CARTEL CASE INITIATION FISCALÍA NACIONAL ECONÓMICA PANAMA, OCTOBER, 2012

INITIATION OF CARTEL INVESTIGATIONS Most FNE cartel investigations have been initiated ex oficio or following a complaint and not following a leniency application. Because of challenges in applying the leniency program, the Anti-Cartel Unit has had to gather information on its own in order to request judicial authorization to perform dawn raids or intercept communications. The FNE’s focus has been on market screening, which has been used to identify markets prone to collusive behavior (structural screening) and to study behavior that is not consistent with competitive behavior (conduct screening). The following example from the pharmacies cartel case (in which the Supreme Court recently sanctioned the participants) shows a simultaneous change in prices: COMPETITION POLICY IN CHILE | FISCALÍA NACIONAL ECONÓMICA

INITIATION OF CARTEL INVESTIGATIONS During the investigation of the poultry cartel, the FNE observed stability of market shares, which was compared to cost information and prices. COMPETITION POLICY IN CHILE | FISCALÍA NACIONAL ECONÓMICA

INITIATION OF CARTEL INVESTIGATIONS In terms of proactive methods of initiating a cartel investigation: What percentage of cartel investigations is not originated in leniency applications? How many come from market screening or other proactive methods? Are the leniency applications determining what kind of cartel cases the agency investigates (i.e. international cartels v. local cartels)? Are the leniency applications determining what markets are investigated? What difficulties do you identify with initiating cartel investigations without leniency applications in terms of teams, resources, location of information, need for an “intelligence unit” and effectiveness. COMPETITION POLICY IN CHILE | FISCALÍA NACIONAL ECONÓMICA

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