Chapter 18: Non-Firm Quantities

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Presentation transcript:

Chapter 18: Non-Firm Quantities

Non-Firm Quantities SLT In both the SEM and the I-SEM, a unit with non-firm access does not have the right to be compensated for not being able to have it’s non-firm capacity accommodated on the system: A unit’s Firm Access Quantity is a value which represents the amount of a Participant’s output which can be accommodated on the system based on network reinforcement. If the unit is dispatched down below that level, it is entitled to compensation. The way this is implemented in the I-SEM is different to the SEM, in that it only impacts the balancing and imbalance arrangements: There is no longer a restriction on Participants to gain a market position for their non-firm capacity, they can trade their entire output range above their Firm Access Quantity in the ex-ante markets; Normally Bid Offer Acceptances are settled at the better of the Imbalance Settlement Price or Bid Offer Price. For Dec actions to turn a unit down / off from their market position, this means that the units can be compensated for being turned down – they may only need to pay back what they’ve stated in the Bid Offer Price, which may only reflect their costs of running, or less through the Imbalance Price, meaning they retain any inframarginal rent they achieved from their ex-ante market revenue; However this treatment is removed for non-firm Dec actions: if a unit traded its Non-Firm capacity but it could not be physically accommodated on the system, it will be treated as an imbalance and they have to pay back for the difference at the Imbalance Settlement Price only; This is implemented through calculating the Non-Firm Accepted Bid Quantity and subtracting it in the Discount Component to ensure that it does not receive a discount, and therefore it is settled only through the Imbalance Component.

Non-Firm Quantities SLT and ILT Firm Access is a Trading Site concept, therefore there needs to be functionality to assign the Firm Access Quantity to the units under the Trading Site to allow for unit-level non-firm quantities to be calculated: FAQ is divided in a way which is inversely proportional to the Accepted Bid Quantity on each unit: If unit dispatched to PN, fully firm; If unit dispatched below PN, non-firm; The greater the dec volume, the lower the firmness. PN (A, B, C, D), QD (A, B), FAQ (A, B) Unit A Unit B Unit C Unit D QD (D) QABNF C QABNF D QAB C FAQ (C) QD (C) QAB D FAQ (D)

Non-Firm Quantities SLT and ILT Was any of that volume in non-firm range? γ MW qFPN γ + 1 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 qD 𝐶𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀 𝑢𝛾 = 𝑜 𝑖 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝐵𝑂 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 − 𝑃𝐼𝑀𝐵 𝛾 , 0 × 𝑄𝐴𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 − 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑄𝐴𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝑂𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝑂𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐿 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝑂𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑆𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 𝑢𝛾 = 𝑜 𝑖 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝐵𝑂 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 − 𝑃𝐼𝑀𝐵 𝛾 ,0 × 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 −𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐿 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑆𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 𝑜 𝑖 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝐵𝑂 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 − 𝑃𝐼𝑀𝐵 𝛾 ,0 × 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 −𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐿 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑆𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾

Non-Firm Quantities SLT and ILT Was any of that volume in non-firm range? γ MW qFPN γ + 1 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 qD qFAQ 𝐶𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀 𝑢𝛾 = 𝑜 𝑖 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝐵𝑂 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 − 𝑃𝐼𝑀𝐵 𝛾 , 0 × 𝑄𝐴𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 − 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑄𝐴𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝑂𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝑂𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐿 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝑂𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑆𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 𝑢𝛾 = 𝑜 𝑖 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝐵𝑂 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 − 𝑃𝐼𝑀𝐵 𝛾 ,0 × 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 −𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐿 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑆𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 𝑜 𝑖 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝐵𝑂 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 − 𝑃𝐼𝑀𝐵 𝛾 ,0 × 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 −𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐿 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑆𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾

Non-Firm Quantities SLT and ILT Was any of that volume in non-firm range? γ MW qFPN γ + 1 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5 qD qFAQ 𝐶𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑈𝑀 𝑢𝛾 = 𝑜 𝑖 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝐵𝑂 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 − 𝑃𝐼𝑀𝐵 𝛾 , 0 × 𝑄𝐴𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 − 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑄𝐴𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝑂𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝑂𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐿 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝑂𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑆𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 𝐶𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇 𝑢𝛾 = 𝑜 𝑖 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝐵𝑂 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 − 𝑃𝐼𝑀𝐵 𝛾 ,0 × 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 −𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐿 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑆𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 𝑜 𝑖 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝐵𝑂 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 − 𝑃𝐼𝑀𝐵 𝛾 ,0 × 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 −𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐿 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾 , 𝑄𝐴𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑆𝑂𝐿𝐹 𝑢𝑜𝑖𝛾