ESCAPE from FREERIDERS

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Presentation transcript:

ESCAPE from FREERIDERS Today is the FIRST day in Europe. (in each slide) Title → SUMMARY → read out → MOVE. Jun Kobayashi (U of Chicago) Hirokuni Ooura (Teikyo U) Hideki Ishihara (Rikkyo U) August 21, 2003 Marstrand, Sweden

COOPERATION in Dilemmas… 1 QUESTION In MODERN SOCIETIES… We can CHANGE PARTNERS. Divorce, Move, Change Job, Immigration. COOPERATION in Dilemmas… when CHANGE PARTNERS? My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE.

ESCAPE  COOPERATION. 2 THEORY SELECTIVE INTERACTION (Dawes), ESCAPING (Hayashi). Prediction… ESCAPE  COOPERATION. But NOT SELF-EVIDENT… b/c Defectors FOLLOW. My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE. C D

Earn MORE than DEFECTORS. 3 HYPOTHESES "ESCAPING TIT-for-TAT"… TIT-for-TAT in a Group, EXIT when DEFECTED, Cooperate in NEW Group. H1 SOME play "Escaping TFT." H2 Earn MORE than DEFECTORS. My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE.

4 EXPERIMENT WEB-BASED. Repeat S.D. Game in a GROUP, MOVE to Anther Group, No COST. ANONYMOUS. 15-20 Subjects (students). 20-40 Games, 3-6 Moves. 6 Sessions, 111 Subjects. 2 Universities in Japan, Nov. 2002. My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE.

My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE.

5 GAME Work at one of 4 FIRMS. If D (Work LAZILY), PAYOFF… # Cooperators 4 . # Workers in Firm If C (Work HARD), PAYOFF… D's Payoff － 2. My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE. Defection # Cooperators Payoff Cooperation

EACH MONTH Your CHOICE, PAYOFF Each FIRM's PAYOFF, #Workers My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE. HOW to WORK?

EVERY 6 MONTHS History of Each FIRM's PAYOFF, #Workers Each FIRM's AVERAGE PAYOFF My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE. WHERE to WORK?

6 RESULT C .40 .24 Move .54 Payoff .80 .38 6 Sessions 111 Subjects Mean SD C .40 .24 Move .54 Payoff .80 .38 6 Sessions 111 Subjects -2 < Payoff < 4 My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE.

7 ESCAPING TFT? →YES! 27% move TFT 30 10 8 48 All C 1 4 6 All D 7 3 2 behav. ESCAPE FIXED RANDOM total TFT 30 10 8 48 All C 1 4 6 All D 7 3 2 12 5 27 Other 18 58 35 111 27% My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE. →YES!

8 BETTER? →NO! move TFT 0.77 0.90 0.80 All C 0.09 0.66 1.01 0.62 All D behav. ESCAPE FIXED RANDOM total TFT 0.77 0.90 0.80 All C 0.09 0.66 1.01 0.62 All D 0.91 0.87 1.39 0.98 0.83 0.68 0.88 0.79 Other 0.74 0.25 0.84 My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE. →NO!

9 CONCLUSION COOPERATION by ESCAPING? Something MORE. Theory… MOVING COST. Test… More Experiments / Surveys. My basic interest is in problems of SOCIAL CHOICE.