The Shortest-Path problem in graphs with selfish-edges

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Presentation transcript:

The Shortest-Path problem in graphs with selfish-edges

Review VCG-mechanism: pair M=<g,p> where g(r) = arg maxyX i vi(ri,y) pi(g(r)) = -j≠i vj(rj,g(r-i)) +j≠i vj(rj,g(r)) VCG-mechanisms are truthful for utilitarian problems (i.e., problems in which the SCF is given by the sum of players’ valuation functions)

Algorithmic mechanism design and network protocols Large networks (e.g., Internet) are built and controlled by diverse and competitive entities: Entities own different components of the network and hold private information Entities are selfish and have different preferences  Mechanism design is a useful tool to design protocols working in such an environment, but time complexity is an important issue due to the massive network size

Algorithmic mechanism design for network optimization problems Simplifying the Internet model, we assume that each player owns a single edge of a graph G=(V,E), and privately knows the cost for using it  Classic optimization problems on G become mechanism design optimization problems in which the player’s type is the weight of the edge! Many basic network design problems have been studied in this framework: shortest path (SP), single-source shortest-paths tree (SPT), minimum spanning tree (MST), and many others Remark: Quite naturally, SP and MST are utilitarian problems (indeed the cost of a solution is simply the sum of the edge costs), while the SPT is not! Can you see why?

Some remarks In general, network optimization problems are minimization problems (the Vickrey’s auction was instead a maximization problem) Accordingly, we have: for each xX, the valuation function vi(ti,x) represents a cost incurred by player i in the solution x (and so it is a negative function of its type) the social-choice function f(t,x) is negative (since it is an “aggregation” of negative functions), and so its maximization corresponds to a minimization of the negation of the valuation functions (i.e., a minimization of the aggregation of the costs incurred by the players) payments are now from the mechanism to players (i.e., they are positive)

Summary of main results Centralized algorithm private-edge mechanism SP O(m+n log n) O(m+n log n) (VCG-mechanism) MST O(m (m,n)) O(m (m,n)) (VCG-mechanism) SPT O(m+n log n) (one-parameter mechanism)  For all these basic problems, the time complexity of the mechanism equals that of the canonical centralized algorithm!

Buying a path in a network f(t,x): The length of a path w.r.t. the true edge costs Buying a path in a network X: set of all paths between s and z Mechanism decides the path and the payments t1 t2 te: cost of edge e t6 t4 z t5 if edge e is selected and receives a payment of pe e’s utility: pe-te t3 s

The private-edge SP problem Given: an undirected graph G=(V,E) such that each edge is owned by a distinct selfish agent, a source node s and a destination node z; we assume that agent’s private type is the positive cost (length) of the edge, and her valuation function is equal to her negated type if edge is selected in the solution, and 0 otherwise. Question: design a truthful mechanism in order to find a shortest path in Gt=(V,E,t) between s and z.

Notation and assumptions n=|V|, m=|E| dG(s,z): distance in G=(V,E,r) between s ans z (sum of reported costs of edges on a shortest path PG(s,z) in G) Nodes s and z are 2-edge-connected in G, i.e., there exists in G at least 2 edge-disjoint paths between s and z  for any edge of PG(s,z) removed from the graph there exists at least one replacement path in G-e between s and z (this will bound the problem, since otherwise a bridge-edge might have an unbounded marginal utility)

VCG mechanism The problem is utilitarian (indeed, the (negated) cost of a solution is given by the sum of valuations)  VCG-mechanism M=<g,p>: g: computes arg maxyX i vi(ri,y), i.e., PG(s,z) in G=(V,E,r); indeed, valuation functions are negative, and so maximizing their sum means to compute a shortest path; p (Clarke payments): for each eE: pe =-j≠e vj(rj,g(r-e)) +j≠e vj(rj,g(r)), namely dG-e(s,z)-[dG(s,z)-re] = dG-e(s,z)-dG(s,z) + re if ePG(s,z) dG(s,z)-dG(s,z) = 0 otherwise For each e  PG(s,z), we have to compute dG-e(s,z), namely the length of a shortest path in G-e =(V,E\{e},r-e) between s and z. { pe=

The best replacement path PG(s,z)  dG(s,z)=11 2 3 4 5 6 5 e 2 10 12 5 pe=dG-e(s,z)-dG(s,z) + re = 12-11+2=3 PG-e(s,z)  dG-e(s,z)=12 z Remark: ue=pe+ve=pe-re≥0 since dG-e(s,z)dG(s,z) and so pe re

A trivial but costly implementation Step 1: First of all, apply Dijkstra to compute PG(s,z)  this costs O(m + n log n) time by using Fibonacci heaps. Step 2: Then, e PG(s,z) apply Dijkstra in G-e to compute PG-e(s,z)  we spend O(m + n log n) time for each of the O(n) edges in PG(s,z), i.e., O(mn + n2 logn) time Overall complexity: O(mn + n2 log n) time We will see an efficient solution costing O(m + n log n) time

Notation SG(s), SG(z): single-source shortest paths trees rooted at s and z Ms(e): set of nodes in SG(s) not descending from edge e (i.e., the set of nodes whose shortest path from s does not use e) Ns(e)=V/Ms(e) Mz(e), Nz(e) defined analogously

A picture SG(s) s Ms(e) u e v Ns(e) z

Crossing edges (Ms(e),Ns(e)) is a cut in G Cs(e)={(x,y) E\{e}: x Ms(e), yNs(e)} edges “belonging” to the cut: crossing edges

