An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure

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Presentation transcript:

An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure Chapter 8 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Eight Basic Facts About Financial Structure I Stocks are not the most important sources of external financing for businesses. Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Eight Basic Facts About Financial Structure II 2. Issuing marketable debt and equity securities is not the primary way in which businesses finance their operations. 3. Indirect finance is many times more important than direct finance. 4. Financial intermediaries are the most important source of external funds. Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Eight Basic Facts About Financial Structure III The financial system is among the most heavily regulated sectors of the economy. Only large, well-established corporations have easy access to securities markets to finance their activities. Collateral is a prevalent feature of debt contracts. Debt contracts are extremely complicated legal documents that place substantial restrictive covenants on borrowers. Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Transaction Costs Transaction costs are a major problem in financial markets. e.g. brokerage fees Financial intermediaries have evolved to reduce transaction costs Economies of scale Expertise Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Asymmetric Information Asymmetric Information: one party has insufficient knowledge about the other party involved in a transaction. Two types of asymmetric information. 1. Adverse selection occurs before the transaction 2. Moral hazard arises after the transaction Agency theory analyses how asymmetric information problems affect economic behavior Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Adverse Selection: The Lemons Problem George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons, QJE (1970) If quality cannot be assessed, the buyer is willing to pay at most a price that reflects the average quality. Sellers of good quality items will not want to sell at the price for average quality. The buyer will decide not to buy at all because all that is left in the market is poor quality items. Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Tools to Solve Adverse Selection Problems Private production and sale of information Free-rider problem Government regulation to increase information e.g. firms selling securities are required to have independent audits. Financial intermediation Experts in producing information, can determine good risks from bad ones, no issue with free riding. Collateral and net worth (equity capital) Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Moral Hazard : The Principal – Agent Problem Moral hazard is the asymmetric information problem that occurs after the transaction has occurred. e.g. seller of security may have incentives to hid information and engage in undesirable activities Separation of ownership and control of the firm Managers pursue personal benefits and power rather than the profitability of the firm. Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Tools to Solve the Principal-Agent Problem Monitoring (Costly State Verification) Free-rider problem Government regulation to increase information e.g. criminal penalties for hiding or stealing profits. Financial Intermediation e.g. venture capital firms Debt Contracts have smaller moral hazard issues Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Tools to Solve Moral Hazard Problem: Debt Markets Net worth and collateral Incentive compatible Monitoring and Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants Discourage undesirable behavior Encourage desirable behavior Keep collateral valuable Provide information Financial Intermediation Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Asymmetric Information Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Conflicts of Interest Conflicts of Interest is a type of moral hazard problem caused by economies of scope. Arise when an institution has multiple objectives and, as a result, has conflicts between those objectives. A reduction in the quality of information in financial markets increases asymmetric information problems. Financial markets do not channel funds into productive investment opportunities. The economy is not as efficient as it could be. Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Why Do Conflicts of Interest Arise? I Underwriting & Research in Investment Banking Information produced by researching companies is used to underwrite the securities. The bank is attempting to simultaneously serve two client groups whose information needs differ. Spinning occurs when an investment bank allocates hot, but underpriced, IPOs to executives of other companies in return for their companies’ future business. Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Why Do Conflicts of Interest Arise? II Auditing and Consulting in Accounting Firms Auditors may be willing to skew their judgments and opinions to win consulting business. Auditors may be auditing information systems or tax and financial plans put in place by their nonaudit counterparts. Auditors may provide an overly favorable audit to solicit or retain audit business. Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Credit Assessment & Consulting in Credit Rating Agencies Investors use credit ratings to reflect probability of default. Used to determine creditworthiness Conflict of interest occurs when multiple users with divergent (short-term) interests depend on the credit rating Conflicts arise when credit rating agencies undertake consulting services Firms ask credit rating agencies how to structure debt Agencies may provide good ratings to attract new clients. Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Conflicts of Interest: Remedies I Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Public Accounting Return and Investor Protection Act) Increases supervisory oversight to monitor and prevent conflicts of interest. Establishes a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Increases the SEC’s budget. Makes it illegal for a registered public accounting firm to provide any nonaudit service to a client contemporaneously with an impermissible audit. Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Conflicts of Interest: Remedies II Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (cont’d) Beefs up criminal charges for white-collar crime and obstruction of official investigations. Requires the CEO and CFO to certify that financial statements and disclosures are accurate. Requires members of the audit committee to be independent. Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Conflicts of Interest: Remedies III Global Legal Settlement of 2002 Requires investment banks to sever the link between research and securities underwriting. Bans spinning . Imposes $1.4 billion in fines on accused investment banks. Requires investment banks to make their analysts’ recommendations public. Over a 5-year period, investment banks are required to contract with at least three independent research firms that would provide research to their brokerage customers. Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Control Attestation in Canada I In October 2002, the Ontario government introduced Bill 198 in response to reforms in the United States. Similar to Sarbanes-Oxley Act Bill made several reforms to security laws including: CEO and CFO accountability for financial reporting; auditor independence; enhanced penalties for illegal activities, and faster public disclosure. Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.

Control Attestation in Canada II In February 2005, the Canadian Securities Administrators proposed the Internal Control Instrument and the Certification Instrument. These mirror the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States . Copyright  2011 Pearson Canada Inc.