Mod_34_18 Removal of Make-Whole Payments for biased quantities and negative imbalance revenue, and small clarifications to determination of Start Up Costs.

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Presentation transcript:

Mod_34_18 Removal of Make-Whole Payments for biased quantities and negative imbalance revenue, and small clarifications to determination of Start Up Costs incurred and saved. 12th December 2018

Summary Information Current algebra includes the Imbalance Component in revenues for the Make-Whole Payment calculation, which is at times incorrectly insulating Generators from negative imbalance revenues where the intended operation of this mechanism is to ensure appropriate recovery of operating costs. Part of mod changes the equation to explicitly reference balancing market quantities only, rather than all imbalance revenues. Current algebra removes Biased Quantities, Trade Opposite TSO Quantities, and Non-Firm Quantities, from the balancing quantities when calculating the unit’s revenue, but not when calculating their costs, for the Make-Whole Payment calculation. This misalignment results in the volumes considered in costs being greater than considered in revenues and so increases which were intended to be settled at the imbalance price only Part of this mod aligns the cost and revenue components by removing those quantities from the balancing quantities in calculating the unit’s costs also. Also a smaller structural change to improve the reading of the logic for the rules of when a Start Up Cost would be considered payable or recoverable.

Legal Drafting Changes (TSC Part B F.11.4.1)

Legal Drafting Changes (TSC Part B F.11.4.2)

Legal Drafting Changes (TSC Part B F.11.2.2 and F.11.2.4)

Justification and Implications of Not Implementing The current implementation does not reflect the intent of the SEMC Detailed Design, the requirements of which can be summarised as follows: Non-energy actions to have their fixed costs remunerated through side-payments; Energy actions can have their fixed costs reflected in, and remunerated through, the imbalance price; and Ensuring that generators do not over-recover fixed costs. The current implementation has an additional element which can remunerate through side-payments negative imbalance revenues which are not related to energy or non-energy actions, and which are not related to fixed costs.

Justification and Implications of Not Implementing In the Imbalance, Premium, or Discount components, a unit would not be settled for their biased quantities, but the operating costs considers it still as a part of their costs. This increases the operating costs over what is considered in the revenues, and therefore increases the chances of a unit over-recovering through their make-whole payments; Including Trade Opposite TSO and Non-Firm quantities in the costs and not the revenues also increases the operating costs versus revenues, meaning the unit could be made-whole for Imbalance Component revenues related to these quantities. This would act to negate the effect of having this intended different settlement approach for these quantities at the imbalance price.

Justification and Implications of Not Implementing These elements all have an impact on Imperfections costs, where in the long term not implementing the modification would increase costs to Suppliers and therefore consumers, and in the short term this would not have been considered in the setting of the Imperfections tariff for this year; Also the imbalance revenues are an important signal which need to be maintained to promote competition and efficiency in the market. Without implementing this modification there would be an unintended means of a participant potentially insulating themselves from this signal.