Personnel Safety Systems

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Presentation transcript:

Personnel Safety Systems Bryce Karnaghan

Background My history Beamline PSS 25 Years in control systems Most experience on water, power and rail Leaning about synchrotrons Beamline PSS Via booster and storage ring PSS

Requirements of a PSS Protect personnel Other requirements Safety Integrity Level 3 No single point of failure Fail-safe Other requirements Separate system from controls and instrumentation system (EPICS) Be able to transfer data to EPICS Control personnel access when radiation hazards exist Allow mtce access when radiation hazards removed

Meeting the requirements Equipment Uses safety rated PLC/relay system from Pilz

Meeting the requirements (cont) Equipment (cont) An intercom and video surveillance system at access points Controlled access gates Captive permit key Blue lights in vaults when no access is not allowed Illuminated signs, at appropriate locations within the facility Emergency Stop buttons throughout the vaults Ability to crash out of an access gate Safety switches on doors as interlocks

Meeting the requirements (cont) Three operation modes Open Access Mode: Allows unlimited and open entry to authorised personnel. Both the radiation and electrical hazards are interlocked to be off.

Meeting the requirements (cont) Three operation modes (cont) Authorised Access Mode: Allows limited and controlled entry to authorised personnel through controlled doors only. The radiation hazards are interlocked to be off. Electrical hazards may be on to allow specialised testing. This access mode allows for the search / secure procedure of each zone and for limited / controlled procedural access. In both cases access is allowed only to authorised personnel following a strict protocol.

Meeting the requirements (cont) Three operation modes (cont) No Access Mode: Allows operation of the beam in the Linac Booster Area (zones 1, 2 and 3) and/or into the Storage Ring (zones 4, 5 and 6). Radiation and electrical hazards exist and no personnel are allowed in the zone. Must complete search before entering this mode

Implementation External contract Installed by Sage Automation in partnership with Pilz and Nielsen. Meeting all requirements

Implementation (cont) Equipment Pilz safety rated PLC/relay system

Implementation (cont) Equipment (cont) Triple redundant CPUs Safety bus Inputs and outputs are dual channel Certified software

Implementation (cont) Equipment (cont) Control desk located in the control room Video feed from labyrinth doors Intercoms to labyrinth doors Master Reset PMI (HMI) located in control desk

Implementation (cont) Equipment (cont)

Implementation (cont) PMI

Implementation (cont) PMI (cont)

Progress Linac, Booster, Storage Ring Type testing of major systems (FAT) Final functional requirements definition Physical installation commence May

Beamline PSS Storage ring PSS provides a failsafe contact indicating shutters can be opened Beamline PSS's will be standalone systems Will provide personnel safety in the Beamline hutch Will utilise the search method for securing Will be responsible for opening the shutters Use Pilz safety rated equipment Will be coded in house