Mi van akkor, ha a legokosabb gyerekek elmennek az osztályból?

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Growing up well: What difference can schools make in young people’s transition to adulthood? Sinan Gemici AVETRA OctoberVET 2013 Ballarat.
Advertisements

Baela Raza Jamil Zara Khan Zaheer Abbas PRESENTED AT: Comparative and International Education Society (CIES) – 10 th to 16 th March 2014 Effects of Parental.
Pension Reform, Ownership Structure, and Corporate Governance Mariassunta Giannetti Stockholm School of Economics, CEPR and ECGI Luc Laeven IMF, CEPR and.
What could go wrong? Deon Filmer Development Research Group, The World Bank Evidence-Based Decision-Making in Education Workshop Africa Program for Education.
Performance Based Incentives for Learning in the Mexican Classroom Brian Fuller, MPA, Foundation Escalera Victor Steenbergen, MPA Candidate, London School.
Deborah Cobb-Clark (U Melbourne) Mathias Sinning (ANU) Steven Stillman (U Otago)
A Performance-Based Evaluation Model for Rewarding Merit in Italian Schools Donatella Poliandri, INVALSI Paola Muzzioli, INVALSI Isabella Quadrelli, INVALSI.
The Performance of Vulnerable Learners Somerset Schools Forum 20 May 2014 Agenda Item 5b Nicola Turner.
“A Unified Framework for Measuring Preferences for Schools and Neighborhoods” Bayer, Ferreira, McMillian.
MSSTL10-Carlow IT May  Setting the scene  Initial phase of research  Aim of presentation  Profiling at risk students  Predicting failure of.
Magnet Schools and Peers: Effects on Student Achievement Dale Ballou Vanderbilt University November, 2007 Thanks to Steve Rivkin, Julie Berry Cullen, Adam.
Charter School Competition: An Examination of Michigan Anthony Galston Economics Student.
Gianfranco De Simone Φ Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli.
1. Measuring the Impact of Universal Preschool Education and Care on Literacy Performance Scores. Tarek Mostafa Institute of Education – University of.
Human Capital Policies in Education: Further Research on Teachers and Principals 5 rd Annual CALDER Conference January 27 th, 2012.
POSC 202A: Lecture 2 Homework #1: 1.2, 1.44, 1.54, 1.62,1.74, 3.2, 3.6, 3.52, 3.54, 3.60, 3.67, 3.70 Today: Research Designs, Mean, Variance.
Growing Up In Ireland Research Conference The Education of 9-Year-Olds.
Early Selection in Hungary A Possible Cause of High Educational Inequality Daniel Horn research fellow Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
Childcare availability and female labor supply Anna Lovasz - Agnes Szabo-Morvai The impact of day-care services on mothers’ employment, fertility, and.
How Much of a “Running Start” Do Dual Enrollment Programs Provide Students? James Cowan & Dan Goldhaber Center for Education Data & Research (
How are inequality of opportunity and mean student performance related? A quantile regression approach using PISA data Zoltán Hermann – Dániel Horn Institute.
Parents’ basic skills and children’s test scores Augustin De Coulon, Elena Meschi and Anna Vignoles.
The use of GEM data for analyzing the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth Jolanda Hessels EIM and Erasmus School of Economics July.
Excellence and Equity in Brazilian Schools Paula Louzano Cartagena, 21/09/2011.
Equity and Participation in Higher Education Comments from New Zealand Rob McIntosh Deputy Secretary Ministry of Education December 2008.
Gender differences in educational outcomes A study of the measures taken and the current situation in Europe.
Reproducing Inequality: Family Background and Schooling in Peru Santiago Cueto, Alejandra Miranda, Juan León, and María Cristina Vásquez GRADE - Young.
