Kant Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View Philosophy 224 Kant Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View

Immanuel Kant Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was one of the most important philosophers of the modern era. His critical project revolutionized philosophy, and has remained a touchstone (positive and negative) for philosophers up to the present. It’s not widely recognized, but Kant was the first person to use the term ‘race’ in the way which we use it today.

The Anthropology The excerpt we are considering today is from a work based on lectures that Kant gave on what was then the newly emerging field of anthropology. Kant gave these lectures annually, from 1772 until he retired in 1796. The lectures (and the resulting book) were intended for a general (not specialized) audience and in them Kant not only discusses the information recently pouring into Europe about the diversity of human cultures, but his views of the world and humanity’s place in it. The key to the work is his reflection on what humans, 'as a free-acting being makes of himself or can and should make of himself.’

A Difficulty Kant begins the selection we read for today by noting a difficulty of adequately specifying human nature. We have no standard of comparison by which to judge the nature of human rationality. We have no example of non-terrestrial rational beings which could serve as the point of comparison to isolate the specific character of our rationality. All we can do, then, is to specify the character of our animal nature: humans are self-creating animals, perfecting themselves in relation to self-determined ends (119).

Three Aspects of Self Creation This account of the specificity of the human animal, highlights the centrality of the capacity of reason to our animal being. This capacity is expressed by the definition of a human being as a ‘rational animal.’ In this capacity, Kant finds three more specific aspects that characterize human activity (and also can be used to account for and characterize cultural development). Preservation: refers to the capacity to address the problems and threats posed to us by the world. Education: refers to our capacity to preserve and pass on our accomplishments in preserving our selves and serves as the basis of society. Governance: refers to our capacity to organize our social existence according to the “principles of reason” (119).

Three Predispositions Coordinate to the three aspects of humans as rational animals are three dispositions typically revealed in human action. Technical: we are natural problem solvers. Indicated by our hand. (cf. also, the reference to Adam and Eve). Pragmatic: we are naturally inclined towards civilization. Indicated by the fact that we progress as a species and not as individuals. Moral: as rational, we are naturally inclined to the good, as sensible, we are naturally inclined to evil.

Three Questions, and an Answer As Kant makes clear, the identification of these three dispositions serves as the basis for answers to three pressing questions: Are humans by nature social? Is that social existence naturally civilized or are we instead naturally savage? Is man good by nature, evil, or both? There’s a clear progression to these questions, and Kant thinks that in the progression we find the key to the answer. The key: education in the good (121).

Where have we seen this before? Some things about Kant’s discussion should seem familiar. Kant is presenting us a picture of human beings as rational animals, a duality only one dimension of which (our animal being) are we in a position to specify. It’s not that our rational being has no significance for our animal being, just that we can’t say anything about it’s content, only about how it conditions our animal being. Sets up a spiritual duality which we have seen before.

Some Challenges If we take seriously that the three dimensions of self-creation, as embodied in the three predispositions, sketch out a teleology of human existence, then Kant insists we have to acknowledge that our very being poses some challenges to the accomplishment of the telos (our ‘destiny’). Our drive for self-preservation often conflicts with our civilizing tendencies. Our ability/desire to procreate emerges before our ability to direct that desire in a way consonant with demands of society. Our drive for education is in conflict with our life spans. We only gain the knowledge and disposition to add to the body of human knowledge shortly before our death. Our drive for happiness is in conflict with the ideal of governance. No one is free from corruption; who is to take the lead in guiding us towards our moral destiny.

Government Works Kant’s response to these challenges may seem surprising. He insists that government (a “civil constitution”) serves to impose the species destiny on the individual, channeling and limiting our (merely) animal natures and creating the conditions under which civilization, education and moral development can take place. With the help of providence, government can create the context within which we can as individuals pursue our ‘destiny.’ This leads Kant to a refinement of his concept of the human (124).

A regulative Idea Obviously, government cannot do what humans are not themselves willing to commit to. Individuals have to take their destiny on for themselves. The human telos serves as what Kant calls a regulative idea, an ideal of reason which serves to guide and unify our efforts, though the telos itself may never be fully accomplished. We need such an idea, suggests Kant, because we are spiritual doubles, and would otherwise never develop at all.

The Final Word Kant sums this all up for us on p. 126. Are we in a better place now to speak to our complete nature (not just our animal nature)? We still face the same obstacle of not having any ground for comparison, but the regulative idea (though it lacks specific content) does point us in the direction of a ground in terms of which we could establish proximity to other rational creatures: morality. See the final paragraph (126-7).