Network Economics - Class 4

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Presentation transcript:

Network Economics - Class 4 Judith Molka-Danielsen j.molka-danielsen@himolde.no http://home.himolde.no/~molka Reference: “Information Rules”, Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian, Havard Business Sch. Press, 1999. January 18, 2001

Overview Describe the New Information Economy Discuss the factors in the Economics of Networks Define the terms: network effects and network externaltities Discuss the concept of Lock-in

The old industrial economy Dominated by Oligopolies a few large firms market share rose and fell slowly lifetime employment Industries that exhibited this: automobile steel aluminum petrolium chemical markets economies of scale

The new information economy Dominated by temporary monopolies dominate player based on the days leading technology short time on top 7 years average at one job Industries: hardware and software economies of networks

Types of Networks Physical networks High Technology (real) telephone, electrical, railroad, airlines High Technology (real) computer, fax machine, compatible modems, email, ATMs, Internet High Technology (virtual) Macintosh users, CD readers-writers users, Nintendo 64 users, minidisc users

Important Concepts It is better to be connected to a bigger network than to a smaller one. Network effects Positive Network Externalities Companies compete by expanding their networks, they increase the value by interconnecting with other networks.

Positive Feedback Positive feedback - the strong get stronger and the weak get weaker. Speaking into a microphone, when the amplified signals go back into the system, you have repeated amplification. It gets loud. Negative feedback - when the strong get weaker and the weak get stronger. Go to a middle point. Industrial oligopolies exhibit. In the industrial markets, attempts for greater market share would trigger respones by others towards efficiency, also too large firms were too complex to manage. The norm were oligopolies.

Positive feedback (cont.) Postitive feedback can contribute to growth, but it is not the same thing. Ie. Internet. Virtuous cycle - success feeds itself. Vicious cycle - product seen as failing, the perception feeds the cycle, death spiral, the weak get weaker. Ie. Apple Macintosh. Tippy market - two players compete, one wins. (Video recorders - VHS v. Beta) Winner take all.

Positive Feedback - example Nintendo - enters home video games in 1985 Other dominant player at the time (Atari, Texas Instruments) Christmas 1986, Nintendo Entertainment System (NES) was hot. More game developers begin to write games for them. Game developers pay royalties to Nintendo and agree to not share the game with other systems for 2 years after release.

S-shaped curve Adoption of new technologies follow an S-shaped curve in three phases: flat during launch, steep rise during takeoff, positive feedback at work, leveling off, saturation is reached. Seen in the adoption of: fax machine, CD, color TV, video games, e-mail, and the Internet.

Economies of Scale Economies of scale - is a source of positive feedback. Larger firms tend to have lower unit costs of productions. This is supply-side economies of scale. In manufacturing the benefits of scale are usually exhausted before total market dominance. Demand side economies of scale - Microsoft Windows 95 in 1998, widely used, de facto industry standard. Some technologies go head-to-head for years before a winner emerges. Telephone netwk also showed this.

Network externalities Sponsor - of a net builds and hopes to profit from the net. Apple controls interfaces, clone license terms, architecture improvements, for the Mac. And influence supply of complementary products. (Partners) externalities are positive and negative (pollution) positive network externalities lead to positive feedback Metcalfe’s law: The value of the network goes up as the square of the number of users. Total value of the network to all users = n x (n-1) = n2 -n where n is the number of users. If value=$1 for a single user, and n=10, then network size 10 has 102-10=90 = $90.

Collective switching costs Switching costs - come from complementary assets, hardware with software, IT systems with training. If I learn to program in Access database language then other access software and the language becomes more valuable to those who are already users. But it is hard to get people to switch, collective switching costs. It is hard to coordinate users to switch all at the same time, and they will not do so by themselves. Therefore, the incumbents have the advantage. 1870 QWERTY keyboard wins over the 1932 Dvorak layout with home row AOEUIDHTNS that was proven to be faster. We would collectively be better to switch but the individual switching costs are too high. (Also called technological Lock-in.)

Industry and positive feedback Not every market tips (Ford had a best-selling-car, but who cares, you do not buy a car because others have it. But you may avoid a car because no one has it.) There are no demand side economies of scale within the IBM compatible PC market because standards allow interoperability. Another example, Internet service providers. (America Online, CompuServe, Delphi, had separate discussion groups before Internet. Now access can be from anyone, AOL, IBM, ATT, etc.) ISPs could differentiate access through QoS offers, video conferencing, etc. Large ISPs have advantage because it is easier to control QoS on a single network.

Likelihood of a market tipping to one technology *sum of economies of scale - ie. There are supply side eos for PC market where Compaq, Dell, HP and IBM have 24%. **standards reduce variety, but global HDTV standards are not needed.

Performance v. compatibility How do you start the virtuous cycle? Philips and Sony introduced the CD in the 1980s. Philips offers digital compact cassette (DCC) in 1992 where DCC players can play regular cassettes, backward compatible. But it didn’t catch on. Consumer inertia approaches: the evolution strategy of compatibility, and the revolution strategy of performance. Revolution - best performance to start over with a new product, but high switching costs. Evolution - give up some performance to allow compatibility (lower switching costs).

Openness v. Control Is the second fundamental tradeoff. Open - make interfaces and specifications available to others. Consumers can fear lock-in, open raises chances of success, attracks allies. Control - keep your system proprietary. (This is valuable if your system takes off.) Installed base is more valuable if rivals cannot offer products to lock-in customers. Control interconnection. Existing market position, technical capabilities and control of intellectual property rights are 3 dimensions of critical market strength. Intel controls MMX multimedia specs for its Pentium chips, but promote an open interface spec for graphic controllers, the accelerated graphics port (AGP) to increase demand for their microprocessors.

Openness v. Control Your Reward (total value to you) = Total value added to the industry + Your share of the industry value. Total value added to the industry = the value the technology adds to the existing value + how widely the technology is adopted (network size). Your share of the industry value = your market share + your profits + your royalties + how the technology effects your sale of other products (add to sales or take away).

Openness v. Control Best Strategies: Have a large share of a small market (small pie), or Have a small share of a large market (Sun and Java). The optimum point is where you maximize Total Value. Systems - are a cooperation of compoenets To caputre value from one component requires cooperation with those providing the other components. Suppliers will want a share of the rewards in retrurn for cooperation.

Openness Strategy When no one firm is strong enough to dictate technology standards. When coordination is necessary. To start the bandwagon rolling. Full openness (ITU standards) v. Alliance Strategy (member advantage, Microsoft developers) Alliance types: special interest group, task forces, groups of companies. Alliances share: cross license patents, manufacturing skills, improve time to market, share designs. Alliances coordinate: standards, interfaces, protocols, specifications.

Control Strategy Central actor controls development Sun sponsors Java, Apple sponsors Macintosh, Ericson sponsors BlueTooth. Companies that control product standards and interfaces have power. But they can lose with poorly conceived standards.

Generic Strategies for new Technology Introduction. 1. Performance Play - new, incompatible, strong control, high risk, big technology advantage, new entrants try with no base to worry about. 2. Controlled Migration - give up performance to reduce customer switching costs, need allies, backward compatible, but proprietary.

Generic Strategies for new Technology Introduction. 3. Open Migration - new product by many vendors, low switching costs, good where there are only manufacturing economies, want a big network. 4. Discontinuity - need allies, make system very open, new product not compatible with old but available from many suppliers, favor efficient manufacturers.