Submarines & Safeguards

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Presentation transcript:

Submarines & Safeguards ChenÉe Tracey Research Sponsored by Brookhaven National Laboratory

introduction Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) that are signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) agreed not to pursue nuclear explosives and to safeguard their civilian energy sectors Nuclear propulsion is not a nuclear explosive and is used by the military Brazil has demonstrated interest in pursuing naval nuclear propulsion for use in nuclear-powered submarines

Questions that Need answers Which part of nuclear-powered submarines are safeguarded? Is Brazil likely to proliferate? If not Brazil, then who? What are options for the international community to protect against proliferation with this technology?

introduction In 2008, Brazil and France signed a contract to share submarine technology to help Brazil obtain diesel-electric attack submarines Brazil plans to use this same technology to build nuclear reactors indigenously for six nuclear-powered submarines Brazil would be the first NNWS to have nuclear-powered submarines Uranium used to power the submarine is not subject to safeguards while it is used in reactor and can be removed from safeguards verification Brazil has agreed to maintain enrichment below 20%

Why does brazil need a nuclear-powered submarine? Protect oil and natural gas off the coast Technological development and national independence Prestige and importance

Protect the “Blue Amazon” Compartments: Sonar, Missile Room, Control Room, Crew Rooms, Reactor PWR provide energy

why nuclear-powered Submarines? Nuclear-powered submarines are powered by nuclear material. They do not house nuclear weapons. Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) Higher enriched nuclear material means more energy and time between refueling PWRs have long core lives and require refueling every 30-40 years when used with HEU The submarine hull will have a hatch to facilitate refueling in lieu of cutting the internal structure of the submarine

IAEA Safeguards regime loopholes IAEA INFCIRC 153 details the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and NNWS A state can “exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded thereunder in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under the Agreement.” Nuclear material is not subject to safeguards while it is being used in the naval reactor

IAEA Safeguards regime loopholes There are a series of steps to be taken before the material is withdrawn from safeguards State must inform the IAEA of the activity and that the material will be used in peaceful nuclear activity State must inform the IAEA that the material will not be used for production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices IAEA and the state must make an “arrangement” that the material will not be safeguarded for a certain length of time and where in the fuel cycle Because nuclear-powered submarines are controlled by military, the IAEA does not have access to classified information and has difficulty pinpointing when fuel is removed from safeguards

Brazil and Nonproliferation Brazil and Argentina signed the NPT in 1998 and are not signatories to the Additional Protocol Brazilian officials believe it created a divide between “haves” and “have nots” Nuclear Weapon States have made little to no progress on disarmament goals in the NPT Former Brazilian Foreign Minister João Augusto de Araújo Castro stated “The NPT drafts propose limitations only for those countries that do not possess nuclear weapons and they include restrictions which are not essential to the objectives of proliferation.”

Cooperation between The iaea and abacc Brazil is a member of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) created in 1991 ABACC enforces the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (SCCC) in Brazil and Argentina This agreement prohibits Brazil and Argentina from “carrying out, promoting, or authorizing directly or indirectly or from participating in the testing, manufacture, production, or acquisition by any means of any nuclear weapon.”

IAEA Loopholes and ABACC catchalls Brazil’s SCCC Quadripartite agreement accounts for nuclear-powered submarines “none of the provisions of the…Agreement shall limit the right of the Parties to use nuclear energy for the propulsion of any type of vehicle, including submarines, since propulsion is a peaceful application of nuclear energy.” Calls for Brazil and Argentina “to accept safeguards on all nuclear material in all nuclear activities.”

IAEA and ABACC Cooperation ABACC has certain liberties that the IAEA does not ABACC’s safeguards include military bases For example, Brazil inspected Argentina’s unfinished reprocessing plant, even though it is not safeguarded by ABACC Both agencies conduct independent evaluations using same equipment, standards, and procedures for inspections Miscommunications may occur due to chain of command

Policy recommendations NWS should promote use of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) in nuclear- powered submarines U.S. uses 93%; Russia uses 45% France and China are using caramel fuel (uranium dioxide composite) Lasts for upwards of 33 years in reactor core with 20% enrichment US should recommit itself to the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program DOE launched this program in 1978

Long Term Options Nuclear Weapon States recommitment to disarmament during the NPT Review Conference in 2020 Renewed commitment to promoting the Additional Protocol especially with Brazil and Argentina Potential for Brazil, Argentina, ABACC, and ABACC to negotiate a modified Additional Protocol with the IAEA Nuclear Suppliers’ Group acknowledges ABACC

Thank You! ChenÉe Tracey Lchtracey@gmail.com