Risk assessment Laboratory diagnostic test results received

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Presentation transcript:

Risk assessment Laboratory diagnostic test results received Initial phone call reporting unusual mortality or signs of disease Action required. Request samples for testing and collect epidemiological data (refer SOP). Categorise the disease No action required. Document decision and inform customer and policy (Is there sufficient evidence to suggest non-infectious cause?) Category 1. Suspect endemic disease but test to exclude exotics. Category 2. Exotic or new/ emerging disease suspected. On-site structured disease investigation (refer SOP). Movement controls enforced. Laboratory diagnostic test results received Endemic- provide disease management advice, farm to self-manage. Unclear. Further investigation may be required. If category 2, treat as exotic until more is known. Exotic or serious emerging Determine extent, source and impact. Consult with industry and determine feasibility of eradication or zoning Eradicate Control and mitigation Containment, control and zoning Destroy/harvest all affected or potentially exposed ponds/ units that are not contained (refer SOP) Contained units (eg recirc indoors) can be held pending test results. Movement controls from infected and high risk properties Healthy prawns from affected or potentially exposed ponds can be sold if risk is not exacerbated (eg cooked and timelines are not affected) Surveillance to determine extent. Continue if eradication feasible. If not (eg found in wild), shift to zones or mitigation Surveillance to demonstrate freedom Eradicate diseased ponds in free zone only. In infected zone, growout and harvest is allowed with on-farm processing before movement (cooking or freezing depending on the disease). Strict disinfection protocols enforced for vehicles and other potential carriers Movement of live or infectious prawns allowed from free zone only. Infected farms must prove freedom before they are allowed to move live stock into the free zone. Surveillance to determine extent. If widespread or zoning no longer feasible, move to control and mitigation Industry-based program to mitigate the effects of the disease Government may provide assistance to adjust to ongoing management Maintain Biosecurity zones Risk assessment Freedom demonstrated Disease endemic

Suspected (initial investigation) Level 1 (endemic) Level 2 (exotic or serious emerging disease) Suspected (initial investigation) Farmer to send samples Movement controls may be advised Farm management to determine which ponds are affected or exposed and implement on-farm disease response SOP BQ to conduct lab testing and epidemiological data to be collected by phone / email. Farmer to send samples immediately Movement controls enforced Affected pond/s isolated BQ on-site investigation to determine: which ponds/farms are affected or ‘exposed’ evidence for introduction pathway take further samples – note the initial sampling may be done by staff rather than the farmer. This will depend on staff availability and travel logistics Disease confirmed Farm to manage with advice from BQ where needed Assume eradication is feasible until surveillance shows otherwise Immediate net harvest /eradication of all affected or likely exposed ponds. Cooked for viruses/ frozen ok for AHPND