Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance CharlesP.Himmelberga R.GlennHubbardab DariusPaliaac.

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Presentation transcript:

Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance CharlesP.Himmelberga R.GlennHubbardab DariusPaliaac 201805.06 方严 mpacc2班

目录 contents Introduction 1 An empirical framework for analyzing executive contracts 2 3 The data Determinants of managerial ownership: empirical evidence 4 Managerial ownership and firm performance 5 6 Conclusions

Abstract Both managerial ownership and performance are endogenously determined by exogenous (and only partly observed) changes in the firm's contracting environment. A large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity. Moreover, after controlling both for observed firm characteristics and firm fixed effects, we cannot conclude (econometrically) that changes in managerial ownership affect firm performance.

1、Introduction First,proxies for the contracting environment faced by the firm (i.e., observable firm characteristics) strongly predict the structure of managerial ownership.many of our results are robust to the inclusion of observed determinants of managerial ownership, industry fixed effects, or firm fixed effects. Second,managerial ownership and firm performance are determined by common characteristics, some of which are unobservable to the econometrician. Third, we explore the use of instrumental variables as an alternative to fixed effects to control for the endogeneity of managerial ownership in the Q regression. We find some evidence to support a causal link from ownership to performance, but this evidence is tentative because of the weakness of our instruments. We argue that future progress will require a more structural approach to the model.

2、An empirical framework for analyzing executive contracts superior monitoring technology superior monitoring technology a lower level of managerial ownership a higher valuation Intangible assets a higher fraction of its asset a higher level of managerial ownership a higher Q value variation in the degree of market power more market power higher levels of managerial ownership better firm performance

Formula derivation (1)mit=β1xit+γ1ui+eit (2)yit=θmit+β2xit+γ2ui+vit. (3)Qit=δyit+β3xit+γ3ui+wit. (4)Qit=δθmit+(δβ2+β3)xit+(δγ2+γ3)ui+δvit+wit. (5)Qit=a0+a1mit+a2xit+εit. (6)E(mitεit)=E((β1xit+γ1ui)(δγ2+γ3)ui)=γ1(δγ2+γ3)σ2υ.

First Second Fourth Third empirical inquiry we investigate the extent to which the empirical relation between managerial ownership and firm performance (measured by Tobin's Q) can be explained by the omission of observed and unobserved firm characteristic we explore whether the observed firm characteristics influence managerial ownership in ways that are consistent with theoretical predictions. First Second Third Fourth we investigate the importance of unobserved characteristics as determinants of managerial ownership. we explore the possibility of using instrumental variables to recover the parameter values in Eq. (5).

3、The data Table 2. Managerial ownership stakes by firm size, 1982 Table 1. Sample of Compustat firms by year

4、Determinants of managerial ownership: empirical evidence If the scope for managerial discretion differs across firms according to observable differences in the composition of assets, then a prediction of the theory is that firms with assets that are difficult to monitor will have higher levels of managerial ownership. We extend their specification by adding a large number of explanatory variables designed to proxy for the scope for managerial discretion, namely, size, capital intensity, cash flow, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, and gross investment rates.

Table 4. (A) Determinants of total equity ownership by top managers*

(B) Determinants of average equity ownership per manager

5、Managerial ownership and firm performance 5.1. Evidence on the exogeneity of managerial ownership In this section, we use panel data techniques to investigate more directly the question of whether managerial ownership can be treated as exogenous in the performance regressions. We use Tobin's Q as our measure of firm performance, but our results are robust to using return on assets as the dependent variable (tables are available upon request) 5.2. Toward a more structural interpretation of contracting relations The strength of the empirical evidence against the exogeneity of managerial ownership suggests that more model structure is required to identify the impact of managerial ownership on firm value.

6. Conclusions We find that a large fraction of the cross-sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity. This unobserved heterogeneity in the contracting environment has important implications for econometric models designed to estimate the effect of managerial ownership on firm performance. First, the simultaneous choice of individual mechanisms or some subset needs to be modeled; subsets of these choices have been considered in a reduced-form setting,. Second, the choice of mechanisms likely involves some fixed costs or `costs of adjustment’ so that firms are not always at their long-run contractual optimum. Exploring these costs and how they might have changed over time for different agency-cost-reducing mechanisms is a particularly interesting task for future research.

谢谢观看 mpacc2班 方严 2018.05.06