|Date faculty of spatial sciences ursi 1 Entry into the working life: spatial mobility and job-match quality of higher educated graduates Viktor.
AN EXPLORATION OF SCHOOL QUALITY, HOUSE PRICES AND GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION IN WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND Sarah Crilly Higher Diploma in Data Science and Analytics.
Early Selection in Hungary A Possible Cause of High Educational Inequality Daniel Horn research fellow IE-HAS and ELTEcon
ItemEnglishMaths National A*-C6661 National boys A*-C6061 National girls A*-C7362 National FSM A*-CNA National boys FSM A*-CNA National girls.
Human Capital Policies in Education: Further Research on Teachers and Principals 5 rd Annual CALDER Conference January 27 th, 2012.
NON-COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT OF FIRST GRADERS AND THEIR COGNITIVE PROGRESS Brun Irina, Ivanova Alina, Kardanova Elena, Orel Ekaterina Center of Education.
1 Migrants in the EU: education and training issues Maria Pia Sorvillo European Commission, Directorate General Education and Culture UNECE-Eurostat Work.
AIG Program and Services Havelock Elementary
Comments on: ”Educating Children of Immigrants: Closing the Gap in Norwegian Schools” The Nordic Economic Policy Review Conference 2011 Lena Nekby Department.
7 th June 2012 Is it better to fail than to succeed? A quantitative analysis of ‘just’ failing an English school inspection Rebecca Allen, Institute of.
R ETURN TO COMMUTING IN S WEDEN Sergii Troshchenkov PhD student L.A.S.E.R.
Two Conceptions of Education and Social Mobility Martin Carnoy Stanford University and Higher School of Economics September 16, 2016.
Effectiveness of interactive distance instruction
Adam Storeygard, Tufts University
School segregation and the performance of immigrant and native pupils
Can Managed Care Turn the Tide for Complex Populations?
Evaluation Requirements for MSP and Characteristics of Designs to Estimate Impacts with Confidence Ellen Bobronnikov March 23, 2011.
TIMSS 2015 Grade 9 and Grade 5 Performance PRESENTATION TO THE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON BASIC EDUCATION 21 FEBRUARY 2017.
Department of Economics, University of Stellenbosch
A Structured Approach to Equity Analysis of SEL outcomes: Evidence from IRS’s 3EA in Niger Silvia Diazgranados, Senior Researcher for Education, IRC;
What do the data and research really tell us?
Residential Mobility, Heterogeneous Neighborhood effects and Educational Attainment of Blacks and Whites Li Gan Texas A&M University and NBER Yingning.
Question 1: What is the baseline of high power?
Impact evaluations at IFAD-IOE
Y7 DATA.
Esteban Villalobos, Diego Portales University
Francesc Pedró Katerina Ananiadou Seoul, 9 – 11 November 2009
Carla Haelermans (Maastricht University, the Netherlands)
Statistics: Stem-and-Leaf Plots
Gender and Educational Attainment in Schools
Between-school Variance in Achievement
Peabody Research Institute Vanderbilt University
Dante Contreras Sebastián Bustos Paulina Sepúlveda
Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI)
Ch. 13. Pooled Cross Sections Across Time: Simple Panel Data.
More About Factorial Design
Evaluating Impacts: An Overview of Quantitative Methods
Linear Panel Data Models
Centre for Market and Public Organisation
POSC 202A: Lecture 2 Today: Introduction to R
Split-Block Class Schedule at Yorktown High School
Ch. 13. Pooled Cross Sections Across Time: Simple Panel Data.
Schooling policies for quality and economic growth
Presentation transcript:

