Kaylee

Perfect Matching Mal Wash Simon Inara Zoe Kaylee

Preferences Mal Wash Simon Inara Zoe Kaylee

Instability Mal Wash Simon Inara Zoe Kaylee

Even though BBT and JA are not very happy A stable marriage Even though BBT and JA are not very happy

Two stable marriages

Stable Marriage problem Input: M and W with preferences Output: Stable Matching Set of men M and women W Preferences (ranking of potential spouses) Matching (no polygamy in M X W) Perfect Matching (everyone gets married) m w m’ w’ Instablity Stable matching = perfect matching+ no instablity

Questions/Comments?

Two Questions Does a stable marriage always exist? If one exists, how quickly can we compute one?

Today’s lecture Naïve algorithm Gale-Shapley algorithm for Stable Marriage problem

Discuss: Naïve algorithm!

The naïve algorithm Go through all possible perfect matchings S n! matchings If S is a stable matching then Stop Else move to the next perfect matching

Gale-Shapley Algorithm David Gale Lloyd Shapley O(n3) algorithm

Moral of the story… >

Questions/Comments?

Gale-Shapley Algorithm Intially all men and women are free While there exists a free woman who can propose Let w be such a woman and m be the best man she has not proposed to w proposes to m If m is free (m,w) get engaged Else (m,w’) are engaged If m prefers w’ to w w remains free Else (m,w) get engaged and w’ is free Output the engaged pairs as the final output

Preferences Mal Wash Simon Inara Zoe Kaylee

GS algorithm: Firefly Edition Mal Inara 1 2 3 4 5 6 Wash Zoe 1 Simon Kaylee