Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk Rights Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk © Michael Lacewing
A bad start People sometimes talk as though wherever there is a duty, there is a corresponding right, e.g. charity if I have a right to do some action, it must be morally right (at least morally permissible) that I do it, so I never have a right to do something wrong
What rights are Freeden: ‘a human right... assigns priority to certain human or social attributes regarded as essential to the adequate functioning of a human being; … is intended to serve as a protective capsule for those attributes; and … appeals for deliberate action to ensure such protection.’
What rights are rights are closely to connected to what we think human beings are, what it takes to live an adequate human life rights seek to protect that attribute against other concerns or considerations that might conflict with it, e.g. free speech rights appeal for action on behalf of the right; every right bestows a duty on someone
Deriving rights from utility Mill’s Harm Principle: ‘The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.’ Harm: to those interests that should be protected as rights
Deriving rights from utility ‘I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of a man as a progressive being’ Singling out these interests for protection will contribute most to utility. Freedom of thought and speech will help us to discover and understand the truth; and ‘the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being’.
Two objections if it proved that freedom of thought etc. did not contribute to utility, then we would no longer have this right if the ground of rights is utility, this protection seems shaky. But a right that can be overridden (easily) is no right at all.
Hart on rights Hart: ‘A right belongs to that branch of morality which is specifically concerned to determine when one person's freedom may be limited by another's and so to determine what action may appropriately be made the subject of coercive legal rules.’
Choice v. welfare Rights relate to freedom (a core human attribute) and the protection they appeal for is legal. But other interests are also important, e.g. health, education, food.
Autonomy v. well-being Mill: rights protect autonomy because autonomy is important to well-being But is autonomy valuable independent of well-being? Won’t Mill’s account sacrifice rights to the ‘greater good’? But can my autonomy be enough reason for someone else to have a duty? Isn’t it the good of protecting autonomy in general that justifies duties?