If We Can Keep It Chet Richards

Pedal to the metal, in neutral Conventional (non-nuclear) military threat

Pedal to the metal, in neutral Conventional (non-nuclear) military threat What’s the size of the conventional military threat in 2008?

Dimensions of the “threat” Amount ($Billions) External Benchmark $650 [FY2008 U.S. defense budget request – including costs of Iraq and Afghanistan] $350-$400 Next 10 nations (Bacevich’s recommendation) $250 Next four nations: China, UK, France, Japan $180-$200 Next 10, excluding close U.S. allies: China, Russia, India, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, North Korea, Singapore, Argentina, Iran and Pakistan $80-$90 Next 10, excluding U.S. Allies and significant nuclear powers: as in previous row, but excluding China and Russia $26 The Center for Defense Information’s (CDI) “Top 25 Countries of Vital Interest to the U.S.” Places we might actually fight, including Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, N. Korea, Pakistan, Sudan, and Venezuela. Total, combined defense budgets of all the places we might actually fight Roughly equals the budget—but not the capability—of the US Marine Corps!

Pedal to the metal, in neutral Spending Trends: (90o => logical independence) Threat

Pedal to the metal, in neutral How did we get ourselves into this predicament? Spending Trends: Threat

Pedal to the metal, in neutral In large systems, this situation virtually always reflects the presence of invalid assumptions. What might they be? Spending Trends: Threat

Invalid assumptions about national security “Terror” is the biggest threat to our national well being Military force is our primary instrument for “fighting terror” When employing military force, more is better (larger numbers, higher tech, etc.) The doctrine of counterinsurgency will permit U.S. administrations to employ military force effectively against non-state opponents Resources can be devoted to the creation and use of military force independent of the rest of the economy or society

Example of a hidden assumption We should either be willing to undertake a long-term, massive occupation and total reengineering of a collapsed state or we should only undertake military intervention as part of a broad-based coalition that is willing to do this. Splitting the difference does not work. … To preclude future Iraqs, investment priorities would center on intelligence, special operations, counterinsurgency doctrine, and improved training. Steven Metz and Frank Hoffman, Restructuring America’s Ground Forces: Better, Not Bigger, (Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation, September 2007) Hidden assumption is that we know how to do this In a good report by a couple of first-rate analysts

A national security manifesto for the next administration At every opportunity, challenge these assumptions in thought, word, and (fiscal) deed Eliminate the terrorism bureaucracy— and its companion climate of fear— created by the current administration Put the DoD budget on a trajectory to reach $250 BN in eight years Start by decommissioning Army units as they return from the Middle East Elevate intelligence to primus inter pares