Getting What You Pay For

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Presentation transcript:

Getting What You Pay For Dime Store Deterrence Getting What You Pay For Evan M. Thompson Research Associate, CBRN Octant Associates, LLC ethompson@octantassociates.com

Costing Nuclear Modernization Investment Over Next 30 Years Ohio Class SSBN Replacement ($102 billion) ICBM Follow-On ($20-120 billion) Long Range Strike Bomber ($100 billion) Nuclear Air-Launched Cruise Missile (LRSO) ($20 billion) B61 Gravity Bomb Life Extension ($13 billion) O&M for next 30 years Current Triad, C&C, NNSA Activities ($727 billion) Total: ~$1.082 trillion

DoD Strategic Nuke Funding: Constant Dollars Funding far below historical levels Only 5% of spending at peak bow wave Investment Average (FYDP) = $5.7B Recapitalization Total Funding (Billions of FY12$) New NAOC New ICBM New cruise missile New SLBM? Investment New Bomber New SSBN Operations & Support SSBN = ballistic missile submarine; NAOC = National Airborne Operations Center; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile; New ICBM, New NAOC, and New SLBM are unfunded

Ohio Replacement Smaller enemy target set Less range coverage How to Cut Costs? The Cost of Cutting Costs? Cut procurement to 8 submarines Estimated savings of $16 billion over 10 years (16% savings) Cut procurement to 10 submarines Estimated savings of $17 billion in 2030s (16% savings) Phase out oldest SSBNs early Estimated savings of $37 billion (36% savings) Smaller enemy target set Less range coverage Smaller fleet taxes individual boats Early phase out would strain fleet in the interim- generate increased risk

ICBM Follow-ON How to Cut Costs? The Cost of Cutting Costs? Delay development by 5 years Estimated savings of $20.6 billion over 20 years (17% saving) Delay development and cut force size by 150 missiles Estimated savings of $31 billion over 20 years (26% saving) Refurbish existing ICBMS Estimated savings of $16 billion over 20 years (13% saving) Cut ICBM leg Estimated savings of $120 billion over 20 years (100% saving+O&M costs) Delays would put considerable strain on a platform that is already aging and approaching end of life Cutting force size would reduce the survivability of arsenal- fewer targets Weakens the most stable leg of triad Making cuts in the leanest, most affordable leg of the triad

Long-Range Strike Bomber How to Cut Costs? The Cost of Cutting Costs? Delay production for 10 years Estimated cost savings of $32 billion (32% saving) Continued reliance on aging systems with limited capabilities Will not be able to penetrate sophisticated air defenses without a modern bomber force Delay in development would result in a delay in much-needed conventional capabilities as well- hampers power projection Delay may create higher costs in long- term

Long Range Standoff How to Cut Costs? The Cost of Cutting Costs? Cancel the LRSO development Estimated savings of $20 billion (100% savings) Loss of standoff capability as current ALCM ages out Sacrificing B-52 nuclear capability Necessitates greater risk for B-2 or LRS-B as vulnerability to sophisticated air defense increases

B61 Life Extension How to Cut Costs? The Cost of Cutting Costs? Scale back B61 life extension by removing consolidation and avoid replacing non-essential non-nuclear components Estimated cost savings of $4 billion (20% saving) Forced reliance on an aging delivery system Sacrificing the dual-capability of aircraft and flight crews and the F-35 dual capability Attrition of national lab capability as they are required to perform a smaller role in modernization Demonstrates an apparent lack of commitment to modernization that weakens assurance to allies

Total Costs of cutting Nuclear modernization Sacrificing survivability and effectiveness of nuclear arsenal- a weakened deterrent and the appearance of it! Many suggestions for cost saving involve costly delays and smaller numbers Many suggestions for cost saving involve accepting deteriorating capabilities Losing comparative advantage against adversaries with growing arsenals and capabilities- nuclear and conventional! Attrition of skills and knowledge pool in warhead development and maintenance Marginal savings by making suggested cuts At its peak, nuclear modernization will only account for 5% of budget As long as we maintain an arsenal the costs will have to come eventually and delays will make it cost more Creates the perception of a lack of commitment to the nuclear mission, waning trust in the nuclear umbrella, and creates incentive for nuclear development in allies

Where to cut Defense Instead? DOD Infrastructure $800 billion in facilities worldwide- time to BRAC! Costs rising for maintaining and upgrading infrastructure Army facility capacity is 18% greater than needed Air Force facility capacity is 30% greater than needed MilPers Highest costs and rising Rising real healthcare costs Rising general healthcare costs Expanded coverage in procedures Shrinking premiums Higher than inflation pay raises