Vicksburg Joint Operations

Joint Operations Operations carried on by two or more of the armed forces At Vicksburg, this was the Army and the Navy

Joint Operations in the Civil War Limited experience prior to 1861 Yorktown (1781) Vera Cruz (1847) Grant had experience at Forts Henry and Donelson in which Captain Andrew Foote’s gunboats bombed Fort Henry into submission and Grant occupied it

Forts Henry and Donelson Showed that in the absence of unified command or meaningful joint doctrine, the conception and execution of joint operations totally depended on ad hoc actions by the responsible commanders, and therefore their personal chemistry and communications Grant and Foote were totally different individuals but they worked well together

Forts Henry and Donelson The command arrangements that did exist on the Army side hampered rather than encouraged successful joint operations Foote’s instructions from the Navy Department were to cooperate, but he was not formally subordinated to the Army Therefore Grant’s departmental commander, MG Henry Halleck, really only commanded half of the joint operation Furthermore, Halleck’s style of command made matters worse Halleck at first rejected Grant’s plan, but approved it after Foote lent his endorsement

Unity of Command vs. Unity of Effort All forces operate under one responsible commander who possesses requisite authority to direct forces in pursuit of a common unified purpose Unity of Effort Coordination and cooperation among all forces, not necessarily part of the same command structure toward a commonly recognized objective

Vicksburg Would Require Unity of Effort “Although unity of command was not formalized by regulation, Grant worked hard to ensure that good relations, constant communication, and division of labor fostered unity of effort.” Joint Military Operations Historical Collection, Chapter1, “Vicksburg”

Grant Involves Porter in Early Planning “I had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to a point below Vicksburg from which to operate– my recollection was that Admiral Porter was the first one to whom I mentioned it. The cooperation of the Navy was absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) of such an enterprise.”

Joint Operations in the Vicksburg Campaign Running the Gauntlet Grand Gulf Bruinsburg Siege Logistics “Running the Gauntlet At Vicksburg” by Don Stivers. Admiral Porter's fleet steams past the Confederate batteries at Vicksburg.

Running the Gauntlet Grant decided to shift Porter’s fleet to the south of Vicksburg Once in place they could protect and transport any troops Grant moved there

Running the Gauntlet To assist Porter with any damage his fleet suffered in running the gauntlet, Sherman positioned four small craft below Vicksburg and “manned them with soldiers, ready to pick up any of the disabled wrecks as they passed by” As Porter’s Benton passed by, Sherman was able to briefly confer with Porter One of Sherman’s yawls picked up the pilot of the Henry Clay floating on a plank after his vessel had been hit

Grand Gulf On 29 April, Grant attempted a crossing at Grand Gulf The plan was for Porter to silence the Confederate batteries at Grand Gulf, followed by a rapid landing of McClernand’s Corps to seize the fortifications and secure a foothold for the rest of the Army

Bruinsburg After a five and a half hour exchange of fire, the Confederates still held Grand Gulf Grant stopped the operation and decided to try a different landing site After consulting Porter, Grant decided to run the fleet past Grand Gulf while McClernand marched his force past along a concealed route By dawn the Army and Navy were at Bruinsburg where Grant crossed unopposed By May 6, more than 33,000 troops had made the crossing

Siege Operations Porter fired 11,500 projectiles from his ironclads and mortarboats He also landed 13 heavy cannon from his gunboats for the Army to use as siege artillery These fired 4,500 rounds

Logistics The Navy ensured supplies and reinforcements reached Grant’s Army without interference from the Confederates As Grant's army neared Vicksburg, Porter established a logistic base just north of Vicksburg on the Yazoo River at Johnson’s Plantation This initiative led to supplies being on the ground by May 18 when Grant’s army reached the outer works around the city. At the same time, Porter’s gunboats reduced the Warrenton batteries just a few miles below the city and enabled Grant’s logisticians to move the lower supply base from Grand Gulf to Warrenton. These two bases cut the overland wagon haul to a maximum of six miles for units manning the siege lines.

Next Dec 1862-Apr 1863 Attempts Cutting the Levees at Providence