Recruitment: Formal versus Informal? Broad versus Narrow?

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Recruitment: Formal versus Informal? Broad versus Narrow? Chapter Fourteen Recruitment: Formal versus Informal? Broad versus Narrow? Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics Copyright © 2018 Oxford University Press

Figures and Tables Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics Copyright © 2018 Oxford University Press

FIGURE 14.1 Expected Quality of the Best Applicant and Screening Costs as a Function of Sample Size Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics Copyright © 2018 Oxford University Press

FIGURE 14.2 Output as a Function of Ability in Jobs with High versus Low Skill Requirements When Ability Matters More in Skilled Jobs Peter Kuhn, Personnel Economics Copyright © 2018 Oxford University Press

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