Extensions: Uncertainty, Risk Aversion, and Multiple Tasks

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Presentation transcript:

Extensions: Uncertainty, Risk Aversion, and Multiple Tasks Chapter Five Extensions: Uncertainty, Risk Aversion, and Multiple Tasks Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics Copyright © 2018 Oxford University Press

Figures and Tables Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics Copyright © 2018 Oxford University Press

FIGURE 5.1 The Optimal State-Contingent Contract for Risk-Averse Workers Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics Copyright © 2018 Oxford University Press

FIGURE 5.2 Timing Gaming with a Concave Reward Schedule Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics Copyright © 2018 Oxford University Press

FIGURE 5.3 Timing Gaming with a Convex Reward Schedule Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics Copyright © 2018 Oxford University Press