Crossing edges SG(s) s Ms(e) u e v Cs(e) Ns(e) z

What about PG-e(s,z)? Trivial: it does not use e, and it is shortest among all paths between s and z not using e There can be many replacement shortest paths between s and z not using e, but it is easy to see that at least one of them must cross only once the cut Cs(e) Thus, its length can be written as follows: where r(f) denotes the reported cost of f. dG-e(s,z)= min {dG-e(s,x)+r(f)+dG-e(y,z)} f=(x,y)Cs(e)

A replacement shortest path for e (crossing only once the cut) x e v y z dG-e(s,z)= min {dG-e(s,x)+r(f)+dG-e(y,z)} f=(x,y)  Cs(e)

How to compute dG-e(s,z) Let f=(x,y)  Cs(e); we will show that dG-e(s,x)+r(f)+dG-e(y,z)=dG(s,x)+r(f)+dG(y,z) Remark: dG-e(s,x)=dG(s,x), since xMs(e) Lemma: Let f=(x,y)Cs(e) be a crossing edge (xMs(e)). Then yMz(e) (from which it follows that dG-e(y,z)=dG(y,z)).

A simple lemma Proof (by contr.) Let yMz(e), then yNz(e). Hence, y is a descendant of u in SG(z), i.e., PG(z,y) uses e. Notice that v is closer to z than u in SG(z), and so PG(v,y) is a subpath of PG(z,y) and (recall that r(e) is positive): dG (v,y)=r(e) + dG (u,y) > dG (u,y). But yNs(e), and so PG(s,y) uses e. However, u is closer to s than v in SG(s), and so PG(u,y) is a subpath of PG(s,y) and: dG (u,y)=r(e) + dG (v,y) > dG (v,y).

A picture s Ms(e) z Ns(e)  Mz(e)

Computing the length of replacement paths Given SG(s) and SG(z), in O(1) time we can compute the length of a shortest path between s and z passing through f and avoiding e as follows: k(f):= dG-e(s,x) + r(f) + dG-e(y,z) dG(s,x) given by SG(s) dG(y,z) given by SG(z)

A corresponding algorithm Step 1: Compute SG(s) and SG(z) Step 2: e PG(s,z) check all the crossing edges in Cs(e), and take the minimum w.r.t. the key k. Time complexity Step 1: O(m + n log n) time Step 2: O(m) crossing edges for each of the O(n) edges on PG(s,z): since in O(1) we can establish whether an edge of G is currently a crossing edge (can you guess how?), Step 2 costs O(mn) time Overall complexity: O(mn) time  Improves on O(mn + n2 log n) if m=o(n log n)

A more efficient solution: the Malik, Mittal and Gupta algorithm (1989) MMG have solved in O(m + n log n) time the following related problem: given a SP PG(s,z), what is its most vital edge, namely an edge whose removal induces the worst (i.e., longest) best replacement path between s and z? Their approach computes efficiently all the best replacement paths between s and z… …but this is exactly what we are looking for in our VCG-mechanism!

The MMG algorithm at work The basic idea of the algorithm is that when an edge e on PG(s,z) is considered, then we have a priority queue H containing the set of nodes in Ns(e); with each node yH, it remains associated a key k(y) and a corresponding crossing edge, defined as follows: k(y) = min {dG(s,x)+r(x,y)+dG(y,z)}  k(y) is the length of a SP in G-e from s to z passing through the node y, and so the minimum key is associated with a best replacement shortest-path for e (x,y)E, xMs(e)

The MMG algorithm at work (2) Initially, H =V, and k(y)=+ for each yV Let PG(s,z) = {e1, e2,…, eq}, and consider these edges one after the other. When edge ei is considered, modify H as follows: Remove from H all the nodes in Ws(ei)=Ns(ei-1)\Ns(ei) (for i=1, set Ns(ei-1)=V) Consider all the edges (x,y) s.t. xWs(ei) and yH, and compute k’(y)=dG(s,x)+r(x,y)+dG(y,z). If k’(y)<k(y), decrease k(y) to k’(y), and update the corresponding crossing edge to (x,y) Then, find the minimum in H w.r.t. k, which returns the length of a best replacement path for ei (i.e., dG-ei(s,z)), along with the selected crossing edge

An example s Ws(e1) e1 e2 e3 Ns(e1) e4 e5 z

An example (2) Ws(e2) Ns(e2) s e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 z Here we may have a decrease_key e4 Ns(e2) e5 z

Time complexity of MMG Theorem: Given a shortest path between two nodes s and z in a graph G with n vertices and m edges, all the best replacement paths between s and z can be computed in O(m + n log n) time.

Time complexity of MMG O(m + n log n) total time Proof: Compute SG(s) and SG(z) in O(m + n log n) time. Then, use a Fibonacci heap to maintain H (observe that Ws(ei) can be computed in O(|Ws(ei)|) time), on which the following operations are executed: A single make_heap n insert q=O(n) find_min O(n) delete O(m) decrease_key In a Fibonacci heap, the amortized cost of a delete is O(log n), the amortized cost of a decrease_key is O(1), while insert, find_min, and make_heap cost O(1), so O(m + n log n) total time

Plugging-in the MMG algorithm into the VCG-mechanism Corollary There exists a VCG-mechanism for the private-edge SP problem running in O(m + n log n) time. Proof. Running time for the mechanism’s algorithm: O(m + n log n) (Dijkstra). Running time for computing the payments: O(m + n log n), by applying MMG to compute all the distances dG-e(s,z).

That’s all folks! Thanks for your attention and be ready for the examination!!