The Effect of High Achieving Peers Leaving The Class - Evidence From Hungary Mi van akkor, ha a legokosabb gyerekek elmennek az osztályból? A kisgimnáziumi szelekció következményei Fritz Schiltz, Deni Mazrekaj, Daniel Horn, and Kristof De Witte Szirák 09.11.2018 Budapest

Overview What happens to „children left behind” when the highest-achieving are cherry-picked by elite schools? We exploit a unique institutional setting, coupled with good data. We contribute to the tracking literature by focusing on potential mechanisms that change staying-students’ outcomes. Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Main results Instrumenting the percentage of leaving peers suggests 1) moderately negative total effects especially in math and aspirations 2) but heterogeneous effects. More negative for girls, and for the top quartile left behind in Math, reading, behavior & aspirations Positive for the bottom quartile in Reading, behavior & aspirations Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Setup Grade Age 8 14 NABC 8 12 6 10 Data collected in Grade 6 and Grade 8 2008 (2010) – 2015 (2017) Total of 635,713 students Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Setup Spatial variance in 6-year-long elite tracks Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Setup Spatial variance in 6-year-long elite tracks Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Setup Spatial variance in 6-year-long elite tracks Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Elite schools for ‚elite’ students Stayers Leavers 49% 52% 19% 48% 26% 52% 1,485 1,657 1,474 1,649 17,105m 7,314m 461,666 26,823 Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Identification strategy I (baseline) Goal: Look at the performance of those who stayed! Problem: % of leavers can be endogenous better primary schools „produce” better students more can leave but less would like to leave -> sign of bias is unclear Exogenous variation: distance from nearest elite track! median class distance in 6th grade measured in meters covered by bus (Volan) from home to nearest elite track Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Identification strategy I   Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Identification strategy I Spatial immobility in Hungary is low! 90% does not move between grade 6 and grade 8 Only 0.5% of students moves to a region with elite schools movers & non-movers equally likely to leave Two out of three movers does not leave school % leavers to elite schools class median distance to nearest elite school (km) Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Identification strategy I Validity of distance as instrument Elite schools 10km further away 1.5% less leavers (mean=6%) Robust to alternative specifications 1. Exclusion Distance is independent of test scores in grade 6 2. Exogeneity Current spatial dispersion of elite tracks is independent of individual place of living (w/ free school choice) Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Identification strategy II Panel fixed effect models. Utilize the fact that there is variation in the number /percentage of leavers by school through the years. Problem: unbalanced panel (several schools have no leavers in several years). This is just a robustness check! Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Identification strategy II % of observations Number of leavers to elite schools per class Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Identification strategy II % of observations in classes where at least 1 student is leaving to elite schools % of leavers to elite schools per class Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Results (IV) (when 10% leaves) Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Mathematics OLS -0.018*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.011*** (N=498,606) (0.003) First stage -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.015*** (0.001) (0.004) 2SLS -0.057*** -0.107*** -0.076*** -0.045*** -0.010 (0.015) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) Reading -0.008** -0.006** (0.002) -0.012 -0.014 -0.062*** -0.035** -0.001 0.026** (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) Controls: Gender, books at home, mother education, score in grade 6, leave-out-means at class level. Regional and cohort FE. SEs clustered at class level. Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Results (IV) – alternative outcomes (when 10% leaves) 65 – 75 % observed Mean Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 GPA 2SLS 0.004 -0.020** 0.019* 0.018 0.020* (N=320,073) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) Behavior 0.008 -0.017 0.003 0.030** 0.039*** (N=370,048) (0.013) Aspirations -0.015*** -0.054*** -0.013 0.013** (N=385,044) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) Controls: Gender, books at home, mother education, score in grade 6, leave-out-means at class level. Regional and cohort FE. SEs clustered at class level. Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Heterogeneous effects Gender Same effect by leavers’ gender More negative effects for staying girls Socio-economic background (~quartiles) More negative effects for high SES Positive effects for low SES: Reading Behavior Aspirations Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Identification strategy II (cohort variation) Effect by ability and gender Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Mechanism Competition Q1 competed with left-students -> lack of incentives 2. Increased/depleted confidence Q1 tried but failed Q4 increased in relative ability 3. Teaching to the mean? More time for Q4? Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Conclusion Positive effects: Lowest ability students Reading, behavior & aspirations Negative effects: Girls, high ability/high SES Math, reading, behavior & aspirations Policy relevance This is effect of small changes in composition Positive effect for leavers Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Thank you for the attention Daniel Horn Horn.Daniel@krtk.mta.hu 09.11.2018 Szirák

Instrument robust to alternative specifications First stage % students in a class leaving to elite schools   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Median class distance (10km) -1.61*** (0.06) -1.56*** -1.49*** -1.14*** (0.05) -1.53*** Individual level X Class level Cohort FE Region FE F-statistic 752.75 755.70 209.45 157.57 80.76 582.27 Students 432,134 Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Results robust to alternative instruments   Median class time bus (minutes) Median class distance car (km) Median class time car (minutes) Mathematics Reading % leaving -0.0054*** -0.0007 -0.0056*** -0.0006 -0.0008 (0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0018) F-statistic 77.53 77.54 81.27 81.32 78.53 78.57 Students 432,103 432,125 Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects

Results robust to alternative specifications   Reshuffling classes Student growth Mathematics Reading % leaving to -0.0064*** -0.0012 -0.0058*** -0.0013 elite schools (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0013) F-statistic first stage 84.78 85.70 69.01 67.67 Students 408,553 432,134 Schiltz-Mazrekaj-Horn-DeWitte Peer effects